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A.

INTRODUCTION

In 1543, the Polish astronomer, Nicolas Copernicus, determined
the heliocentric design of the solar system. 1 Copernicus was motivated
in large part by the conviction that Claudius Ptolemy's geocentric
astronomical model, which dominated scientific thought at that time,
was too incoherent , complex, and convoluted to be true. 2 Hence,
Copernicus made a point of making his model coherent. simple, and
elegant. Nearly three and a half centuries later, at the height of the
impressionist movement , the French painter Claude Monet set out to
depict the Ruen Cathedral in a series of twenty paintings,' each presenting lhe cathedral in a different light. Mone t's goal was to
demonstrate how his object of study may be perceived by observers
differently depending on the circumstances of the observation. In the
spirit of these two projects, in 1972, Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed resolved to craft a comprehensive , yet e legant,~ model for
l. See JACOB BRONOWSKI & BRUCE MAZLISH. Til [ WEST ERN INTELLECTUAL
TRADITION 113 (1960). For the purpose of historic accuracy. it is important to note that 1543
was th e ye a r in which Copernicus published his REVOLUTIO NS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES.
It is highly likely that Copernicus completed his account we ll before 1543, but was afraid that
his views would offend the religious establishment of his time . Thus. Copernicus delayed the
publication of his book until 1543, the year of his death. and rumor has it that he died holding the first printed copy of the book in his hands. I d.

2. Jd. at 112-15.
3. See KARIN SAGNER-DUCHTING. CLAUDE MONET, 1840-1926. at 172-73 (1998).

4. See Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Vinues of rhe Carhedral , 106 YALE L.J.
220 1. 2202 (1997) [he reinafter Calabresi. Remarks] (stating that the Calabre si-Melamedian
lra mc work was inte nded to be simple and elegant): Saul Levmore . UniJ:ving Re111edies:
Properly Rules, Liabilitv Rules, and Starrling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 21 49. 2155 (1997) (comme nding Calabresi and M e la m e d for the elegance of their mod e l).
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o rga ni zin g th e uni verse of lega l e ntitleme nts.' Th e a rticl e's impact has
bee n profound a nd enduring. 6
In their path-brea king article, Property Rules. Liubiliry Rules. and
Jnolienobiliry: One View of th e Cothedml/ Ca labres i a nd Melam ed es tablishe d a new way of conceptualizing legal ri ghts an d duti es. Departing from tr aditional jurisprudentia l notion s. Ca labresi a nd
M e lamed introdu ced the concepts of "property rul es" and '·li abi lity
rul es" as the ord e ring principles of the legal system . a nd then an zd yze cl
th eir virtues and vices as m ea ns of protecting legal e ntit le ments. Propert y rul e protect io n forces po te ntial tak ers to se cure the co nse nt of th e
e ntitl em e nt own e r, a nd thus a llows the ow ner to d ete rmine th e pr ice
of her e ntitlem e nt . Liability rule protecti on, by con trast. a llows p o te ntial takers w av a il th e mselves of o ther peo ple's entitl e me nts as lon g as
they are willing to pay a colle ctively de te rmine d p rice that is us ua lly
se t by a co urt , a legislator, or an administr a tive agen cy . ~
H avi ng introd uced the distinction betwe e n prupe rty rules and liability rules, Calabresi and M e lamed ve ntured to ex plain how th ese
rules sho uld be employed to promote economic efficie ncy. Th ei r n ormati ve insight was that property rules should be fa vored over liability

5. G uido Calabres i & A. Douglas M e lamed, Prope rty Rules, l.iubilitv Rules, un d !n alienubilily: One Vi ew of rile C111hedral, 85 HARV. L. R EV . 1089 (1'c!72). Fo ll o wing con ven ti o n.
we will ca ll the a rti cle Tile Cmiledral.
6 . Virtu a lly a ll citat io n s tudi es list Calab resi a nd Me la m ed's a rticle as o ne o f th e top
thi rty most-cited articl es. See. e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The M os1- Ci1ed L.mv Review Ar1icles . 73
C\L. L. R EV . 1540 ( 1985) : Fred R. Shapiro , The J'v!os1- Ci1ed L(l\ v R evie1v Arric/es Revis i1ed.
71 C H!. -KENT L. RE V. 751 (1 996). Accord ing to Shapiro' s citation st udies, The Carh edml
rank ed twe nty-second in l'c!85 . and clim bed up to numbe r e leven in 1996. A different study
b y Kr ie r a nd Sc h wab ra nk s The Carh edra! as th e fourt ee nth m os t cited ar ticle . S ee Jame s E.
K ri e r & Stewart J . Schwab. Tile Cachedral a r T wenry Five: Cirmions and l111pressio m. 106
YALE L.J. 2121. 2140 (1997) [he re inafte r Krier & Schwab, Ciw rio ns and !111 p ressions ].
It bea rs e mpha sis. howe ver. th a t no citation study ca n ca pture th e full impact of The
Carli edro l. In our experie nce. very few scholarly works ha ve affect e d le ga l thought as did
Til e C(l{hedra/. Our impress io n is consiste nt with th e findings of Kri e r and Sc hwab. who repo rt th a t "Calabres i a nd Me lam e d 's co ntri b ution to th e lite rature has had a significa nt a nd
o ngo ing. eve n in c reasing. influ e nce.·· !d. a t 2 130. They . too, not e th at "evide nce o f th e im porta nce of th e ir work is fo und in th e m a ny anthol og ies, case books. a nd tex tbooks th a t reprodu ce [th e workJ in who le or in part o r o therwis e disc uss or refe r to ir.·· !d. Furth er m o re .
th e fr a m e work devi se d by Calabres i a nd M e lamed is taug ht and di sc usse d in prope rt y a nd
tort law classes . and is o ft e n extend ed to o ther lega l fie lds. S ee Lev m ore. supra note 4. a t
2 151 (no ting that ··some o f th e valu e of the Calabresi-Me lamed fram e work li es in its abil ity
to illumina te fi e lds o utside of traditi ona l property a nd to rt law" ): accord Krier & Sc h wa b.
Cillllions and Impressions. supra a t 2130 (noting th a t "Ca lab resi and M e la m e d 's articl e fi gur-es reg ul a rl y in books o n subjects lik e Pro perty, Torts, a nd Co ntr acts.').
7. 85 HARV. L. R EV.l089 (1972).
ll. In pr in ciple. the price of th e use may be dete rmin ed by a n v third party . F or e xa m ple .
two pa rti es may co ntractu a ll y ag ree to acce pt a n y price X wo uld se t fo r the e ntitlem e nt. Th e
de te rmina ti o n may occ ur e ither ex a nte. be fo re th e tak in g occurs. o r e x post. foll owing the
takin g.
As the title of th eir a rticle suggests . Ca labrcsi and M e lamed al so di sc ussed a third type
of p ro tec ti o n: inali e nability rules. An e ntitl e ment protecte d by an in a li e na bility ru le ca nn o t
be transfe rre d at an y pr ice.
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rul es wh e n tran sacti on costs are lo w, a nd p art ies ca n cos t-effec tivel y
bargain with on e another. W he n. o n th e o th er hand , tran sacti o n costs
are high, and vo lunt ary ba rga ini ng cannot b e expecte d , li ab ilit y r ule s
s ho uld be e mployed .
In th e vas t lite rature th at fo ll owe d,~ co mm entators h ave atte mpted
to refine. revamp , and . at t imes. cha ll e nge th e Cal ab resi-Melame clian
an a lys is. In particu la r. att e mpts have bee n made to di s tinguish betw ee n vari o us types of tran saction costs. a nd then exa min e which typ e
of rules is bette r s ui te d to combat e ac h particular cost. Ye t. th e a n<l lyti ca i structure dev ised by C alabres i an d M e la med , and in particulcH.
the found a tion al di stinction be twee n pro perty and liability rul es, ha s
bee n acc e pted by virtua ll y a ll the comme ntato rs - support ers and
criti cs alik e . The Calabresi -Me lam cclian typology h as been wid e ly un d e rsto o d to ex h a ust al l possible ways of prot ectin g legal en titl eme nt ~ .
and the binary sys te m the y devise d h as dominated legal thou g ht an d
sc ho larship . A lmost thirt y ye a rs afte r its publication, Th e Cathedral is
expe rien cing a ren a issance as increasing numb ers of preeminent
sc ho lars flock to ree va lu ate a nd in1 prove upo n Calabr es i a nd
M e la med 's class ic. 10 T his Article s hare s the same ambition .
We contend that , while the Ca lab resi-Me lamecli an fr a m e work pre sents a solid b as is fo r und e rsta ndin g legal entitlements, 11 a more co m 9. Sa. e.g .. Ian Ay re s & Paul iv!. Goldb a n. Op1imul D elegmion and D eco up ling in !lze
D esign of Liahilirv l<ules. [()()MICH. L. R EV. 1 (2001): Rich a rd Craswe ll, Prope rty Rules an d
L iohi!it\' Rult's in Uncons ciona bi!irv and Rela!t'd Dou rines, 60 U. CHI. L. RE V. l ( 199:>):
R obe rt C. El li ckson. ;\ilemuli,·es 1o Zo ning: Co venun1s. Nuisa nce Rules, and Fin es us Lan d
Us !:' Co ntrols. 4(1 U. CHI. L. REV. 68 1 (197 3 ): W ard Farnsworth . Do Par1ies w Nuisnnc c
Cases /Jurgain i \jier .ludgntenf? ; \ Glimpse Inside 1he Ccah edral, 66 U . CI !I. L. R EV . 373
( 1999) : Z o har Gosh en . Co111rolling S nmcgic Vu1 ing: Properly Rule o r Liubili1y R ule ?. 70 S.
C AL. L. R EV . 74 1 (1997) : Lo u is Kapl o w & Ste ven ShavelL Propeny Rules V ersu s l.ia hilit\'
Ru les: An Econ o mic 1\ nalvsis . l09 I-I ARV. L. RE V. 7 13 ( 1996) : Daphna Lewinso hn- Za mir.
Tlt e Ch oice Bel\l·eett Prop en v Rules and LiaiJilily Rules R evisi1ed: Crilica l Observmions fi-mn
B ei111vio rul Sw dies , ~() TEX AS L. R EV. 21 ') (20Cll ): Ro bert P. Merges. Col/[raCiing inru Liabilit\' l?ules: lnrel/ec[/{a/ Propertv Rig /us und ColleCiive Rig /us Organizmio n s. 84 CA L. L.
R EV . 1293 (1996): Tho ma s W. M e rrill & H e nry E. Smith. What H appened w Propcrl\' in
Lcn v an d Eco n o mics ?. 111 YA LE L..f. 357 (20lH) : D a le A. N a nce , G uidan ce Rules Ufl{ / En j(Jrccntenl /(u /cs: A Be11er Vie1 v of 1/te C{l[/t edral . S3 VA. L. RE V . 837 (1997): A. Mitchell
Po linsky. R eso lving Nu isance Dispu1es: Th e Si111ple Econ o mics of fnju nCiive and Damage
R emedies . 32 STAN. L. R EV . 1075 ( 1980 ): Susan Rose-Acke rm an, lnali enabili1y i/1/{ 1 1/t e
Th eo ry of Propeny Rig/us. SS COL UM. L. R EV . 931 (1985): Sy mposium . P ropertv Rules, f.i .
ah ilil_\' Rules and l na!icnahi!itv: A T 1venty-Five Yea r Re1rospee1ive. 106 Y ALE L.J. 208 1
( l 997). This li st is inte nd ed to be illustrati ve : it is fa r fr om being ex haust ive . W e disc uss
man y ot her a rt icles in the te xt and in s ubse qu e nt footnotes.

10. See so urces c ited supru not e 9.
ll. A br ie f cavea t is in o rd e r he re. It is very possib le that Ca la bres i and M e lam e d
no tice d ot he r ways to p ro tec t lega l e nt itlem e n ts. but d ecid e d. for the sak e of simplic ity and
elegance . to di sc uss o nl y p ro pe rty. li ab ility. and inali e nability ru les in th e ir ce le b rat ed ar ticle .
A s Ca labres i illumi na te d in a recent symp os ium th at mark e d the twe nty-fifth a nnive rsa ry o f
Th e Cmh edra/. c ru c ia l d is tin c ti o ns a nd nu ances "we re left o ut beca use I fwd to ma ke [the
arti c le ] simple so th at people would unde rs ta nd ir.·· Calabr esi. R e111urk.1·. supra n o te 4. a t
2202 . It is safe to asse rt. howeve r. tha t Tlu: Ciuhedrul does n o t discu ss. or eve n m e nti o n. p lia bilit y ru les a nd th e im portant func tio ns they se rve in the lega l sys te m.
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plcte analysis must probe bcvond the ostensible dichotomy between
property and liability rules. We seck to add another level to Cabbresi
and Melamed·s analysis , to ca pture fully the protection of entitlernents
in our legal system.
By looking at their cathedral frozen in a moment in time- as in a
single one or l'vionet"s paintings - Calabresi and Melamed have
overlooked t he importance ol examining the cathedral over the couc;c
of time , as did l\tlonet's series. More concretely, by focusing th e ir attention on swric property and liability rules, Calabresi and M eLtnl ,~d
have obscured th e possibility ol protecting legal entitlements by mcctn~'
of dynamic rules that we ca ll ··pliability rules. '.12
Pliability. or pliable. rules arc contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with prupe rty rul e or liability rule protection as long as
some specified condition obtains: however, once the re levant comlition changes, a different rule rlrotects the entitlement- either liability
or property. as the circumstances dictate. Pliability rules. in other
words, are dynamic rules , while property and liability rules are static.
This can be seen by revisiting the famous case of Boomer v. Ar!unric
Cement Co. 1' In Boomer, homeowners near a manufacturing plant of
Atlantic Cement complained that the plant's pollution gave rise to an
actionable nuisance , and they sought an injunction that would close
clown the plant. The court, however, decided to permit the plant to
continue operations, subject to its payment of permanent damages to
the homeowners. Calabresi and Melamed viewed the case as presenting a choice between enforcing property rule protection, as the home owners demanded, or liability rule protection, as the court eventually
ruled. Calabresi and Melamed believed these to be the two basic uptions1.j because they -like the theorists that followed them- focused
on discrete moments of legal protection in isolation. In reality. though.
the court cou ld have chosen a pliability rule. For example, the court
might have allowed Atlantic Cement to pay damages and continue
operating for five years to avoid immediate and massive layoffs at the
plant, but also decree that at the end of the five years, the injunction
would become absolute to enable homeowners' quiet and clean use or
their realty. 1:i This pliable rule- a five-year liability rule, followed by

12. The term ··pli:1bility rule·· owes its origin to Peter Siegelman, who suggested it in :1
conversation with one of the authors.
13. 257N.E.2d870(N.Y.1971J) .

14. Calabresi and M e lamed allowed for four options: property rule protection in the
hands of either the homeowner or plant. and liability rule protection for either the homeowner or plant.
15. As we discuss latcr, pliability rules can come in many forms. and mav involve anv
number of ditlerent combinations of property and liability rul e s. See infi-a Part II.
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indefinit e pro pe rty rul e pro tecti on -wo uld pe rmit the co urt to combin e th e features of lia bility and property rul es over th e course o[
tim e .
Whil e th e te rm "p li ab ility rul e'' is o ri gin a l. thi s mod e o f lega l e n titl e ment has long exi sted in o ur legal sys tem. The lega l p ro tectio n of
sh are owne rship in me rg ers is a class ic ex am p le ul a positive pliability
rul e . Con sider the case of a co rpo rat e takeove r s ucceed ed b y a free zeout. Th e mino rity shareholders ca n either acce pt th e price offere d by
th e acquire r or exercise th e ir appra isa l ri ght. in whi ch case a court will
d ete rmin e th e a ppropriat e co m pe nsati o n. [n '.:: ith er ca se. the minority
share ho ld e rs lose th e ab ility to refuse to pa rt wi th th e ir shares. In
othe r words . the ir initial property rule protec tion ch <tnges in to a
liability rule. f\ s in o ther li ab ili ty rule s. t he pr ice th ey w ill receive is
no t det er min e d by th e m: it is set by a thir d pa rty.
Lik e wise. a real pro pe rt y own e r m ay lose her p roperty right if sh e
a llows adve rse possessors to tak e hold o f he r la nd a ncl usc it ope nly for
a statutoriiy specified p er io d. The pro perty rul e protection of the
landown e r is co nditi o nal since it depe nds o n he r vigil a nce in safegu ardin g her lan d against potenti a l tak ers. F a ilure to perform this duty
erases th e original protection o f th e land a nd transfers it to the
adve rs e possessor. Adverse possession thus cre ates a " title shifting pliability rul e," th a t is , a combinati o n of property rul es in which th e tri gge rin g of a condition transfers property rule protection from th e origi nal e ntitle ment hold e r to ano th er.
A nothe r pervasive kind o f pliability rule in th e lmv is " th e zero ord er pliability rul e .'' In fa ct, ze ro ord er pliability rul es are the organizin g principle of much of our inte ll ectu al propert y law. In zero order
pliability rules, p ro perty rul e protec ti o n is succeeded by a no li a bility
rule. Specific all y, up on a tri gge ring event, the initial entitlement
ho lder loses the ability to exercise property rul e protection, such as
th e right to exclude , over he r prope rty. Instead th e e ntitl e ment hold er
must all ow all comers to use th e prope rt y fr ee o f ch a rge - that is, with
ze ro orde r liability. Importa ntly. the s ubje ct item has not bee n abando ned . No twith standing the ze ro ord e r liability , no third party m ay
gai n a supe rior right to th a t o f th e o rig in al ent itleme nt ho lder. Rathe r,
zero orde r pli ab ility rules creat e anti- e xclu sion, or ope n access re gi mes. Consider, for example , a pate nt. A patent confers up o n th e
pate ntee property rul e protection for tw e nty years , but, upon th e expirat ion of that te rm , the nat ure of protection chan ges from a property
ru le to a ze ro ord er lia bility rul e since she ca n no longer re fu se o th ers
th e right to use her patent. 1°Copyright law provides a similar example.
16. T o be sure . it is poss ible to think of o ther ways of c hara cterizin g pate nt protec ti on.
F o r in sta nce. it is poss ible to view it as a p ro pert y ru k limite d in tim e . A lt e rn a ti ve ly. it is
poss ible to class ify pa te nt p ro tecti o n as a p ro perty rule pr otec tion to the pate ntee fo llowe d
hv a prope rty ru le protection to th e user. We do no t di spute that bo th of these alte rn at ive
c harac teri za tio ns are plausible. Both . however. ob fu sca te th e poss ib ili ty o f v iew in g pate nt
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These examples, and others. show the attracti veness of pliability
rules. Pliability rules combine two separa te rul es; with the passage between the two stag es of rule protection triggered by a preset condition.
Owing to th eir a mal gama ted nature. pliability rul es are capable of
comb ining the respective st rengths of pro perty an d li abi lity rules while
av oidin g their respective \vea kn esses . P liability rules allow decisionmakers to avoid th e all-or-nothing deci sion of crea tin g property rule
o r liability rul e protection. in ste ad. d ec isionm<lk e rs may b uild tlexibility int o the rule , setting conditions th a t switch from a stron ger to a
weaker p rot ection of e ntitlem e nt s (or vi ce versa) when eco nomi c effic iency or fairn ess co ns ide ration s so requir e . A s a result, pliability rul es
present dec ision makers with a wick arr a y of optio ns tha t arc u nava ilab le to them in th e Calabresi- iVkLtnll..::dian bipolar world o f property
a nd li ab ility rule s.
This Article has thr ee goa ls: the fir st conce p tual, the second d escriptive, and the las t normative. Conce ptually, we demonstrate tha t
pl iabilit y rules fa ll in a distinct category of rule protection , and that
the y must be recognized a longs id e their more fa miliar co unterp a rtsproperty and liability rules. D escriptive ly, we show th at, a lthough this
fact m ay have e luded Calabres i and Me lam ed ,17 pliability rul es are
widely used in o ur legal sys tem. Furthermore, we devise a typology of
pliability rules to illuminate th e myriad options the use of such rules
presents to policy mak ers . Normat ive ly, we argue that in man y cases
p liability rul es can promote econo mic effic iency, and fairness, better
than ei ther property rules or li ab ility rules. Th e two main legal fie lds
we use to substantiate th ese claims are property and int e llectu a l property, but we also show that pliability rules are p rese nt in other legal
areas, s uch as antitrust and cor po rate law.

protection as a continuum starting with prope rty rule protecti o n. whi ch e ndures for twenty
ve a rs. and then shifts into a ze ro o rder liability rul e . Th inkin g of patent prote ction as a " zero
order p li a bi lity rule" is helpfu l as it sen s itizes o ne to the poss ibility of '·positi ve p li abili ty
rules," i. e .. pliability rules whi c h set th e liabil ity am o unt above ze ro. Furthermore, it is im por tant to recall that patent and copyri g h t differ fm m traditio nal property rights beca use
th e y are lim ited in time: sta ndard prope rty right s. Lln th e oth e r hand , ma y e xist in pe rpe tuit y.
Th us, it is use ful to di stin gu ish the theore ti cal c ha ra c te rization o f th e protec tion accorded by
the Patent and Copy right Acts from that accord e d to regul ar property e ntitl ements. For
these re aso ns, we propose th at patent and copyright p rotecti on should be thought of as zero
order pliability rule s.
Th e ide a of e qu a ti ng no-liability wit h ze ro-liability prote ctio n draws o n a famou s insight
of Ian Ayres and Robert G e rtner. wh o , in c hara cteriz ing U. C. C. § 2 -20 l. provided that a
co ntra ct fa iling to specify quantity is e nforceable a s a '·zero -qua ntity d e fault.'' Th e y justify
the " ze ro -quant it y d e fault" b y noting '·it is cheape r for th e parti e s to e s tabli sh th e qua ntit y
te rm be for e hand t ha n for th e co urt s to d ete rm ine afte r the fact what th e pa rties wou ld ha ve
wanted. " Ian Ayres & Ro bert G e rtn e r. Filling Gaps in !ncomplele Con/racts: An Economic
Theorv of Defaull Rules , 99 YALE L..f. 87 , 96 (1989).
17. See Levm o re . supra not e 4. a t 2 157 (n o t in g that beca use Ca labr es i and M e lamed
sough t e le ga nce as opposed to compre he ns iven ess . it wou ld be wro ng to d escribe them as
hav in g '·missed " re m e dies not e xp licit ly di scussed in thei r arti c le ) .
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Structurally , t he A rticle consists of three parts. In Part L we re view
Ca la bresi and Me lam ed's seminal article, as we ll as its pre d ecessors
and progeny. In P art IL we present th e concept of pliability rul es. We
id entify th e m any areas of law in which p lia bility rul es are already in
us e, a nd discuss how the use of pliability rul es serves to p ro m o te efficie nc y and fairness . A mong the in sta nces of pl ia bi li ty ru le protection
we discuss a re those used in e minen t d oma in . co pyrigh t. a n titrust. and
cor porat e law, as well as th e doctrine of adve rse possession. finally, in
Part III , we draw on th e an a lys is in Part II to suggest how pol icymak ers may usc pliability rules in the futur e to enh a nce suciai ut ility. H ere,
we show how a pl iab ility a na lysis can reshape key doc trin e:; of p roperty a nd inte ll ectua l property la w. We then ven tur e t:: ven furth e r and
demonst rate how the use of pl iabili ty rul es can be usec.l lO overco m e
ant ieommo ns problems th at plague the integr ity ot suc h vu lnerab le soci a l units as Nat ive A m erican tribe s and rural A friccm-Am c rican
communiti es. We conclude by disc uss ing th e potent ia l of a p li ab ilit y
an alysis to revolutioni ze th e doctrine of e min e nt dom a in.
I.

TH E E VOLUTION OF ENTITLEM ENT TH EO RY

A.

Coase and the Problem of Socio! Cost

To full y appreciate th e contribution of Calabres i an d Me lam e d, it
is necessa ry to begin with Ronald Coase 's seminal article The Pro blem
of Social Cos t. 1 ~ Importantly, Coase was not interested in the assignme nt of lega l e ntitle me nts pe r se , but ra th er in th e pro ble m of externali ties - the cos ts a nd benefits of one's activity on thir d parti es th at
are not cap tured by th e price syste m. T he paradigma tic manifesta tion
of the externalities problem that co ncerned Coase a nd hi s conte mpo ra ri es was industrial pollution. 19 Co ase 's prim ary aim was to challenge
th e Pigouvian theory that government interve ntion in the form of
taxati on was necessary to r e medy the proble m of social cost. Spe cifically, Pigou had proposed that th e governm e n t le vy a tax on po lluters
in th e amount of the social h arm they ca use in ord er to force th em to
consider this cos t in th e ir production d ecisio ns.20 By contras t to P igo u,
and the other theori sts of his time, who fo c used exclusive ly o n the
18 . R ona ld H. Coa se. Th e Prahl em of Social Cost . 3 J. L. & EC ON. l ( l%0).

l9. See He nry E. Smith . Ambiguous Quality Changes .fi·0111 Taxes and Legal Rules. 67 U.
CHI. L. R EV. 647 , 684 n. 87 (2000) (no ting that '"[i]n hi s critiqu e of Pigouvi a n taxes. Coase
propose d th at prope rty ri ghts could in ternalize polluti on ex ternaliti es '"): cf Ca rol M. Rose.
The Slw dmv of rhe Cathedral. l 06 Y 1\ LE L.J . 2175. 2189 ( l 997) [here inafter Rose . ShodoH: of
the Co rlzedml] (noting that Ca labrcsi and Me lamed cited ··a ir po ll ution and noise (including
th e ubiquitou s Boom er) as exa mpl es o f negative ·ex te rnali ties · ··). Fo r a more re ce nt treatmen t of industrial pollu tion using th e Ca lab resi-Me lamecl ia n framework. sec Kaplow &
Sh ave !!. supm note 9. a t 748 -52.
20.

See ARTH UR C. PI GOU . TH E ECON O tvi iCS OF WELI7 ARE l5 9 (2 cl eel. I 925); ARTHUR

C. P! GO U. WEALTH AN D WELFAR E (l9l2 }.
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polluter, C oase observed t hat pollution - as we ll as all other externa lities- ar e reciproc a l in nature. Coase was th e first to notice that ,
in p rinciple. not only th e wrongd oer but also th e victim can e limin ate
th e harm. If p olluti on from a nearby factory preve nts residents from
h a nging their lau ndry o utd oo rs , the harm can be e limin a ted in on e of
two \vays: the factory can inst a ll smokescreens o n its chimneys or the
reside nts can purchase el ectric d ry e rs. 21
Real izing th e reciproca l n a ture or the ex te rn a lities problem e n ab led Coase i.o notice an im porta nt connection be tw ee n co ntracts and
torts. More :-;pccilical ly. it enab le d Coase to sec that p riv a te b a rgainin g
may substitute tor regulatory int e rvention as a m e~ m s of controllin g
socia l ha rm:; . F rum ther e, the Co ase th eorem was very much in si ght,
b ut it to o k another ingenious step to get th e re .
To demonstrak t he flaw in Pigo u's analysis, Coasc conjured up a
fr ic ti o nless \Vorld in vv hi ch transact ing is cost less 22 H e then showed
that, in s uch a wor ld . p ri vate bargaining wo uld a lways yield th e economicall y eflicient o utco me regard less of the initi a l a llocation of lega l
e ntitle ments or li a b ilitiesY C oase recognize d the need for clear de lineation and assignment of legal entitlements as a prerequisite for
bargaining even in his 7.e ro tra nsaction cost world. 24 But once this task
is accomplished, no ot he r legal rules are necessary since private bargaining would override a ny legal norm and result in efficient resource

2 1. See A . i'vi iTC' HEL. L POLI NS KY. AN Il\TR ODUCT ION TO LAW AN D ECONOM ICS l l - 1.:\
(2cl e el. 1909).
22. C( R.H . C OASE. Tfi E F IR,\1. THE MARKET. ,\ ND TH E L\W 174 (198S) (" The " ·or iel
of ze ro tra nsac ti on cos ts h;ls o fte n bee n desc ribed a s a C oas ian wo rld. No thin g co ul d be fu rth e r fro m th e tru th. It is the wo ricl o f mod e rn eco nomi c the o ry, o ne whi ch I was hopin g to
pe rsuade economis ts to leave.").
23. Th is formulation ha s come to be known as th e "strong ve rsio n," or the "invariance
ve rsio n·· of the Coast: Thc o rc: rn. See Tho mas S. Ult:n. Flogg ing a D ead Pig: Professo r Posin
on rh e Couse Th eo re111. 38 W ;\ YNE L. REV. 9J ( 1991 ). A "weaker'' ve rsion of the Coase
Th eo re m maintains th at in a world without transacti on costs th e a ll ocation of entitle m e nt s
would not influenc <e th e tu ta l val ue of o utput. but it mi g ht affect th e use of resources and the
pattern o f o utp ut. Sec R obe n D. Coo te r. The Coase Til eo re111. in T HE NEW PALG RAVE: A
D ICTI Ot'A RY OF E C:Oi\O~· I I CS ( 1987 ). It is de batable whethe r e ith e r vers ion of th e Coase
th eore m ac tu all y ho ld s. Fa mous ly. R obe rt Cooter has pointe d o ut that even in a wo rld with
ze ro tran sac ti o n cos ts. s trat egic ba rga inin g ma y th wa rt effi c ie nt a ll oca ti o n of reso urces . S ee
Robe rt Coote r. Tile Cosr u( Couse . II J. LEG AL ST UD. 1. 23 (1 982). A diffe re nt concern has
bee n ra ised by Clifford H o ld e rn ess. who p ro poses that th e strong ve rs ion on ly holds tru e
wh e n e ntitlemt:nts arc g r:1n tcd to close d groups. but not wh e n th ey a re g iven to open groups
that allow en try. See C lifford G. H o ld e rness. Tile Assignm enr of Rights, Emry Eff'ecrs. and
ril e A llocation ol Resuurc es. IS J. L EGA L STUD. lSl (1989) . Rur see H e nry E. Smith. Tw o
Dimensions of Prope rt y Rights (Mar. 31. 21101) (unpubli shed m a nu sc ript. ci1cd in Merr ill &
Sm ith . .l'llpro note lJ. at 368 n.4:i) (s ugges ting that ''[i]f tran sact ion costs were truly zero.
barga ining could cost lessly c!o:;e <t il classes " ). It shou ld be e m p has ize d that the Coase th eore m do es n o t guarantee efficie ncy in positive tran sac tion cost se ttings. Sec Dic rcl re
McCioskev . Other Filing.' Equal.- Th e So -Called Coase Th eorem. 24 E . ECO N. J. 367 ( 1998) .
2-L Coasc. sup m no te I 8 . at 8 . Rur see Ste ven N .S. C heu ng. The Tran so uion Cosrs Pamdigm. 37 ECON . Ic-JQ. 5 14. 5 1S-20 ( 1998) (qu est ionin g lh e nee d for a we ll -d e fin e d sys te m o r
e n.tit le me nt in a wor ld \\' ith ze ro tr ansac ti o n cos ts) .
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all oc ation . If cl ea n air wer e more va lu ab le th a n th e ac tivit y causing th e
po llution , res ide nts wo uld p ay pl a nt s to shut clown: if th e opposite
w e re true, industrial co mp a nie s wo uld pa y res ident s to r e lo cateY Priva te ord e ring wo uld rul e : lmv cou ld be shunt e d asid e.
T he transitio n to the rea l wor ld . in th e seco nd pa rt of the a rticl e .
t h rus t law back to th e for e . Th e introd ucti o n o f pos itive transa ction
costs for ced C oase to a ddress th e signi fica nce o f lega l rul es , a s we ll as
of t he co urts a dministe ring th e m . O nc e the ass umption o f zero tran sact io n cos ts is a ba nd o ne d. Coasc·s ~1 n a l ys i s . ~1 lt hou g h s till illuminatin g.
loses som e of it s anal ytical ri gor. Coasc's gen e ra l presc ripti o n is that in
a \Vor lcl with p ositi ve tran sac ti on cos ts. courts sho ul d ass ig n pro pe rty'
ri g hts in a m a nn e r tha t m ax im it.cs t he va lu e o r p r o du c ti o n. ~(, ln assessi ng the abilit y of the co urt\ to reac h e tli cie nt o ut com es in pa rticula r cases , C oase re viewed a host or nu isa nce dec isio ns. A lth o ug h he
failed to tr ace a ny eco nomi c th eo rizin g in th e de ci sio ns, anc.l worse, h e
fo und th e re aso nin g e mpl oye d hy t he co urt s o dd and irre leva nLn
C oase co nclude d , some wh a t surpri singly , th a t courts are consci o us o f
th e e con o mic co nsequ e nces o f th e ir d ecisions. Thus, a t th e end o f th e
day, Coase was willing to e ntrust the co urts with th e ch a lle ngin g task
of alloca ting legal entitleme nts efficie ntl y.
C oase, however, did no t pro vid e th e courts with any meaningful
gui da nce as to how to perfo rm this tas k. All he h a d to sa y wa s that ,
inso fa r as this is at all possible . co urts sho uld co nsult e cono mic considera tions in making th eir d ecision s with o ut cre atin g too much uncerta int y about th e lega l position itse lf . .. ." 2 ~ This p ro posa l e xposes an
25 . A n o bvio us p ro ble m with thi s co nclus io n. as \\e ll as with th e Coase th e ore m in ge ne ra l. is th at it ign ores wea lt h effec ts. See Ric ha rd C raswel l. Passing on rh e Cosrs of L egul
Rules: Efficien cy an d Disrrihurion in /Jur a -Sel ler Rl'iurionships. 43 STAN. L. REV. 36 1. 385 I.J l (li.JI.J l ) (no ting that Coase 's mo de l ove rl ooks cog niti ve biases. s uch as wea lth an d fra min g
e ffec ts): se<: also Ian Ay res & J ac k Ga lkin. Legal Enrirle111enrs as Aucrion s: Propeny R ules,
Liah ilirv Rules. and Beyond, 106 Y i\LE L.J. 7U3 . 71 1' n.52 (1 908 ) (ex pla inin g that '· wea lth e ffects a re p rod uced by b ud ge t co ns tra in ts o n o ur a bility to pay"). A lth o ug h res id e n ts affe cted
bv th e po lluti o n m ay va lu e the ri g ht to li ve po lluti on -free m o re hi g hl y th a n th e ac ti vity ge nerat ing th e po llutio n , they ma y no t have su fficient n:: sources to pay the pl a nt s, ca using th e
p roble m to shut dow n. If tra nsactors do not possess s u ffici e nt fund s. assumin g a way tra nsa ctio n cos ts wo uld no t hel p b rin g abo ut e ffi cie n t all oca ti o n of resources. See H e rbe rt
H ove nkamp. Marg in al Uriliry and rlu: Couse Th eo rem, 75 CO RN ELL L. R EV. 783 . 797-808
(1990) (no t in g that we alth e ffec ts arc mo re com m on tha n is so metimes th o ug ht) ; Willi a m M .
La nd es. Copyrigh r, Borrmved Images. and Appropriarion Arr: A n Econ omic A pproach , 9
G EO. MASON L. R EV . 1, 21 (2000) (listing th e a bse nce of tra nsactio n costs a nd we a lth e ffe c ts
a s two preconditi o ns for effecti ve u pe ra tio n o f the Coase th eore m ) . B ut see Rus sell
Ko ro bkin. No te. Policym aking an d rhe Offerl!\ sking Price Cap: To1va rd a Theo ry of Effi cienr Enritlement A llocu tion, 46 STAN . L. R EV . 663, 679-82 (1994) (d isputing Ho ve nk a mp 's
wea lth e ffec t claims) ; cf C hri stin e .l o lls. Ca ss R. Sun stein & Rich ard Thal er, 1\ Beha vio ral
A pproach ro Law and Econ omics. 50 STJ\N. L. R EV. 147 1. 1483 (1998) (o bse rvin g th a t "even
wh e n tran sac tion cos ts and we alth effec ts arc kn own to be zero . ini tia l e nt itle m e nts a lte r th e
fin a l alloc at ion of resources") .
26. See Coase . supra note 18, a t 15-16.

27 See id. at 15.
28. !d. a t 19.
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inherent tension in Coase's analysis. On the one hand. Coase·s article
calls for a clear delimitation of legal rights in order to encourage private bargaining. On the other hand , its reliance on the courts injects a
considerable degree of uncertainty into the legal system as it necessitates extensive use of judicial discretion to promote efficiency in particular C<Jses. More importantly, perhaps, the two perspectives developed in Coase\ article-- the contractarian an d the judicial~ arc in
potcnti<ll conflict when transaction costs are positive. The more courts
exercise judici<ll restraint by deferring to private bargaining. the
strong,~r the incentive to bargain privately. Conversely, when cuurts
take an interventionist approach to private ordering. the incentive to
bmgain f·,rivatcly uver efficient allocation ol resources is significantly
undcrrnincd. Yet, Coasc did not suggest how this tension can be resolved. m which perspective, the contractarian or the judicial. should
take preced e nce in cases of conflict. Ultimately, Coase advanced neither a theury. nor a list of factors. to help the courts in performing
their charge; he trusted them, based on past performance, albeit a very
mediocre one. to succeed in the future.
Despite these drawbacks, Coase's analysis is illuminating and it has
been extremely influential. It would not be an exaggeration to state
that Coasc's discussion of transaction costs blazed the trail for all subsequent law and economics scholars. In particular, Coase's focus on
contractual arrangements has elevated private bargaining to unprecedented heights, turning it into the primary focus of law and economics
scholarship. Yet, Coase ·s analysis by itself did not aptly explain the
role of legal norms in promoting efficiency; nor did it provide a positive account of how exactly, if at all, the law protects entitlements in
the real world. Moreover, Coase did not discuss how entitlements
should be protected after the initial allocation. These tasks were reserved for Calabresi and Melamed.

B.

The Calabresinrz-Melamedian Framework

Unlike Coase, whose primary goal was to determine the role of
government intervention in the regulation of harmful activities,
Calabresi and Melamed's goal was to analyze the role of law in the assignment and protection of entitlements. Specifically, Calabresi and
Melamed sought to shed light on the ways in which the legal system
does, and ought to, protect rights. Yet, Coase's insights had a palpable
influence on Calabresi and Melamed. His contractarian perspective
and the careful attention to transaction costs informed much of
Calabresi and Melamed 's normative analysis. Due to their different
focus and superior mastery of law, however, Calabresi and lVIelamecl
ventured far beyond Coasc's legal insights and developed a new conceptualization of the law.
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In The Curhedm!, Calabresi and Melamed made three important
contributions to legal theury. The first was conceptual. Calabresi and
Melamed were the first to realize that a thc:orv of entitlement allocation must address two questions. not one. One question is how to assign the entitlement initially between the contending parties. T he
other is how to protect the initial assignment?' In addressing the former question . Calabresi and Melamed di d not advance a si rnple ansvver, or even a single principle according to which entitlements should
be assigned. Instead, they pruposcd th~1t in assigning e n titlements. society should consider Lhrc<.' bruitd types of considerations: economic
efficiency, distributional p n:tcrences. ~mel othe r justice reasons. '"
Cala bresi and Melamed di sc usse d an d explore d all three concerns ,
an d, in contrast to Coasc . they did not single o ut one value the courts
should maximize. Rather. they· advocated a careful weighing of the
various criteria they listed <ts a basis for entitlement allocaLion in particular cases. 31
Calabresi and Melamed's second important contribution was descriptive. In analyzing how the law protects entitleme n ts, C alabresi
and Melamed divided the universe of legal remedies into three modalities of protection: property rules, liability rules, and inalienability
rules:' 2 They defined the three modalities as follows. Property rule
protection confers upon the entitlement holder the exclusive power to
determine the price nonholders would have to pay for using the protected asset or right.'' Thus, all transfers of entitlements prot•.::cted by a
property rule must be consensual: all attempts to transfer the entitlement nonconsensually would be met with an injunction. Liability rule
protection, by contrast, gives the nonholder the power to take the entitlement without the consent of the entitlement holder a nd pay a price
to be determined by a third party, typically a court or the legislature.
The entitlement holder would not be able to enjoin third parties fromtaking her entitlement; instead, she would have to settle for damages. 34
29. Calabresi & Melamed. supro note 5. at 108lJ-93.
30. /d. at 10lJ3-95. Calabresi and Melamed recognized that it is hard to pour content into
the term ·'justice reasons." /d. at 1102. Furthermore. they admitted that. broadly defined.
distributional considerations can subsume all other justice reasons. /d. at 1104. Yet. they
suggested that it is preferable to think of considerations such as equality. caste preferences.
and other idiosyncratic preferences. separately from traditional distributional considerations.
/d. at 1098.
31. !d. at 1093-1105. See generai/v GUIDO C".LABRESI. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-33
(1970) (discussing economic efficiency. distributional preferences. and other justice considerations as bases for entitlement allocation).

32. Calabresi & Melamed. supra note 5. at 1092. 1105-06.
33. /d. at 1092. 1105.
34. /d. at 1092. 1106-10. Coleman and Kraus have criticized the idea of liability rule protection for being at odds with the classic view of rights as domains of freedom and personal
autonomv. See Jules Coleman & Jodv Kraus. Rerhinking r!Je Theorv of Legal Rigf11s.
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F inall y, inali e nab ilit y rules bar a ll transfers of the c mitl e m e nt , wh e th e r
co nsensua l o r no ncon se nsu a l.' 5
M o re over. Ca la brcs i and Me lame d n o tic e d the existence o f whJt
C arol R ose late r call ed " bilatem l symm e try:· ·;(, na me ly, that pro pe rty
and li a bility rul e protec tion may be acco rd e d to e ithe r o f the parti es to
the co nflict. " T his in sight ena b le d Ca la bresi an d M e la med to craft
their fa mou s fo ur-rul e menu . which ca ptures the re m e dial choices
ava il ab le to cour ts. To illustr a te th e o pe ra tio n o f th e four diffe re nt
rules. it would be: hclp i" ui to re turn to th e pol luti o n di spute example.
A ss um e. first. t h ~l t soc ie ty dec ides to fa vo r the resid e nts ' inte res t in
clea n air. In th is case. a co urt ca n vindica te the res id e nts ' right to li ve
p ollutio n-fr ee e it he r by e njoini ng th e po llutin ~ ~lc tivit y (rule L), o r by
conditio nin g the con ti n u<! ncc ol" the po llu t ion u n th e pay ment of dam o.ges to the vict im s (ru le 2 ). Converse ly, if society ass ig ns the initi a l e ntitleme nt to the t·act ory own er, the co ur t ca n vindi ca te her ri ght to
pollute by permitting he r to po ll u te with impunit y (rul e 3), or by con ditionin g th e aba tem e nt of th e po lluti o n on th e paym e nt of d a mages
to the factory ovvner (rule 4 ). T h e four-rule fr a mework a nd the taxonomy d evelope d by C al a bresi a nd M e lamed to describe the diffe rent
rules have become stapl es in le gal schol a rship a nd teaching. 38
Cala bresi a nd M e lamed 's third impo rtant co ntribution was normative. In analyzing how the legal system should protect entitle ments ,
Calabresi and M e lame d s uccessfull y synthesi zed the contractaria n and

95 YA LE L.J. 1.335. l33l) ( ll)l)5). F urth ermo re . Co lema n a nd Kra us have no te d th a t the protection acco rded cha nges th e nat ure o f th e e ntitleme nt. It!. a t 1346.
35. Ca la bresi & tvklam e c!, supra note 5, at 1092. Later in the arti c le . Cala b res i and
Me lamed b road e ned the defi nitio n o f in a lie nability rul es to include not o nl y outright prohibition o n tra nsfe rs. but a lso we a ke r fo rm s of reg ula to ry o ve rsigh t. Jd a t llll. A cco rding to
Ca labresi a nd Me la med . inalie na bility r ule prote ction ma y be ap propri a te wh e n cha nges in
the initia l assignm e nt have unt o ward e ffec ts on third parties. o r for pate rn a listic or di stributional reasons. Jd. at 11 11-1 5.
36. R ose, Slwtl01v ofilu: Cathedral. supra no te l9. a t 2 177.
37. Ca labresi & Melamed , supra note 5, at 111 5-17: see alsu James E. Krier & Stewart J.
Schwab, Property Rules and Liab ility R ules: The Ca tlt edrul in A noth er Light, 70 N.Y.U. L.
R EV . 440. 444 ( 1995) (he re in afte r Krier & Schwab, The Cathedral in A nother Light] (mapping the sy mm e tri ca l re lati o n in a two-by-two matri x) .
38. It is noteworthy that a t the time Til e Cathedral was auth o red, rul es 1 through 3 were
well kn own, but rul e 4 wa s not . Indeed, a t the tim e, th e re we re no cases in which rul e 4 was
e mployed. Fortuna te ly for Ca la bresi and Melame d , the yea r The Cathedral wa s published ,
the Arizo na Supreme Co urt, in Spur Industries In c. v. Dell£. Webb Developm ent Co., 494
P.2d 700, 708 (Ari z. 1972). e nj o in e d th e o pe rator of a fe edlo t fro m continuing its o pe ration,
but ordered that a deve lope r representin g residents indemnify the tortfeasor for the cost of
m oving o r shuttin g down. A lth o ugh it was be lieved that Ca labres i and Me lam e d we re th e
first to un ve il rule 4, it was, in fac t. sugges ted se ve ra l yea rs ea rli e r by Ja me s At wood in a
student no te in th e Stanford Lmv Revie1v. See James R. Atw ood , Note , A n Economic Analysis of L and Use Co n flicts , 21 STAN. L. RE v. 293. 315 (1969 ); see also Calabresi , R emarks ,
supra no te 4, at 2204 (a ttributin g the ·'discove ry" of rule 4 to Atwood). Ye t, it is indisputable
th a t rule 4 has beco me fa mo us thanks to its inclu sion in th e Ca la bresia n-M e la me dian
framework.
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judicia l pe rspecti ve ra ised by Coa sc . -~" They propose d th at prope rt y
r u le s be e m p loyed whe n transact io n costs ;:re low, whe n th e re a re only
a few parties to th e di sput e , and w he n th e parti es to th e d isput e arc
rea d ily icle n tifia b le.·10 W he n t hese cond iti o ns ob ta in . there is no n ee d
!'or lega l in te rven ti on since th e pr ivate tr a nsacti ng wo ul d lead to an erlicie nt all ocation of reso urces. L ittb iiit y ru les, on t he othe r h <mcl.
shou ld be use d in t he presence of hi g h tran sac tion cos ts . whic h preven t
th e part ies fro m easil y ide nt iry ing and bctrga in ing with one anothc r: 11
C a la b re si and M elamed 's no rma ti vr.: <ma lysis h~1s so licl ificcl the
domi nance of pri va te o rd eri ng over p ubli c o rder ing. P ri vate o rder ing .
thr o ugh transactin g, s ho ul d tak e prece den ce ove r lega l inte r ve ntion . ft
is o n ly wh e n we s uspe ct th a t pr ivz1te bmga in ing m ight be ine ffective
tiwt we sho uld resort t o lega l in terv e nti on. Ot herw ise . the law sh ould
m e re ly provide th e backdrop again st whi ch p riva te barga ining tak es
rl:tce . T he ce ntr ality of priva te barga ini ng to Ca lab rcs i a nd Me lan1 c cl
is mos t ev ide nt in thei r d isc uss io n o f the cri mina l la w. Th e role
Ca la brcsi a nd Me la m ed ass ign to the cr imin a l law is no t to p ro tec t in d ividu al rig hts and person a l security . b ut rather , to de te r ''a tt e mpts to
co nve rt p rope rt y rul es into lia bility r ul es." 42
Howeve r , the strong e mphasis o n b a rgaining , th e p o te n t ia l weak ness of Ca la bre sia n- M ela m e dian fra m e work, was a lso th e so urce of its
appea l an d success. This foc us e na bl e d Ca labresi a nd Me lame d to
propose a revolu t ionary way o f think in g abo ut th e law. Mor e o ver. it
e nab led th e m to ke ep the ir a na lysis cohere nt and e legant. Yet,
Ca la bresi an d M ela med 's a na lysis was n ot at a ll o ne -dim e nsio nal ; no r
di d it o nl y see k to m ax imi ze eco no mi c efficie ncy. A n o th er laud ab le
aspec t of Ca labres i a nd Me la m ed 's ana lysis was the call fo r th e inco rp o r a tion of fa irness-based co nsid erations into enti t le ment t he ory. Un fortu nate ly, this aspect of the article has not a tt racted nearly as much
atte ntion as the efficie ncy a n a lysis. In fact , it was large ly ig nored by
s ubsequ ent comme ntators.43

39. Ca lab resi & Melamed. supra no te 5. at 1108-1 0.
40. /d. at 1125-27 .
4 1. See id.; .1ee also R ICI-!AR D A. POS NER. ECON OM IC AN AL YSIS OF LAW 56-5 7. 70 (4t h
ed. 1992) (discussing the "conventional wi sdom" favorin g property ru les whe re transa ction
cos ts are low. and li ab il ity rul es whe re tra nsac ti on costs a re hi gh): Kri e r & Schwab. Th e
Co rh et!ral in Another Lig/11. supra no te 37. at 447-53 (prese nting th e "conventiona l wisdom "
for late r critique) : c( Kap low & Shave!!. su pm no te 9. at 7 18 (no tin g that th e ir fi ndin gs co ntradi ct the ·'conventi onal wisdom").
42. Ca labres i & Me la med, supm no te 5. a t 11 2o. q: l-I AN OCH DAGr\N. UN JUST
15 (1997). Dagan argues that th e choice bt:tween property rule s and li a bi lity
rules embod ies a ch oice be tween we ll-being and control. with li abi lit y ru les protec ting th e
former and prope rt y rul es pro tecting the latte r. Thus. "th e choice between lhc two ru les req uires a choice of th e substan tive conten t of th e e ntitlt:m cnt itse lf. .. /d . (foot no te om itte d).
ENR I C H~ J ENT

43 . We seek to redress thi s omissio n in Pan IlL m/i'u.
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Su bseq uen t Con rri h u tions

As one could ex pe c t. The Curlz edrnl has n o t met wi th un ive rsa l accep tan ce . Sub seq ue nt scho lars have cha ll e nged bo th th e descr ip ti ve
a nd th e n o rm a ti ve cl a im s o f th e a rti c l e . ~~ Th e no rm ati ve cha ll e nges
have targete d Ca labre si a nd M e lame d 's prescri pt io ns a s to how pro pe rt y a nd liability rul es s ho uld be a ppli e d to enha nc e eco no mi c effic ie ncy. T he d escr ipti ve cha ll e nges have fo c use d o n th e acc u ra cy a nd
co mpr e he ns ive n ess of Ca la bres i a nd ;'vlcl<~mecl" s po rtr ay <li o f the lega l
s ys t e m . ~ 5 \Ve co mm e nce by rev iewin g t he nor m a t ive clw ll c ngc s a nd
th e n turn to th e descri pt ive o nes.
l.

N um wrive Clzul!enges

o. A y res w zd To /le v's S o lom onic Enrir!em enr.1. Fo ll o w ing Ca la bresi
a nd M e la med , t he acc e pte d lore was th a t prope rty rul es outpe rlo rm
li a bility r ul es w he n di sp ut e s in vo lve a s ma ll nu mbe r of pa rti es and the
cos ts of ide nti fy in g th e re leva nt pa rti es arc lo w. fn s uch se ttin gs, the
e mploym ent o f pro pert y rules was pres um e d to induce s uccess ful priva te b arga inin g a nd co nse quentl y effi cie nt all oca tion of rcso u rc e s . ~ 6
Ay res a nd T a lley ca lle d this view into qu e stion . The y co nt e nd e d tha t
li a bility rules might be s up e rior to prop e rty rul es in set t in gs in which
pro pe rty rules were be li e ve d to wo r k bes t: thi n m a r k e t s . ~ 7 T o re ac h
this so m e wha t co unte rintuiti ve c la im. Ay res a nd T a ll ey re ch a rac te rizc cl tw o import ant comp o nen ts in th e C a labre si-Mcl a m ed ian fr a mewo rk: li abi lity rul es a nd tr an sac ti on costs.
Ay res a nd Ta lle y bega n th e ir accoun t by po intin g o ut t hat t he use
of liabilit y rul es divid es e ntitle m e nts int o a n opti o n to bu y th e s ub ject

--+4. A co mpre he ns ive rev ie w o l all th e ch a llen ges is be yund th e scupe o f thi s An icle.
N a tur a ll v. we foc us o n th e cha ll e nges that ~1 r e m o st re le va nt to o ur cl isc uss iu n. W e do not
s ugges t tha t the c ha ll e nges we di sc uss a re necessa ril y the mos t impo rta n t o r pl)we rful o nes.
45 . A dmittedl y. thi s disti ncti o n invol ves a d eg ree n f imp rec isio n. Some u l th e cha lle nges
we label no rmative a lso conta in descripti ve insi gh t:;. a nd vi ce ve rsa. Ye t. this di s tin ction
he lps o rga ni ze the sub seq ue n t li te ra tu re in a se nsible fas h io n.
46. See supra te xt acco mpa ny in g no te 4 l.
47. See [a n A yres & Eri c T a lley . Solonzon ic Borguin ing: Di viding 11 Lt!gul Enrir/entf// 1 ro
Fu ciliwre Cousean Trad e. 104 Y1-\LE L.J. 1027 . 1030-33 ( 1905). In para lle l with A y res a nd
Ta ll ey . .J ohnsto n re a che d a simil <n findin g. See Jaso n S. J o hn s to n. Barga in ing Un der Rules
Versus Srondords . II J .L. E CON. & ORG. 256 ( I'J'J5) . J o hn s ton d e mo nstr a te d th a t whe n ce rta in con d iti o ns ob ta in. co ntinge n t e x pos t e n title m ent s may p rod uce m o re e fficie n t ba rga inin g t han cle a r ex ante e ntitle m e nts. A n impo rtant impl icati on o f thi s obse rvati o n is that
blur ry ba la nc in g tes ts a nd eve n JUd ic ia l e rror are more soc ia llv d es irabl e th a n p rev io usly
th o ugh t. ln a subse q ue nt articl e, J o hns to n a nd C roso n a dclucc cl e xpe rime nt a l res ul ts that
o ffe r s u pp o t·t o f th e theo re tic pre d ictions o f J o hnston· s mod el. See Rac he l C ros o n & J aso n S.
Jo hns to n. E.rperim mw l R.esulrs on Barga ining Under !1 /r en w ti ve Prop errv Rig/us Regi111 es. 16
J .L. E CON. & ORG. 50 (2000). In the text. we fo cus o n Ay re s and Tal ley simpl y beclll se th e y
fr a me d the ir a na lys is in prope rt y ve rs us li a b ili ty ru le te rm s. whe reas .J o h ns to n ·s m a in p rism
is that ot ru lc: s versus sta nd a rd s.
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of the ent itl emen t ~' an d a ri ght subject to th e option. ~" Moreo ve r, they
insightf ully observed that thi s d ivision creates a uniqu e op portunit y
for ·· So lomonic Lxuga ining·· between th e holders of the divided ent itlem ent. Because the partition o f th e e ntitl e ment pe rmits tw o -way
trading, rather tha n o ne. li a bility rules co uld ge ne ra te more pri va te
bargai nin g than prope rt y ru les. H the option -holder values th e s ubj ect
of t he e ntitleme nt more highly th a n th e ri ght hold er. she would exercise her option and buy the ri g ht. C onverse ly , if the ri ght holder values
th e und er lying dSSd mo re highly. she wou ld ·'bribe'' th e opt io n hold e r
not to exe rc ise th t; o ption.' 11 Eac h party to a liability rule disput e is simul taneous ly a poten tial buyer a nd a pote ntial seller. By contrast.
proper ty rules crcctte only one se ller and one buyer: no a lternatin g i::;
possibl e.
B ut what about transacti o n costs? Eve n if liability rules ha ve th e
pote ntial to gencr:tte more trad es, this advantage may be lost in th e
pre sence of transact io n costs. To overcom e this ch a ll e nge , Ayres a nd
Tall e y modified tr aditional tran saction cost ana lysis. They noted that
in thin markets th e main obstac le to private barga ining is not th e cost
of locat ing and assembling th e affected parties, which preoccupied
Calabresi and Me la med , but rath e r , str ategic bargaining. 51 In such an
environment, wh e re price is not re adily d e terminable, each negotiator
has an incentive to pos ture in order to secure a larger share of th e bargaining surplus. Conse quently, the challenge for legal rul es is to facilitate exchange by co unterin g th e predisposit ion to bargain strateg ica ll y.
Liability rules acco mplish just that. By dividing entit le m e nts, liability
rul es put the barga iners in an '·identity crisis," with neither of them
knowing wheth e r she would wind up buying or selling. Asking too
much , or offering too little , run s the risk of the other party se lecting to
sell for th e quot e d price inste ad of buying, or buy for th e quoted price
instead of selling. 52 Mo reove r, dividing the entitlem e nt lowers the
stakes for each bargainer, thus further reducing th e incentive to bargain dishonestly. 5 ~

48 . That is. a .. call op ti o n."
49. See Ayres & T a lley . supra no te 47, a t 1031.
50. See id. at 1U38.
5l. See id. at 1030: see also Robe rt Coote r. Tlz e Cos! of Coase. 11 J. LEGAL ST UD. l, 23
(1982) (pointing out th a t di sag reements as to how to divide the contractual surplus may prevent successful Coasean bargaining): J oh n Kennan & Robert Wilson . Bargaining 1vi!l1 Primre !nfo rmmion. 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993) (hypo th esizi ng that di ffere nces in
pri vate info rm atio n a rc a primary cause of barga in ing de lays).

52. See Ay res & Talle y. sup ra note 47. a t 1030. This " iden tity c ri sis" is str o ngest when
entitlements a rc divide d eve nly. See. e.g., Pete r Cramton e t al., Dissolving a Porrnership Efficienrly, 55 EC ONOM ETRIC\ 6 15 (1987).
53. See Rose. Sluuhnv of rlze Cmh edrai . s upra note 19, at 2184.
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f in all y, Ayres and Tall ey ha ve illumin ated the info rma tionrcvea iin g aspec t of li ab ility rul es. They proposed that th e values th e
parti es place on the whole entitlement may be discerned fro m their
bargaining tact ics . Assume , for exa mpl e , that th e op ti on hold e r see ks
to exercise her op tion . A hi gh-va lu e right ho ld e r v.' o ulc.l o ffer to pay
the op ti on holder not to exercise. Conve rse ly . a l O\\ -valu e r ight ho lder
wo uld not a ttem pt to stave o ff the exe rc ise or ih•: o ption . and may
even ap proach the o ption-holde r with an offe r to se ll. Th us. the
Solom o nic b ar ga ining ge nerated by li ab ility ru les pcnlitions Lh c holde rs of the clivicl ccl entitle m e nt int o hig he r- a nd luvv:_:r- \ a lue bidders.
thereby div ulging p ri vate inform a ti o n and facilit atin~ t rade.'-'
b. Kap!mv ond Sho vel!. A d ifferent rdin cmc n~ !.U : he Cal a bresi Ivlcl amedian framework has bee n propose d by Ka ptcl\V and Sb a vel l>'
L ik e Ay res and Ta lley, Ka plow and Shavc li have called tor a more expa nsive usc of li ab ility rules, albeit for diilerent reason s. F urth e rmore.
unlik e Ayres and Ta ll ey who disregard ed property ru les. Kaplow and
Shave ll redefin e d the proper ro le of property rul es in protectin g e ntitlements.
At the core of Kaplow and Shave ll 's analysis lie two an alytical distinction s which e nabled them to compartmentalize the uni ve rse of entitleme nt disputes into a two-by-two m a trix. Th e fi rst distinction is between "externalities disputes" and "possessory disputes ." A
paradigmatic example of the form e r is industrial pollutio n, or noise. A
typical exampl e of the latter is a disp ute ove r a n item of p e rso nal
property, such as a la ptop com pu ter. T he second . and more fa miliar ,
distinction is between high tra nsac tio n cos t and low trans actio n cost
settings .
Kap low and Shavell p rop osed that property rules are superior to
liability rules in th e context of possessory disputes irrespective of
whether transaction costs are high or low . This is beca use liability rul e
protection of possessory interests rais es two problems: rec iprocal ta kings and se qu ential taking. 56 If A's possession of her laptop computer
is protected by a liability rule , a nd the damage amo unt is se t too low,57
B would tak e A' s laptop and pay th e damage award. I'his, in turn,
wo uld prompt A to tak e back th e lapt op and pay B, a nd so a vicious
54. See id. at 2184-85: see also Ayres & Talley , supm note -f7 . a t 1039-47. Ayres and
T a lley acknow ledged tha t nego tiato rs wo uld co nti nue to m is rep rese nt th e ir true va luations
in the hope of ex tracting a large r share of th e bargai ning sur p lus. They point ed out. howeve r.
that th e li abi lity amount re stricts the ability of the parties to exaggerate . O r, as th ey put it.
the expecte d dam age a ward '·serves as both a ceiling to overstatem ents a nd a floor to understate me nts." Jd. at l046.
55. See Kaplow & Shavell , sup ra note 9.
56. /d. a t 722. 765-67 .
57 . If th e dam age award is too high, th e d istinc ti o n bet1we n li ab ilit y ru k protect ion and
property rul e protec ti o n loses its significa nce . See id. a t 724 (o bse rving that .. a liab ilit y ru le
with very high dam ages is equivalent to a pro perty rul e prote c ti on o f vi ctim s").
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cycle ol re ciproc al ta kings would ens ue . Eve n wo rse , ot her partie::;.
such as. C and D. m ay choose to take th e lap top a nd pa y, s p e a rh ead in g a n in [inite se ries of sequ e ntial takings. In ste ad of negotiatin g in th e
sha dow uf li ab ility rules, as Ayres and Tall ey wo uld ha ve th em . th e
contendin g part ies would re peated ly ta ke fr om on e a noth e r. 's
In e.\tcrnalit ies cases , the choice o r lega l rul es depe nds o n th e
m ag nitu de oi transact ion costs. R e ite rat in g Coa se 's main in sight.
K ap lo w ~ tnd Shave !! co nclu de th a t wh e n tran saction costs are low, th e
ch o ice u!· legal rul e does no t m a tt e r. In thi s in s tance, pro pert y rul es
<m el liClhility rule s wou ld p erform e qually well sinc e parties can ba rgain
to achie ve th t: : optim a l a ll ocat ion o f reso urces . \V he n transact io n cos ts
arc hi g h. li~tbility ru les ha ve the e dge . When p ri vat e barga inin g is im poss ih k. the ctl urt mus t a ll ocat e the ri ght to the higher va lu e user. H
th e court choose s to e mpl oy property rule protect ion , it mus t know
b oth th e cLtm age to the victim and th e prevention cos t to the pollut e r.
By co ntr <ts L the use o f li ab ility rul es re quires th e co urt to know onl y
on e variable: th e dam age to the victim. Once the court se ts the li a bility
amount co rrec tl y, th e polluter, w ho knows th e cost o f p reve nti on, h as
a choi ce to m a ke. lf th e cost o f preve nti on exceeds the da ma ge
amount. s he would continue with th e polluting activity a nd pay damag es. If th e cos t of prevention is lower than the expected li a b ilit y, sh e
would in ve st in preve ntive me as ures and ab a te the pollution. Thus.
li ab ilit y rules minimi ze info rm a tion costs. According to Kaplow and
Sh <.we ll. it is for thi s reason that liabilit y rul es should b e fa vore d ove r
property rul es w he n tra nsact ion costs are hi g h , and not because of th e
im poss ibility of bargaining, as Calabresi and Melam e d su ggested. '~
c. Krier and S chwab. Th e final chall e nge to th e C a la bresiMe lam ec! ian fra mewo rk differs dramatically from t he two prev io usly
clisc uss ecl. In a marke d d epa rture from the conventional view amon g
Jaw and econ o mics scholars, Kri e r and Schwab qu es tio ne d th e pre sumed superiority of liability rul es in high transaction costs se ttin gs.
Th ey n o te d th at th e conve ntiona l view that liability rul es outpe rform
pro perty rules when transact ing is prohibitively costly rests on a tacit
ass ump tio n th at courts can assess damages with reasonable accuracy in
such situ a tions. Yet, following Polinsky,6° Krier and Schwab pointe d
out that this key assumpti o n has ne ver been s ubst a ntiated .6 1 Kri e r and

5S. !an Av res a nd Jack 13alkin . ho wever. ha ve pointed out th a t this proble m co uld be
av oided if eac h taking were accomranied by an incre mental pri ce incre;Js e . More ge nera lly.
th ey note: that li abi li ty rule s are esse ntially trunc;Jtcd auctio ns. Thus. they p ropose tha t e ntitl e me nts be auctio ned off be twee n th e co nte ndin g parties with the hi ghest bi dder ultima te ly
rece iving th e cn tit !t:ment. See A yres & 13alkin. supra note 25 . at 707-716.
5l). See Kaplow & Sh ave! !. supru note 9. at 71 9. 726-27: see olso R ose. Slzwlmv of rl1 e
Curhedm l. supm note 19. at 2 19 l.

GO. S ee Polin sky . supm note 9. at Ill!.
6 1. See Kri e r & Schwab. Th e Carli edral in Anorli er Liglir. supra note 37. a t 45.3 -5-+.
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Schwab attributed this omission to the failure of scholars to recognize
the exist e nce of assessment costs - the transaction costs of the judicial process -and, more generally, to engage in comparative institutional analvsis -"c
In addressing these omissions , Krier and Schwab found that th e
presumed superiority of liability rules in high transaction costs settings
is illusory, Krier and Schwab contended that although private bargaining over damages is costly when transaction costs arc high, th e
cost of judicial assessment of damages may be higher still. lienee. it is
impossible to determine in the abstract which mode is supe rior. (''
Moreover , they suggested that there is a positive corre la ticm b e tween
factors th z1t give rise to high transaction costs ami tho se creating high
ass essment costs. "~ For e xampl e , bargaining is likely tn be inctlective
in disputes involving multiple parties and in bilateral monopoly cases.
But so is judicial ~1ssessment of damages. Consi d er. for c::xample , the
case of Boomer v. Atlwuic Cemem Co 6 ' fn Boo111 er, the presence of
multiple victims, which gave rise to hi gh transaction costs and potential holdout problems, thwarted the possibility of a voluntary agreement between the cement plant and the residents. T he same fact,
however, made judicial determination of damages extreme ly difficult. 66
This example may be generalized: the involvement of multiple parties
and the lack of readily ascertainable market prices make accurate assessment of damage virtually impossible. 67 Thus. the very factors that
undermine efficient bargaining also frustrate the ability of courts to
determine damages with reasonable precision.
Furthermore, because courts routinely grant objective damages
and ignore subjective , or idiosyncratic, harms , damage awards tend to
be unclercompensatory; victims ' losses are rarely fully redressed in litigation.6:o At the end of the clay, therefore, Krier and Schwab posit that
there is no inherent reason to assume that liability rules would better
e nhance economic e fficiency when transaction costs are high. 1' 9
62. Seeid. at45 4.475-77.
63. See id. at 454-55.
64. See id. at 459-61.
65. 257N.E.2d870 (N.Y.I970).
66. For discussion. see NEIL K. KOMESAR, Ii'viPERFE CT ALT ERN ATIVES: CHOOSI'JG
INSTITUTIO NS IN LAW. ECONO MICS, AND PUBLIC POL.ICY 14 -28 (1994) (di scussing the asse ssme nt problem in the Boomer case ): Daniel A. Farber. R eass essing Boome r: .fusrice, Ej fi'·
ciency, and Nuisanc e Lmv , in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL ED UCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF JOHN E. CRIBBET 7. ll-12 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich e els .. 1989) (pointing out
that Atlantic's total liability "ultimately came to S71Cl,OOO, som e four times the amount mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision denying injunctive r e lief'').
67. See Krier & Schwab. The Cmh edm! in Anorher Lighr. supm note 37. at 460-62.
68. See id. at 457-59.
69. It hears emphas is. however. that Krier and Schwab have no t positive ly shown that
pro perty rules would outpe rfo rm liability rules in high -tra nsaction-co sts se tt ings. Their
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Descripri ve Challenges

u. Pw Protecrion. C o mbining the C alabresi-Melame di a n framewor k '.Vith option the ory, se ve ra l schol ars have noticed an inte res tin g
e xte nsion to Calabresi and Melame d's analysi s of li ability rul es . Specifica lly. th e y o bse rv ed that while C alabresi and M e lamed tre a ted lia bility rule s strictl y as call options, i.e .. option s to " buy '· entitle m e nts
from th e ir ho lde rs. e ntitl e m e nts m a y a lso be protected with put opti o ns711 T he mirro r im age of calls, put option s b es tow upon th e e ntitl e m e nt ho ld er th e power to sell th e entitl e m e nt to the othe r part y to
the dis p ut,2. t" o r ex amp le th e poiluter, for a ce rtain exercise price.
He nce . it •:<m be SE\id th a t put o pti o n p ro te ction grants to '· th e initi a l
en tit k rn ent ho lder every thin g that she would have und e r a p ro p e rt y
rule plus a p ut o pti o n. " 71
T he choice betwee n '· call s'· and ·' pu ts " has importa nt distrib uti o na l
co nse qu e nces . P ut s increase th e e xpec ted payoff of th e e ntitle m e nt
holde r rel a ti ve to calls and s tandard property rule pro tection. 7:c
More ove r, p ut option protection reduces the risk to which entitle m e n t
a nalysis only sugge sts th at Ca labresi and Me lam ed's concl usion that liability rul es be tte r e nha nce cfricie ncv in th e face o r hi gh tra nsaction costs may be incorrect due to Cala bresi and
Ivlelamecl" s omi ss ion of comparati ve in stitution al analysis.
70. See . e.g.. Ian Ay re s. Prorecring Pmp erry l''ith Purs. 32 VAL. U. L. R EV . 793, 79S
( 1998) (n o ting th a t a put op tion. or ··ro rc ed purchase ·· rul e . gives the e ntitlem e nt ho lder th e
option to forc e the non c: ntitleme nt ho lde r to purch ase): Madelin e Morri s. Th e Srm cwre of
Enrirlelllenrs. 7S CORNE LL L. Rt= v . 822 . 854-56 ( 19LJ3) (describ ing put optio ns as exa mples o r
reve rse liab ilitv rule s in which th e entitlem ent holde r has th e right to a for ced compe nsa te d
transfer ): c( Ay res & Da lkin. supra note 25 (desc ri bi ng vari ous mechani sms for a ucti o ning
put opti ons). /) ut see Ri chard A. E pste in. Prorecring Prope rly Rigl11s 1virh Legol Re!ll edies: A
Co iiii!IOII Se nse Heply w !'rofi>sso r A v r es. 32 VA L. U . L. R EV . 833 (1 998) (chall e nging th e
e fforts of I<J n An es and others to apply finan cial economi cs to elaborat e on Ca la bres i and
Melam ecl· s original twu-bv-two matri x) .
7 1. See A vres. sup ro note 70. at 799 . Corr espo ndin gly. th e none ntitl ement ho lde r agJ inst
whom the put o ptio n ma y be exe rcise d has less than nothing. sin ce she ma y be forc ed to buv
an entitleme nt again st her will. !d.

72. See id at ~ 04-13 . Ayres points out th a t in additio n to ch anging th e di visio n o r th e
barga ining sur plus betwee n th e pmti cs. put pro tecti on al so affects th e bid/as k differe nce . He
no te s that '" [f] o r bot h cognitt ve and wea lth effec ts rea sons. it is often th e case that a particuIJr pe rson will de ma nd a hi ghe r price whe n se lling a n entitl e ment than she would be willing
to pay if force d to buy.·· Jrl. at 609-10: see also Levm orc. supm not e 4. at 21 66 (describin g th e
o ffer- as kin g diffe rential. or ··e nd owme nt effect'" ).
On th e ··endowmen t effect.'. sec gene rally Daniel Kahn eman et al.. Experimenral Tcs1.1
of r!z e Endo nmr:nr Ef(ecr i/1/(/ rhe Conse 1h eo rr:m. 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 ( 1990) (co ncluding
th a t endowmen t effects a re not ea sily altered by experi ence): Daniel Kahnem a n e t al.. Th e
End01 vm e111 F/fecr. Lu.\S A t·ersiun, ltn d Sllt rus Q uo Bias. 5 J. E CON . PERSP. 193 . 194 ( 19LJ I )
(de finin g the ·· e nd owmen t effect"" as a behavio r in which "peopl e ofte n deman d mu ch more
to give up an obj ec t th an th ey would be willing to pay to acquire it"'); Richard Tha le r.
TOI I'Ord u Posiun· Theory of Consu111er Cho ice. J. ECON. B EHA V. & OR G. 1 ( 1980) (e x<J rn ining wavs in which consume rs deviate fr om ration al eco nomic models). On the impact of
the e nd owment effect on lega l po licymaking. sec Elizabe th Hoffman & Matthew L. Spit ze r.
Willingness w Put· ~"·' · Vvi/ling/l(:ss ro A ccepr: L egol und Econ omic !mplicurions , 71 WASI-l. U.
L. Q. 59 ( 19LJ3 ): Russe ll Korob kin. No te . Policl"llw king und rhe Offei/A sking Price C up. To t\"ltrt! u Theon· of l:J/icienr Lnrirletn m r A llocurion. 4 6 ST;\ N. L. R EV . 663 ( 19')4 ).
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holders are exposed . Call opt io ns ves t the power to exercise in. the
non entitlement holder. Put options, by contrast, grant the decision makin g power to th e e ntitlemen t holder. Consequ entl y, put option
protection provid es the grea test incentive to property owners to inv es t
in th e ir asse ts. and the strongest dete rrent to potential takers .' '
A lth o ugh put option protect ion is an impo rtan t th eore ti cal possi bility. it is rare ly used in rea lit y 7 1 Richard Eps tein, for C';ampk. ~ug
ge stecl that puts "are never imposed as a matter of law o n stran gers .
but are the ou tgro w th or conse nsua l transactions over orga ni1cd markets ... i ' In respo nse to th is cl<lim. fan A yres showe d that the rc;Kh ~~ f
put optio n protection extends to certain nonco nsensua l selli ng:;. :-; uc i\
<1S con vei·sion . a nd tresp ass disputes . Even Ayres, ho wev e r, cunccd c u
E pskin's basic point: that th e co mmon law does not emp loy puts in
rcl!l. but rather. as li m ited in p ersonwn ri g hts in certain bilatenli rno nopo iy situat ions?'
h. ''Swrtle'' or "Stortling" Rules. 77 Aside from th e possib ilily cf put
option protection, seve ral schol a rs have observed vari o us ot her exten sions to th e C alabres i-Melam eclian four rul e fra mework. T he sch o larl y
interest in the possib ility o f additional rules has been re kindl ed by
K ri er a nd Schwab 's '·discovery" of a new rule , which th ey entitle d
''rul e 5." 7 ~ Krier and Schwab proposed that in certain insta nces th e
transgresso r should be permitted to choose to abate the tortious activity and co llect th e vict im's ga ins occasioned by this d ec isio n. Under
thi s ru le. A, who cau ses a nuisa nce to B , ge ts th e discret ion to stop at
73. Sc.: Ay res. supra no te 70. at SIJ7.
74. See . e.g. . Ri cb;trel A. Epste in. A Clm r Vi('J v of !h e Ca rhf'dml: T/11~ !Jmn;nunce nf
Prop !'rrv Rules . l 06 YALE L.J. 20'1 l. 20':)3 ( 1997) (not in g tha t ce rt a in fin il nc ia I <Hra nge m e n ts.
suc h as puts. a rc ·· co mm o n e no ug h in fin ancia l mark ets. but a re ra re ly e nco un te red in th e
wor ld of le ga lly c t-cated re me d ies " ). Even Morr is. who was the first to obse rve the possibilitv
of put op ti o n protecti o n. found o nl y two rea l world exam ples of thi s tvpe ol' pro tection:
"[g]un buy-out ulfers by po li ce departm e nt. Jnd soft drink containe r d epos it redem ption
laws ... See i'dorr is. supm note 70. a t S55.
75. E ps te in. supm note 74. at 20'13.
76. See Ay res. supm no te 70. a t 8 14 n.63. It s hou ld be no te d tha t so me of th e put protection examples id e ntifi ed by Ayres clu not clea rly fall und e r hi s ow n definiti o n of th e tenn.
For in stance. Ayres ch Jracte ri ;r.es the fam o us case of Pile v. Pedrick. 31 A. fi4(-i (Pa. l gl))). as
grantin g the plaintiffs. the v ictims of th e e nc ruachment. put op tion protec ti o n. In fact. th e:
cour t m e rely perm itted th e plain tiff to choose be tween injun ct ion a nd damages. and the
p laintiff ultimate ly prefe rred the former. i. e .. propert y rul e prote ction. Sin ce tru e pu t opt ion
p rotection wo ul d g ive the p la intiffs mo re th a n a sim ple prope rt y rule. the plai nti ffs' e lwi cc
se ems quit e odd . It is poss ib le. then. that the co urt wa s not offe ring the plaintiff put opt ion
protection. bu t r a th c: r. a cho ice betwee n prope rty rule pro tec tion and a ca ll o ption protec tion to the clcfcnclant-transg resso r. Thi s is not to say that Ay res · construc ti o n o f the c1sc is
necess a ril y in cor-rect. Howe ve r. wi th o ut knowing what exactly th e dam age award was in thi s
case. it is impossible to say with ce rta in ty tha t th e cou rt e m ployed put opt ion prot e ct ion.
77 . Th e te rm ··s ta r tlin g rule" owes its o rigi n to Levm o re.

78. See Krier & Schwab. Til e Carli edwl in 1\n orh cr Lighr . supm n o te 37 . at 47U- 7 1. it is
widclv agree d that th e or ig inal startling rul e was Calab res i and M e lamed's rul e 4. S'ee
L cv m ore . supu1 no te 4. at 2 150 .
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he r choi ce, a nd collect d a mages fr om B in th e a mount of th e be nefit B
receiv es as a consequence o r to co ntinu e th e nuisance and receive
nothin g.7Y Krie r a nd Schwa b·s proposal re portedly ''infuriate d [ce rtain
scholars] who found it too unus ua l to be of no tc ."' 0 But it captivated
the minds o f most othe rs, 81 des pite the fa ct that Kri e r a nd Sclnvab
we re un abl e to fine! any judicial authorit y employing or foreshadowing
th e ir in sight. a nd the ob vio us ri sk of st rat eg ic a buse of this r e medy by
tortfea s or s . '~ Importantly. Kri e r and Sc hwab 's insight. debatable as it
might be. cl e m o nstr <t tc cl th a t other rul es ma~' be hidin g in th e win gs or
Calabrcsi and M e lamed's four basic rules.
lncl ce cl. thre e years later, Saul Le vrn o re. in an analytical tour de
forc:e, deri ve d ~1s many as sixt ee n vari a nts lro m Calabresi a nd
Melamecl's o riginal fo ur. '' To accompli sh this feat , Levmore di vid ed
th e fo ur basic rul es accordin g to variou s famili a r lega l di stinctio n s. For
exam ple . in the conte xt o f lia bi lit y rules. Lcvmore proposed tha t a
court might o rd e r comp e nsation on ly if th e injurer was n e glige nt, but
no t otherw ise_s-+ F urth e rmore, d rawing on th e di stinction b etween torts
and unjust e nrichm e nt, L ev more noted that in d e te rmining the proper
compensatio n aware!. a co urt cou ld choose betwe en th e victim 's loss
and the injurer's gain."5 L cvmore a lso observe d that instea d of awarding compensation for both past and future injuries, a court may compe nsate the victim for eith er pa st or fut ure injuri es.s6 In the same vein ,
in the conte xt of property rul es. a court may award the victim an injunction, but d e ny her d amages for past injuri es . Or, if th e court
wishes to increase th e victim 's compensation , it may e njoin th e harm ful activity a nd aware\ the vic tim the injure r 's past ga in .
Inspired by the unve iling of rule 5 , L ev morc also so ught to uncove r
se veral '·startling rul es " of his own . U ltim a te ly, Levmo re found o ne
such rul e, which he dubb e d ·'Rule 5CE." 87 Drawing on rule 5,
Le vmore proposed a rul e that wo uld permit th e injure r to continue

79. Jan Ay res correc tl y no ted that r ule 5 is esse ntiall y iln exa mple of put opti o n protecti o n. S<'e Ayrc:s. su p m no te 70. at 00 1.

00. Levmore . s u pm not e 4. at 2150.
8 1. See id .

82. See Lev m ore, supm note 4, at 2 16 1 (notin g th a t ' ·[i] f A kn e w that a j ud ge would re sp o nd to a ny compla int by B with thi s ru le 5. th e n A wou ld ha ve a perverse inc e nti ve to cre-

at e nuisances in order to collect from B'" ).

83. A full rev iew o f a ll o f Le vm ore 's var iants is beyo nd th e sco pe of thi s Artic le. F o r a
ta ble summ a ri zin g th e sixteen differe nt rul es. see Levmorc, supm no te 4. a t 2 173 .
84. /d. a t 2156. In a d iffe re nt va ri a n t. Lev m o re proposed th at if the injurer wa s no t negli ge nt she wo uld sha re in the victim' s loss if th ey bot h be long to the sa me comm unity. ! d. at
2159 .

85. !d. at 21.57.
86. !d. at215lJ.
87. !d . at 2162.
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with the harmful activity, but would force her to pay all her gains from
choosing to clo so to the victim.'' However. Levmore himself aclmittecl
that "it may be hard to see \vhy Rule 5 or 5CE would ever be selected
.. ,,,
[lJY a cour t1. ·
c. Sumnzory and Evn!umion. The Curlzedm! ancl its progeny have
had a profound impact on entitlement theory as well as our understanding of the legal system ~~sa whole. The locus on transaction costs,
the defining characteristic of this body o! literc1turc. has transformed
traditional understandings of property. contract . and tort. Several
changes cllT worth noting.
Fir~t , the locus on transacting has re duced the status of property
rights from ncar-absolute rights th~tl d crwtc individual autonomy and
security to fungible bargaining chips. From ct right that granted to its
holder the power to exclude ot hers." 1' propert y has become no more
than a contractual lever. And. from ~~ right that could only in rare
cases be taken for a public use.'' ' property has become an up-for-grabs
right, open to all potential takers. The familiar ··no-trespassing" sign
was replaced with an ·'all welcome'· one.
Second, the entitlement literature has largely changed the internal
hierarchy between property and contract. Traditionally, property was
deemed a keynote right, 92 and contract as a subservient right, designed
to enable property owners to transfer their property. The right to
transfer, represented by contract , was just one stick in the bundle of
rights property confers upon its holcler. 9 ' The entitlement literature
has turned this relationship around, placing contract at the core of our
legal system, and property at the fringe~. Under the new conceptualization, property merely facilitates contracting by defining the initial
bargaining positions of the parties.

88. !d.
89. !d. at 2loS.
90. Sec. e.g.. Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (" '[T]he right to
exclude others' is ·one of the most essential sticks in the: bundle of rights that are common1v
characterized as property.· '"): Thomas \V. Merrill. Properly and rl;e Right to Exclude. 77
NEB. L. REV. 730. 730 (2000) (positing that '·th e right to exclude others is more than just
·one of the most essential" constituents of property- it is the sine qua non").
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ('·[Njur shall private property bt: taken for public use.
without just compensation.").
92. See Carol l'vl. Ruse. Propenv os the Keystone Righ(l. 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329
(1999) [hereinafter Rose. Keysrone Rig/ttl (reviewing and critically examining the various
sources of the view of property as a keynote right).
93. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER. A Tl!EORY OF PROPERTY 40-5() (1990) (suggesting that
the right to transfer the "stick" distinguishes property rights from personal rights); J.E. Penncr. Tit!! "Bundle of Rig/us'" Pic!ure uf Propertv, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 747 (arguing that
.. the right to transfer property is an inherent feature of property rights"): cf Merrill & Smith.
supra note 9. at 365 (observing that for some writers inlluenccd by the legal realism of the
1920s and l930s, ·'the bundle-of-rights concept simply meant that property could be reduced
to recognizabk collections of functional attributes. such as the right. . to transfer .. ).
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T hird . the economic a nalysis of entitlemen ts has stri pped property
of one of its definin g characteristics. its in re111 nature.'' 1 By contrast to
in personum contractual rights that arc binding only o n the parti es to
the co ntract. prop er ty rights arc binding up on th e res t o l the worl cl. ~'
Yet, owing to the te nd ency to model disput es as two party conflicts.
the econom ic literature on e ntitlements has o blit e rated this importa nt
dil'fcrencc . As Thoma s Merr ill and Henry Smith ha ve obse rve d ... most
mo de rn economic account s e ndow property with no dist incti ve cha racter at all'' Property ri ghts are "simpl y ... little emp ty bo:;cs l'ill ed with
Cl mi scellany of use ri ght s that opera te in the background uf <t ··.vur ld
consisting of nothin g but in pc r:;onam obl igation s ....,r,
Fo urth. th e virtually exclusive focus on l'ctcilitclting tr<ms< tctic1ns has
p ushed to th e corner the traditiona l utilit clrian justifications of prop er ty, most notably th e nee d to incentivi ze owners to invest in re so urces.'17 For thi s reaso n. property regimes overwhe lmin gly emp loy
proper ty rules as th e defau lt reg im e.% As Ca rol Rose e:.:plainecL this
property r ule favoriti sm is not accidental. Stron g. undivided , a nd
sha rply defined prope rt y rights not only faci lit ate contracting but a lso
··e ncourage indi vidua l inves tment , plannin g and el'fort" by giving acto rs ·'a clearer sense of what they are getting ... q" Moreover, the transac tional focus has margin alized another key role of property law -

0.J . M e rrill & S mith. supm no te 0. a t 360 (not in g that "[pjrope rt y rig ht' h is to r ica ll v ha ve
bee n reg. arclecl as in rem"): Tho m as \N. M e rrill & H e nry F.. Smith. The l'ropc rn / Conrmcr
lnrcrjinc. l()l COLU\'1. L. R EV . 773 . 777 (2 110 1) (noting th at " [p ]roperty rights arc in remth ey hind the 'rest of th e world' '' ).
05. See 'We sley Newc o mb H o hfcld. Fundwnenru/ Lcgul Co n n'fJlions us i \pf!lied in .ludiciul Reusoning. 26 YAL E L..J. 7 10 (ll) l 7) (di sc uss ing th e diffe re nc e betwee n in per.1·onun1
ri g hts. which avail again s t one or a i'ew pe rsons. and in rem ri g ht s. which ~1V~1il aga in st a la rge
and in definite class or peo pl e) .

lJ6. Me rrill & Smit h. sup r11 no te Y. at 305 .
07. See J ERE~'I Y BE NTH Mvl. TH EO RY Or LEGI SL.-\T ION l l l-1 3 (.:it h eel. 1882) (pos itin g
th ;H p ro pe rty is th e bas is o f an expec ta ti o n of adva n tages). Ex ample s of modern law and
ec on o mics sc holars of thi s view inc lu de: R ICHARD POSNER . ECO NOM IC A N1\LYSIS OF L AW
(4 th eel. 1908) . J ESSE D UKEM INIER & ] ;-\iviES E. KRIER. PROP ERTY )3 (4t h e el. 1008 ) ( notin g
th a t "[u]t ilitarian th eo ry is. without doubt. the domin a nt view of property today ... espe cially among those workin g in law and eco nomics' '): Haro ld D e m se tz. I()\mrd 11 Tlu:orv of
Properly Righ1.1. 57 A\-1. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (providing a utilit:Jrian account of th e emergence of property ri g h ts): R obe rt C. E llickson, !'rop u1y in l.o/1{/. 102 YALE LJ. 131:1 ( l 0LJ3)
(co mparing private and g r· o up la nd owne rsh ip. and notin g th a t a c hange in la nd regim es is
e ffi cien t when it red uces the sum o f tra n sac tion costs and deadweig ht losses) : and Ruse.
S/l(fr/ol\' oflhc Ca1hulml. supru not e 19. a t 2 182 . 21 :-:\7 .
08. See R ose. Shlllimv o(rhe Carhcdrul. supra note 10. a t 2 187 : Epste in . SIIJJm note 7-1. at
2(1S>fi-2 10) (d isc ussin g th e d o minance o f property rul es in prope rt y law ).

0<). Rose. Sha dolt' o(lhc Cmhn/ml. s upra n ote l Y. at 2 1S7 .

1'/iuhi/irv Rules

Oc to be t· 211112]

str ikin g th e bal ance bet we en exclu sivit y and acccss . 11111 and in som e
cases. between monopol y and compe tition. 1111
Finally. Calabrcsi an d lVfc lamed's cc1!1 to con sider distributive and
other justice cons id e rations in determining the allocat ion of e ntitl ement s has been all but ignore d by subseq ue nt law and econ omi cs
scho la rs. A lth o ugh Ca labresi a nd Melame d p ut the va riou s consider<1 tio ns o n eq ual foo ti ng . economic ,_:tlici e ncy some how eclipse d th e two
othe r va lues .
1!.

E NTTR P LI.,\H I UTY RU LES

I n this Pa rt. we introd uce the concep t of pli a bility rul es .1112 ·1\!Ie t<t phori ca ll y spea kin g. C1labres i :111d Mela med viewed th e la w as a
thre e-l eve l structure. with in alie ndb ility rul es at th e ground leveL
prope rt y rul es at the first ri oor. anc.l li~1bilit y rules at th e seco nd . Whil e
we adopt Calabresi and Mc~ldmed·s three bas ic ca tegorie s, we sho w
th at their metaphor is in co mp le te. It fail s to capture the dynami sm o f
the legal system, which allows fo r the chan ging of entitlements ove r
time. In other words. it neglects to acco unt for connections within the
structure and the ab ility to mo ve aro und in it. We propose th at
pliability r ules should be viewed as th e stairways between the floors,
a nd th e corridors and doo rways connecting rooms on those flo ors. In
o the r words, we contend that th e se t of enti tleme nts described by the
metaphor should in clud e not on ly the rule in isola tion , but also th ei r

l Oll. Sct' . t'. g .. Lau ra l.illllc rkull"le r. O n fJIIif!l' rl\ ': / \11 E.1sur. 1011 YALE L.J . 127 . 12<J. 1-1-l -15 ( l<J <Jl) (pos iting that prllperty e m bod ies ~rn inhere nt tcns iun between the individual and
th e co llec ti ve .): c{ Ne il Weinstock :'-Jc t ~1 n el. Cnprrighr 111/{1 u D enwcmric Civil So ciel\'. 1116
YALE L.J. 283.36-1 (19<J6) (s ugges ting. in th e cuntexl of copy ri ght. that the cha llenge facin g
decisio nmake rs is to stru ct ure th e t ~1 1V so that it strikes a .. ca re ful ba lance be twee n exclusivit1·
a nd access .. ).
10 !. See RICH A RD A. E l'STE \:--1 . T.AK I:--IGS: PRJ V !\ T E PROPE RTY AN D TH E P OWE R OF
EMIN ENT DOMAIN ( I<J:'N): cf J.H. Reichman. lnrellecruul Prop r.'rl\' in ln remarionul Fuu le:
Oppnrruniries und Risks uf u C:A TT Cnn necrion. 22 Y AN D. J. TR ANSNAT"L L. 747. 867
( 1989) (s ugges ting that pwg ress in in tt: rn a ti o na l inte llec tu al property re lati o ns has bee n
base d ·'on a process ol conse nsus that e nab led all participants to determine th e des ired bal a nce be twee n mo nopo ly and co mpe ti tio n.. ): De borah ·russey . Fru111 f {tn Sites ro Files/wring:
l'ersonul Us e in Cv br:rspo cc . 35 Gi\. L. Rev. 11 29 . !17 1 n. l4 1 (20<Jl) (no ting. in the intell ectual prope rty co ntext. that "u tilit a rianism seeks to ba lance creators' incentives aga inst th e
pub li c ri ght of access, providing monopoly ince nti ves onl y to the ex te nt necessary to induce
creation").
102. As Ia n Ayres ca uti oned. origin alit y is tri cky to claim . Indeed. it is poss ible th a t
Cn labresi and Melam ed saw the possibility of mixing p rope rty and liability rul e prote ction. It
is li kely that Le vmo re saw this opt io n. hut never deve loped it. whe n he me nti o ned th e possibility of less than pe rfect property ru le protect ion . A nd clearly. Mnri ll not iced. and even
di sc usse d, th e possibilit y of incor po ratin g a sim ilar mo de of protection in to th e doctrine s of
adve rse possessio n an d prescri pli ve case me nt s. See Thoma s W. iVI e rr iiL Property Rules.
I.iahilily Rules, and ; \d1·crsc fJo sscs.1ion . 7'J Nw. U. L. R ev. 11 22 (1984). Howeve r. !Yi e rrill" s
d isc uss io n wa s limi ted to th a t co ntex t. and was prim a ril y norma tive. !Yie rrill neve r went be yo nd adverse possess ion. H e did not ex plore th e desc ripti ve preva le nce of pli ab ili ty rules in
o th e r legal areas. nor d id he propose th e use o f plia bi lit y rul es in o ther se ttings.
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interconnections. Calabresi and Melamed's model is static; ours is dynarmc.
Our three-fold project in this P art is to demonstrate the conceptual
distinctiveness of pliability rules, show the descriptive pervasiveness of
such rules. and to expound the various goals pliability rule protection
serves. Our conceptual discussion focuses on demonstrating the distinctiveness of the category of pliability rules. and the importance of
pliability rules for extending Calabresi and Mclamecrs analysis.
As should be clear by the large number of examples presented in
this Part. we contend that lawmakers have preceded the academy to
pliability rules: pliability rules arc already widely used. Our descriptive
exposition covers various legal areas, with a m<~jor focus on property
and intellectual property law. as well as antitrust law and corporate
law. We show that in certain instances pliability rules enhance economic efficiency, while in others they promote fairness and distributive concerns.
Our normative aim here is to show that. due to their amalgamated
nature, pliability rules provide a unique policy tool for a variety of circumstances, such as the need to accommodate competing societal interests such as efficiency and equity, and monopoly power and competition. By combining property and liability rule protection, pliability
rules merge the respective strengths of the two modalities. 'We generalize our normative discussion in the next Part; here, our aim is to
show the gains achieved by each of the examples of pliability rule we
cite.
A.

Property+ Liability= Pliability
1.

Pliability and Grue

Pliability rules are amalgamated rules. They combine their familiar
cousins- property rules and liability rules- in numerous combinations. Among the many legal fields employing pliability rules are corporate law, intellectual property, eminent domain, and antitrust, as
well as several areas of law not discussed in rhis Part, such as bankruptcy. However, pliability rules are much more than a rearrangement
of familiar materials.
To illustrate the importance of pliability rules, we turn to an analogy provided by the philosopher Nelson Goodman. In his Fact, Fiction
and Forecast, Goodman sought to illustrate a problem with inductive
reasoning by hypothesizing an imaginary color called "grue." 103 An
item that is colored "grue" looks green to anyone who observes it
prior to a given time - for example, the year 2003. Thereafter, the
grue item appears blue. Goodman notes that before the year 2003,
103. NELSON GOODMAN. FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 74 er seq. (2cl eel. 1965).
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anyon e cxammmg the grue -colored item would be unable to tell
wh e ther she was looking at something that was gree n or something
th a t was gruc. Anyone he aring an item described as ··green" before
2003, or as "blue" aft e rw ards, would not kn ow wh et he r the described
ite m were actually gree n or blue, on the one hand . o r grue , on the
other. This. says Good m a n, demonstrates a characteri stic failure of in d uction. W hile gree n . blue and grue are all ontol og ica ll y distinct each bas its own di stinct co lo r characteristic - the obser ve r can never
indu ce whe th er she has see n grue or either gree n o r blue. Induction,
no tes Good man . fai ls to distinguish betwee n items th at appear th e
same, but are ontologically diffe rent.
Pliability rules are distinct from property and li abi lit y ruks, as grue
is fro m green and blu e . While a pliability rul e m ay appear as a prope rty or liability rul e at a ny given point in time, it is neve rtheless ontolog ical ly distinct. Unlike a property or li ability ru le , a pliability rule
co nt ains within itself its own conditions for change. A perso n who observ es property rul e or liability rule protection a t a give n point in time ,
and assumes that the property rule or liability rul e protection encapsul a tes the true legal protection of an object, may be making a critical
error. If the entitlem ent holder actually enjoys pliability rule protection over the obj ect, describing the protection as property rule or liability rule protection would constitute an ontological error. In this
se nse, a pliability analysis is thus the opposite of what Louis Kaplow
lab e led a "transitional" analysis - the analysis of how e ntitleme nts
sho uld be treated in th e face of " the existence of uncertainty concern in g (a] future governme nt policy (transition] prior to the governm e nt ac tion. " ' ~ Pliability rules provide entitlement ho lders with certainty concerning future changes in the rul es protecting th eir
e ntitl ements, and , therefore, a truer appreciati on of the nature of protection they enjoy at present.
Importantly, given that pliability rules have distinct properties and
a unique identity and course, they create a diffe rent se t of incentives.
Property rules are ge ner a lly thought to encourage greater investment
than liability rul es, since the entitlement holder m ay prevent involuntary loss of the object. P liability rules fall som ewhere in the middl e,
depending on the particul ar combination of prope rty rules and liability
rules. Also, certain pliability rules offer the additional advantage of
self-regulation as th ey allow the entitlement hold er to affect the nature of the protection she enjoys. We illustrate these important features of pliability rul es in the discussion and examp les later in this
Part.
Ne lson Goodman's discussion of grue provides a m e taphor for another key feature of our ana lys is of pliability rules. Good man does not
1 1

I 04. Louis Kaplow . An Econo111ic Analysis of Legal Tm mi1ions. 99 H A R V. L. RE v . 509 .
512 ( 1%6 ).
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suffice with grue's ontological distinctiveness; ultimately, Goodman
rejects the importance of grue on pragmatic grounds, noting that grue
is not a significant category in the real world. Thus , for the existence of
pliability rules to be noteworthy, such rules must have some practical
significance, as well as ontological identity. Our d iscussion in this Part
shows the pervasiveness of pliability rules in the legal world, rendering
pliability rules a more valuable category of analy~is than grue.
Indeed, as our discussion shows, pliability rules are so ubiquitous
in our legal regime that every entitleme nt can be viewed, in one sense
or another. as falling under the protection or pliability rules, rather
than property or liability rules. This, too. requires a practical approach. Property rules, liability rules, and plia bi lity rules are not divorced [rom the legal context in which they arise. In some cases, the
legal contingency that gives rise to a change in legal protection may be
so remote that it may be safely ignored for most purposes. Pure property or liability rules are the more useful framework for examining the
entitlement in such instances.
2.

Pliability and Calabresi and Melamed

The role of pliability rules can also be illustrated in reference to
Calabresi and Melamed's famous table of the four basic types of property and liability rules. Their table omitted inalienability rules. The table is meant to illustrate four possible responses to claims of nuisance.
The typical case underlying each cell in the table involves a homeowner suing a nearby polluter. In cell one, the plaintiff homeowner
enjoys property rule protection and is entitled to a court order enjoining the polluting activity. In cell two, the plaintiff homeowner receives liability rule protection. The polluter may continue her activities but must pay the homeowner for damages. In cell three, the
defendant polluter enjoys property rule protection. The polluter may
continue the activities, and the homeowner receives no relief. Cell
four involves liability rule protection for the defendant. The polluter
must cease her polluting activities, but the plaintiff homeowner must
pay the defendant polluter for the resulting damages.
The table below illustrates these possibilities, with cases in which
courts may be deemed to have employed the relevant type of protection.
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1: PROPERTY RU LES AND LIAB ILIT Y RULES

1. Property Rul e (Plaintiff)
Deparrment of Health & Menw!
H ygiene v. Calo:ry Ch emical Co. 1" \

2. Liability Rul e ( Plaintiff)
B oomer v. Atlantic Cenz ent 1"'

En sign \". v\ioll.\ 1" "

3. Property Rule (Defe ndan t)
I
Francisco 1". DeporTment of
[
Institutions & Agencies 11 ' : Rose v. I
[
Soco ny Vucu //Ill Corp. 1' '''

4. Liability Rule (Defe ndant)
Spur lndusrries Inc. 1". Dei/ E.
Webb Deve!op m e11f Co. 11"

As we noted in the last Part, the Ca le bresi-M clamed ia n four- ce ll
table has been the lau nchin g pad for man y analyses o f propert y a nd
liability rules. In th a t vein , we illustrate th e place of pliability rul es
within the traditio nal four-ce ll table. A s the ir name implies, pliab ility
rules are amalgamated ru les that combine property and liability rule
protection. Under pli ability rule protection , the entitleme nt holder initia lly receives one type of rule protection - property or liability and then upon th e occurrence of a certa in contingency , the nature of
the protection changes to an oth er kind of rul e protection. Som e times,
pliability rules invo lve transfer o f the entitl e ment itself.
T he next table ad ds th e poss ibility of pliability rules, illustrated by
the arro ws. As the ta ble demonstrates, pli ability rules involve either a
simult aneous rule, in which more than o ne of the rules applies at the
same time, or, mo re common ly, a changin g rule, in which protection
begins with one o f th e four types of ordin ary Calabresi-Me lame dian
property and liabi li ty rules, a nd then, upon a specifi ed event, ch anges
to another of th e four types of rul es. Alth ough there is no limit on the
numbe r of possible pliability rules, we illustrate in the chart, only th e
six prototypical pli a bility rules that we describe in this Part.

105. 1 ENY IR . R EP 1660 (Md . C ir. C t. 1970) (enjoining che mica l sme ll s) .
106. 34 N .W.2cl 549 (M ic h. 194R) (enjo inin g rai sin g a clog in res iden ti a l ne ig hborhood).
107. 257 N .E.2d R70 (N.Y. 1970) (ru ling that a vo idance of injuncti on was co nditi o n ed o n
pa ym e nt of pe rman ent damages to pl a intiffs).
108. 180 A . 843 (N.J. C h. 1935) (h o lding that plaintiffs were not e ntitl e d to enjoin no ise
and odors of aclj;1cent san ita ri um) .
109. 173 A. 62 7 (R. I. llJ34 ) (findin g th at absent negli ge nce. po llu tio n o f pe rco lat ing wate rs was no t e njoin ilb le).
110. 494 P.2d 700 (Ar iz . 1972) (e nj o inin g the opera tor o f a fe ed lo t from continuing its
ope r ation. but ordering th at a devel oper rep resenting res id e nts ind emnify the tortfeasor for
the cost of moving or shutting clown).
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T A BLE 2: PROPERTY RULES , LIABIUTY RULES , AND PLI ~\l31LlTY
RULES

1. Property Rule (Plaintiff)

2. Liability Rule (Plaintiff)

Classic Pliabilitv

Title
Shifting

3. Property Rule (Defendant)

4. Liability Rule (Defendant)

As the table demonstrates, we focus our discussion on six prototypes of pliability rules that are common in existing law.
The first set of pliability rules involves property rules that are
transformed into liability rules - "classic pliability rules" under our
terminology. T he legal protection of post-freeze-out minority shareholders provides an example of such classic pliability rule protection.
The second set comprises the particular variety of pliability rules
that we call "zero order pliability rules"- property rules that become
liability rules where the compensation for breach of the rule is zero.
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A n examp le of a zero order plia bility rul e is copyright protection , under which the a uthor receives a property right for her life p lus seventy
ye ars, and th ereafte r anybody can usc th e copyri gh ted express ion free
of charge.
As a third set of prototypical pli abi lit y rul es, we turn to th e ca se of
'·s imultaneous pli ability rul es," in which the same entitle m e nt holder
ho lds one type of rul e protection with respect to so me pote ntial users ,
b ut a different type of rul e protec ti on with respect to other users. For
ex ample, th e fa ir use doctrine in co pyright law red uces the usual proper ty rul e protection to zero order li ab ility pro te ct io n where th e use of
the copy ri ght entitleme nt constitutes a '·fair use .- ' 111
The fo ur th set includes " lop erty rule s," in whi ch init ia l li ability rul e
protecti o n is transformed into property rule protection. The trans!orm ati o n of ca ttl e-feed ing righ ts resulting from fe ncing pasture in a
"fe ncing-out " lega l r egim e provid es an examp le of a loperty rule.
T he fifth se t of pliability rules we exam in e consists of "title shi ftin g
pliability rul es," i.e., rul es th at transform property rule protection in
the hands of one entitlement ho lder into property ru le protection in
the hands of another entitlem en t hol der. Adve rse possessio n provides
the classic example of this type of pli ability rul e.
Finally, we examine the case of " multiple stage pli ability rules," in
which rul e protection is changed more th an o nce. For examp le, we observe th at eminent domain can be viewed as property rul e protect ion
fo ll owed by lia bility rule protecti o n in th e hands of the original owner,
and then propert y rule protection in the hands of the subse qu ent entitlement hold er.

B.

Classic Pfiob ility Rules

Classic pliability r ul es, as we noted, invo lve the tra nsform ati on of
an en titlem en t fro m property rul e to liability rul e pro tec tion. In cases
involving cl assic pliability rules, property rules provide the baseline
prot ection in order to advance effi cient allocatio n of reso urces. B y
cre ating in r em rights in reso urces, prope rty rules re duce the cost of
defending the item against potential takers, a llo wing owners to in vest
o ptimally in the item's use . Where exogeno us transaction costs are
low, the in r em protection comes at low cost, since the object will still
gravitate to the highest value user. Moreover, property righ ts themse lves lower transaction costs and facilitate exch ange by re ducin g the
cost of defining ownership and usage rights in obj ects.
However , class ic pliability rules also take into account the many
instances in which the defaul t property rule protection b ecomes inefficient or unfair. Classic pliability rules, by defining th e tri ggering event
111. Adm it tedly , in fr ami ng the issue in thi s way, we treat users as intrinsica ll y wed ded
to certa in types of uses, which blurs the impo rtant distincti on be twee n uses and users.
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that a lters protection from prope rty to liability rule. re ta in s the advan tag es of b as eline property rul e protection, wh il e creating the flexibili ty
to adapt to changing circumstances.
""VVe introduce th e category with an exa mination of the most
straightforward exa mple: th e ri ghts of min ority share ho ld e rs in th e aftermath of merge rs a nd acquisitions.
1

~

.

/v!erge rs ond Acquisirimzs

Ord in ar il y. share ho lders in a corporati o n e n jo y prope rty r ule pro te ct ion ove r their s ha res . Subj ect to reporting a nd a iienab ility restr iction s es tablished by law , shareholders ma y free ly sell or tra nsfe r th e ir
share s. and shares m ay not b e appropriated by nono wne.r:.; without the
o wner' s co nse nt. 112 However, most types of co rporat e d ec isions do not
require un an im o us asse nt. This category inc lud es k ey dec isions such as
merge rs o r free ze-o ut takeovers that forc e minority shareholders to
surre nd er their shares in exchange for compensation determined by
the corpora tion. 1u Ge nerally, in such cases, state law entitles min ority
share ho lders to petition for court review of the ad eq uacy of the compen sat ion. This right to demand review is te rm e d an appra isa l right. 11 ~
11 2. S ee WILLIAM L. CA RY & MELVIN ARON E ISENB ERG. C ORPORATIONS: CASES
.Ai\ D MA TERIA LS 92 (6 th e el. 1992) (notin g th a t " sh ares of co rpora te stock a re fr ee ly tra ns-

ferable .. ). Cary and Eise nbe rg also obse rve that unde r th e U.C.C.. a stock ce rtificate is a nc:·
got iab le in strument. See id. a t 92 n.4 (citing U.C.C. s§ 8- 102, 8 -1 05( 1) ). Th e re fore. .. a tran sfer to a holder in du e course cu ts off m ost cla im s again st th e tra nsfere e ... !d.
11 3. Co 111pore Weinbe rge r v. UOP.ln c .. 457 A.2d 701,713 (Del. 1983) (holding tha t ap prai sa l is th e o nl y ava ilab le re medy fo r minority sh are ho ld e rs in a c:1sh -ou t m e rger. a nd
no tin g th at .. [flair pri ce o bvi o usly req uire s consideration o f a ll relevant [ac to rs in vo lving th e
va lu e of a companv .. ). •villi Rabkin v. Philip A . Hunt C he m. Corp.. 498 A .2d 1099. I 106.
1107-08 (Del. 1985) (hol ding tha t apprai sal is not an exclusive remedy whe n the defe nd an t
e nga ged in fa ithless act s th a t were re asonab ly related to and have a sub stan tial impac t up o n
the price o ffe red in a fr eeze -out merge r).
114. S ee J ESS E H. C HOPER ET AL.. CASES AND M ATE RIALS ON CORPO RATIONS 11 67
(3 d eel. 1989) (defi nin g ·' disse nte rs· a ppra isal ri gh t'. as th e ri ght of .. [sjh a re ho lde rs who di sse nt fr o m a co rporate me rge r a nd. in mos t state s. s hare ho lde rs who d isse nt fr o m the sal e of
all or s ubs ta ntially a ll of th e ir cor porati on 's asse ts ... to re quire the corpora tion to purc ha se
th e ir shares at a judicial ly de te rmined price") .
For a sa mple of sta tut es that provide for dissente rs' app raisal ri ghts. se c CAL. COR I'.
COD E§§ 17600-17613 (Wes t 1.999) (p roviding for di ssente rs' right s with regard to certa in
reo rga niza ti o ns or me rge rs o f limited liability co rp o ration s) : FLA. ST.·H. A NN .
608.4381 (4)( d ) (W es t 1999) (refe rrin g to offers re quired in conne ctio n with disse nte rs'
rights) ; NY. Bus . CORP. L AW§ 1005 (McKinney 1994) (pr oviding for pa yme nts to di sse nting m embe rs in the case of certain m e rge rs or consolida ti ons) ; OHI O REV . CODE ANN.
§ 1705.40 (A nderson 1998) (outlining me mbe rs' entitle m e nt to relief as di sse nting members) .
Man y co rporation s sta tutes lack simil a r protec ti on s, notwithstandin g the wide sp re ad
prov isio n of a prrai sal right s for min o rity 0\Vners in corpo rati o ns. See Joe l Se li g man.
R eappra ising file Appraisal Remedy, 52 G EO . W AS H. L. REV. 829, 831-32 & n.l1 ( 1984) (re portin g that a li fift y sta tes a nd th e Distri c t of Columbia p rov ide apprai sa l rights in case of a
corpora te merge r or con solidation); see also Sa ndra K. Miller, Wlw1 Buy-Ou1 Rig/us, Fidu ci ary Dwies, and Dissolwion R emedies Sh o uld Apply in 1he Ca se of rli e Min orify 01vn er of u
Liabi/in· Com pany?, 38 HARV. J. ON L EG IS. 413.416- 17 (200 1). For example, some limite d
liabilit y co rpo ration s sta tutes do not prov ide for di sse nt ers' right s in th e case of ce rtain
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Conside r the case of th e class ic te nder offer accompani ed by a
freeze-o ut. The target corporation is a publicly he ld corpo rati o n with .
let us say. 100,000 o utstanding shares. An acquiring corporation desires to purchase and incorporate the business of the target corporation into its own. To this end , the acquirer issues a tender offer for the
purchase of 50,001 of the targe t's shares. Following th e success of the
te nd e r offer. th e acquirer int ends to usc th e 50,001 shares to cau se th e
target to vo te to m e rge itself into the acquire r. U nd er the te rm s of the
merger deal. the target will sell al l its assets to the acquirer for cash,
and t hen ce ase to exist as an ind epe nd e nt co rpor at ion. Since minori ty
:; harc hold e rs in the target will be forced to rece ive cash in exchan ge
fo r the ir shares in the dissolving corpora ti o n. th e nature of the ir en ti tleme nt will be transformed from prope rty rule protection into li ability
rul e prot ec tion. If displensed with the a mount of compensat ion set by
the majority (the acquirer's 50,001 shares), the m in ority sha rehold ers
may seck judicial app raisal of the value of their shares in the tmge t.
E ith e r way, th e minority shareho ld ers lack the ability to veto the
transfer of their asse ts and must make do with a third party determination of the amount they will receive.
Minority share ownership in the face of majoritarian corporate
decisionmaking is therefore a pliability entitleme nt: in most cases, a
share is a property interest entitled to property rule protection, but the
adoption of certain corporate decisions alters the nature of the shareholde r's interest in his or her shares. The provision in state law r equiring majority decisions to engage in a me rg er, fre eze-out takeover
or th e lik e, should therefore be viewed as creating a classic pliability
rule.
The use of a pliability rule in this case is justifiabl e on grounds of
both fa irness and e fficiency. The property rule baseline, by empowering sha re holders to dispose of their shares ns they please , induces investme nt in the stock market, and allows individuals to plan ahead.
Since ordinary share trading on the market is relatively cheap, marke ts
are liquid , and there is no inheren t reason to assume that non-holding
inve stors value shares more highly than existing shareholders, property rule protection is th e optimal means for ensuring that shares are
efficiently alloca ted.
However, in scenarios involving transfer of corporate control,
property rule protection is unduly cumbersome. Obtaining un animous
consent is likely to be prohibitively costly. Additionally, strategic
holdouts may bar such transactions altogether. Under a unanimous
co nsen t rule, each shareholder will find it in her interest to holdout in
order to increase her expected payoff.l 15 Finally, in the absence of stram e rgers o r acqui sitions. and fe w corporations statutes pro vid e a n equitable dissolution or
buy-out rem edy in the case of ille gality or fraud. !d. at 417.
1 15. See Zohar G oshen. Voling (In sincerely) in
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tegic behavior, majority decisions are the best mechanism for maximizing the wealth of the shareholders as a group. Thus, to ensure the
efficient operation of the market for corporate control, corporate law
replaces the property rule baseline with a liability rule triggered by
majority de cis i ems.
While a pliability rule in this context is superior to both unchanging property and liability rule protection, it still leaves open the possibility of majority abuse in the liability phase. In cases of freeze-out
takeovers, for cxmnpk, majority shareholders may use their power to
divest minority shctreholders of their assets to tran~:;fer value from the
minority to the majority. Majority decisions make minorities vulnerable to unfair <:sset :;ubstitution, in which the majority uses a merger or
takeover to substitute one set of assets underlying the share for another, less valuable set. 116 The law thus ensures the shareholders' right
to adequate wmpensation in the liability stage of the pliability rule by
means of an appraisal right. 117

INQUIRIES L. Sl5. S20 (2001) (explaining the holdout problem with the example of a corporation that asks for its bondholders' consent to an interest rate decrease to ease the corporation's debt burclt:n- a Jccision requiring the unanimous consent of all the bondholders:
.. Despite the fact that this decrease in the interest rate may be in the best interests of all the
bondholders, an individual bondholder may vote strategically against the change. withholding her consent until she is paid a higher price for her support.").
116. Modern explanations of the importance of appraisal rights tend to rocus on reducing the c!istortive effects of two-tier tender offers. See. e.g., Daniel FischeL The Appraisal
R!'medy in Corporare Law. lY83 Ai\1. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 879 (1983) (arguing that ap praisal rights :1lleviatc the prisoner's dilemma in the case of a two-tier tenckr offer): Hidcki
Kanda & Saul Le vmore. The 1\ppraisal Re111 edy and the Goals of Corporate Lmv. 32 UCLA
L. REV. 42lJ, 463-469 (1985) (contemplating the theoretical potential of appraisal rights as a
general monitoring tool against management which reduces the ex ante costs of the agcncv
relationship). These e :-.:planations of the importance of appraisal rigl1ts also tt:nd to focus on
ensuring minoritv shareholders a '·fair share" of value created in the corporate change. See
Victor Bruclnev & Marvin A. Chirelstein. Fair Shares in Corporate Nfergers unci Tak('(Jvi'rs.
08 l-IARV. L. REV. 297. 336 ( 1974) (arguing that in the case of a two-tier tender offer, ·'the
function of a fa irness standard should primarily be one of preventing deception"): Council of
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association, The Proposed
Delaware Takeover Statute: A Report to the Delaware General Assembly 3 ( i 988) (noting
that a potential bidder is able to ··take over the company without the approval of the board,
sell the assets, and dividend out the proceeds and have each stockholder receive his fair
share of its assets"). rather than "asset substitution." For further explanation. see also Peter
V. Ldsou, The Role ofAppraisal in Corpomte Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121 (19YS); Paul Mahoney & Mark Weinstein. The Appraisal Re111edy and Merger Prerniums, l Aivl. L. & ECON.
REV. 239 (llJlJ9): Barry M. Wertheimer, Thf' Shareholders' Appraisal Remedv unci H o w
Courts Detenninl' Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613 (1998).
.
117. Under the stock market exception , many appraisal statutc:s do not apply to widely
held public corporations. See. e.g .. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, 262(b)(1) (1991 ).
Ot he r lega l mechanisms exist to protect minority shareholders, especially in the close
corporation context. For example, Delaware permits the shareholders of a close corporation
to include in the certificate of incorporation a provision allowing dissolution at the request of
any shareholder. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (1991). Similarlv. the Model Business
Corporation Act empowers courts to order the involuntary dissolution of a corporation if a
shareholder establishes that (i) tl1e directors arc in a deadlock that cannot be broken by the
shareholders: (ii) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting ,
or will act in a manner that is ·'illegal. oppressive or fraudulent:'' (iii) the shareholders are
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Essenria/ Fociliiies wzd A nrirrust Donwges

The essenti al facilities doct rine in ant itrus t law provides anoth er
exampl e of a class ic pliabilit y rul e. Ori ginating in Un ited States v.
Terminal Railroad Associmion .11 ' th e doctrine renders it illegal for
own ers of .. esse nti al faciliti es'· to deny o th e rs access as the res ul t of
anticom petiti ve motives or un der conditi ons that reduce compe tition.
Essenti al faciliti es are faciliti es that cdnrwt pc,lcti ca ll y be duplica ted
and are necessary for competitors· sur viva l. ' ,,, The C<lse of Temzinol
Rai!mod is ill um inatin g. T here. fin anci e r Jay Ciu uld es tablished a
group th a t acquired co ntro l ove r all the fac iliti es necessa ry to load or
unl oad freight or passe ngers. or cruss th e Mi ssissippi River in the area
of St. Lo uis. G o ukrs group used it s mo no po ly pmvcr to impose premium pricing o n use rs o r th e fac iliti es ow ned by his gro up . T he
Termin al Roilrood Co urt found in thi s arra ngemen t a violation o r sec tions l and 2 of th e Sherman Act. Howeve r. rather than strip Gou ld of
his property by orde ring divestiture , the Co urt established that Go uld
could maintain his monopoly ove r the St. Lo ui s nexus - a facility esse ntial to trans-Mississippi traffic in the Mi chves t - so long as pricing
(and other terms of usage) we re regulatcd. 120
Th e essenti al facilities doctrine has been ex tend ed to a wide array
of assets , including electri city distributi o n networks ,12 1 telep hone
transm ission and switching sys tems,m gas pipelines, 123 and th e New

deadl oc ke d and hav e bee n unable to elec t clirc:c ttx s fc1 r a t least two co nsecutive a nnual
me e tin gs: o r (iv) the co rpo rate cbSets cHC being mi sappl ie d or ,,·astc: d. S ee M ODEL Dus.
CORP. f\ CT ~ 1-+.30(2) ( I 960) (amended I 90-i ): Michae l P. Doolc v & M ic hael D. Goldman.
Som e Compa risons Ben veen !h e !vl ndel Bus int>ss Co rp or111iu n A cl und lhr Defmva rr G en r ml
Corporlllion L 111v. 56 Dus. LAw. 737 . 7-17 (2 00 1). Th e "opp ressio n" g ro und is m os t ofte n
c it ed in pe titi o ns for disso lution. and so me co urts have rec ognized a Cll!Se o f ac ti o n for o ppr ess io n o utside o f the di ssolution co nt e xt. Se e R obe rt B. Thom pso n. The Slwrelw lder.,
Caus e of Auion f o r Oppression. 48 Bu s. L ". w. 699 ( 1993 ). However. d isso lution pr ocee dings
rare ly res ult in th e act ua l dissoluti on of th e corporati o n but o ften res ult in a bu yo ut o f the
pe titi o ne r's shares. o r. mo re rarel y. th e pet it io ner's b uyo ut o f th e majo rit y's shares . Sec . e.g ..
Park McG int y. R eplacing H oslile Tak eovers . 1-14 U. P ,'\ . L. R.E V. 983.999-1002 ( 1996) (co ncluding tha t in vo lu nt a ry dissol uti on "e ith e r levels th e te rrain o n wh ich opp ressed min o rity
shareho ld e rs nego ti at e o r (q uite r·are lv) fu r·ces liquid a ti o n" ) .
11R. 224 U.S. 383 (l9 12) .

J 19. See . e.g .. H echt v. Pro-footba ll. In c. :170 F. 2cl082 ( D.C. C ir. 1077).
120. Src genemllv A bbott B. L ipsky. Jr . & J. G regory Sida k. Esse111ial Fucili1ies. 51
STA N. L. R EV . 11 87 ( 1999) .
12 l. See Otter T a il Powe r Co. v. U nit e d States. -i1(J U.S . 366 ( 197?< ): C ity of Anah e im v.
S. Ca l. Ed ison C o .. 955 F.2cl 1373 (9th Ci r. 1 992) : C it y of Ve rnon v. S. Ca l. Edison Co ., 95 5
F. 2c! 136 1 (9 th Cir. 1992)
122. See MCI Co mmuni ca ti o ns Co rp. v. A m. ·re i. & Tel. Co .. 70o F. 2cl 108 1 (7 th Ci r.
1983); Be ll A t!. Corp. v. MFS Communi catio ns Co .. 00 1 F. Supp. 835 ( D. De l. 1995).
123. See City of C ha nute v. Willi a m s Natural Ga s Co .. 955 F. 2d 64 1 (JO th Cir. 1992) :
Illin o is e.r ref. Burri s v. Pan handle E. Pipel in e Co .. 935 F.2d 1-169 (7th Ci r. 1991): Gars!J man
v. Unive rsal R es. H o ldin g. Inc , 824 F.2d 223 (3 d Ci r. 1987) .
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York Stock Exchange. 124 The aim , in all cases, has been to preserve the
adv a nt<1gcs or unifi e d control of the essenti a l fclcility. o n the one hand ,
and to avoid the ineffici e ncies or monopoly pricing. o n the o t her. 1c5
The doctrine re quires co urts to mandate access to privately O'Nn e d
prope rt y once it be comes esse ntial for compe tition. Th us. the essentia l
faci liti es doctrin e provides an example of a jud iciall y tri ggered classic
pl ia bility rule . U pon a judicial finding or a n esse ntial facilit y. th e
ow ne r' s property rule pro tec tion over he r esse nti a l facilit~· changes
into li a bility rul e pro tec ti o n. S he reta ins ownersh ip o f th e facil it y but
mus t grant acce ss to compe ti tors at a price determined or rev iewed by
a third party - th e court o r a regulator.
T he use of a pliability ru le in the instance of esse ntial facililies en ab les co urts to preserve th e baseline advant ages of pro perty rules d isc ussed ea rlier - such as enco uraging optimal invest m ent and reducing
tra nsactio n costs - whil e introducing liabilit y rules in th ose cases
where circums tan ces m ake s uch rules more ad va ntageo us. Specifically,
th e liability rul e stage dimini shes th e socia l d ea dw e ig ht loss associate d
with monopol y pricin g by granting competitors access to necessary facil iti es at an approximatio n of competitive pricing.
In mandating a liability rule as the second stage of the pliability
rul e, rather than dividing th e property amon g differe nt firms, the esse ntial facilities doctrin e produces another benefit. Keeping the prope rty together und er one roof preserves th e eco nom ies of scale produced by natural mon opo lies, while the liability rule avo ids the cost of
m o no polistic pricing. In a n atural monop oly, th e cos t of providing a
se rvice d eclines with o utput , making a single pro vide r the optimum
fro m a cost perspecti ve. 126

l :Z4 Set' Silver v. New York Stock Exch .. 373 U.S. 341 (l%3).
125 . To effectuate th e balance. the essential faciliti es doctrine imposes liability on a
She rman Act section 2 defendant when the plaintiff proves th e fo llowing e lements: (I) con trol of an essential facility by a monopo list: (2) a competito r··s inab ility reasonably or practi ca ll y to duplicate th e essentia l fac ility: (3) denial of th e use of th e facility to the compe titor:
and (4) providing th e competitor access to the fa cility is feasible . See /vi C /. 708 F. :Zd atll32 33 (lay ing o ut fo ur facto rs) : J ULI AN 0. VON KALI NOWSK I ET AL.. ANTITRUST L AWS AND
TRADE R EGULATI ON§ 25.04(3] n.ll 4 (2d ed. 2001) (listing cases adopting or ci tin g with a pprova l th e /'v/C/ formul ation of th e e leme nts of an esse ntia l faci lities case). Howeve r, th e esse ntial facilities doctrine has no t me t wi th uni ve rsa l approva l. See. e.g., Philip E. Aree da, Es selllinl F({ ciliries: An Epithe1 In Need of Limiting Prin ciples . 58 Ai\TITRUST L.J. 841 (19YU)
(a rguin g that no Supreme Court case has provided a consistent rationa le for the doctrin e or
has explored either th e socia l cos ts and benefits or th e adm ini st rative costs of requirin g th e
crea tor of an asset to share it with a rival).
l2ii. See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOV r\C IC. ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOrvrr cs IN A NUTSHELL 70 (4 th ed. 1994) ("In what is known as a ·natural mon opoly.' a
single firm' s average costs decl ine with output. meaning that it is a lwa ys less cos tly for th e
one firm to produce any leve l of output rather than subdivide production among two o r
mo re firm s.'') : Christophe r Wyet h Kirkham, B usting tlze Administmtive Tm st: A n Expe rillll!!I!Uiisr 1\ pproach 10 Univ ersal Service Administration in T e/ecom n111nicarions Policy. 9R
CO LU'vl. L. RE V. ()20. 621 n.4 (1998) (describing na tur al monopolies as "situa tio ns in wh ich
th e ma rginal cost of production or se rvi ce provision declines with increasin g economies of
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So far. our discussion ha s focu se d on th e ex post ei1e ct ol the esse nti al fac ilit v doctrine - i. e., th e o utcome that results fr om the aDDli' '
ca tion of the doctrine. It is al so import ant to not e the ,; x ante effe ct of
the doctri ne. particularly the ince nti ve it creates for se lf regu lation.
Because own e rs of facilitie s that may eventually be found ,;:;scnti al
kno w tha t they enj oy onl y pli ability rule, not property rul e prot.ecti on,
they will se lf- reg ula te in ord er to re main in the property rule :;tagc o f
the pliability rule. T hey can do so eith er by e nsuring that they do not
acc umula te assets in a way th at stymi es competition. or by Yoluntarily
granting access to compet ito rs.
Th is last point demonstrates a broad er im plication ot pl i ~1b ility
anal ys is of antitru st law. T he esse ntial fac iliti es doct rin e is net the sole
a ntitrust remedy to e mploy pliability rules; in deed. piia bility u 1 k~; m<lY
be see n as th e animatin g prin cipl e behind an titru st law. In <.l p liability

sca le ac ross the size of th e ent ire marker:· nnd not ing th at ·· [ij n such a case. opt im;1 l sucia l
utility is arguably gaint:cl bv co ncent rating production in a single enter prise .. ): Josep h
i'.-lonti c ro & Gera ld Robe rts on. S!Iipfiing Co nference L egislari(ln in Cwwdu. rile r ·uroJ)('il n
Eco n omic Com n utniry and ril e Unired Srares: Background, Fm erg ing Dcve/opn1enrs. Trends
and a Few ivfrrjo r Issues. 26 TRANSP. L.J. 141, 203 (1'1'19) (ex plaining -that the cost fun ction of

n n3tura lmo nopolist is subaddi ti ve nt output because it is more expensive fo r two or more
fi rms to produce th an it is fo r th e natu ra l monopolist to produce alone) .
Nn tural monopolies may ari se in vn riou s contexts. For te lecommuni cations . sec D anie l
F. Spulber. De reg ularing Telecon1municarions. 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 ( 199.5) (d iscuss ing
nn tur al mon opoly in th e context of te lecommunications). Bur see Robe rt W. Cranda ll & J.
G rego ry Sidnk. Comperirion and Regularory Po licies for Inreracrit·e Broadband Ner,,·orks. 68
S. CAL. L. REV . 1203 . 1214 (199.5) (warning th at "[w]hen fo rmu lating polici es for inte ra ctive
bronclba nd networks .. . regubtors should be cautious abou t assu ming that natural mun opoly wi ll nece ssar ily charac terize such ne tworks " beca use '·[w]hat was o nce a na turally monopoli stic mc: thocl for delivering a particul ar kine! of telecommunicat ions se rvice may be
suppl anted ove r time by n !own-cost method th a t does no t necessa ril y have la rge sun k cos ts
and low increme ntal costs. ' ). For public utilities. see Jim Ros,i. Tlli: Comm on Lo11 · ··Dury ro
Se rve" ond Pru recrion of Consumers in an A ge of Co m peririv c Reroil Public Ut i!ily Resrrucru rin g . 5 1 VAN D. L. RE V. 1233.1 237 (1998) (defining a ··publi c utili ty.. as ·· a la rge \·e rti ca ll yintegrated firm th at provides service to all custome rs within its geograp hicall y-clcfin ecl se rvice a rea'·). es pecinll y th e transmission segme nts of public utili ties. see Christo pher G . Bo nd.
Shedding N ew Lighr on rlze Eco nom ics of E!ecrric R esrrucru ring: / \ re R eruil !'vlurkers fen·
E!ecr riciry rhe Amwer ro Rising Energy Costs~. 33 CONN. L. REV. 13 11 . 13:23 (200 I) (notin g

tha t "[t]he tra nsmission segmen ts of the tmdition nl public utiliti es (e lectri ci ty. ph one. and
ga s) are often cited as th e best exa mples of na tural monopolies'") . For wa ter wo rks an d ca ble
te levision, see Lancaste r Cmt y. Hosp. v. Ante lope Valley Hosp. Di st. . 940 F.2cl 397. 40 1 n. 8
(9 th Cir. l99l) (e xplaining that "e lectric utilities, wnter works. an d cable television are gene rnll y hi ghl y regulated " beca use " th ese industries are paradignwt ic examples of natu ral monopolies" ). For newspape r deli very . see R oge r D. Blair & Joh n E. Lopa tka . Th e A lbrecht
Rule afrer Kahn: D earh Beco m es Her . 74 NOTR E D AME L. REV. 123, 152 (19% ) (nu ting that
·· newspa per deli ve ry has na turnl monopoly characte risti cs in very smnll are as .. ).
On the econ omics of natural mono poly. see ge nernll y \VILLIA !vl J. B AU ~IOL ET AL ..
CONTESTABLE MAR KETS AN D TI-lE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STR UCTURE i< (rc;v . eel . 1%8) :
SANFOR D V. BERG & J OHN T SC HIRH ART, NATURA L fv!Oi\OPO LY R EGULATI ON :
PR INC IPLES AN D PRACT ICE :22 (1988): D ENN IS W. CAR LTO N & .J EFFREY M. PERLOFF.
MODERN INDUSTRI AL 0RGANIZATlO:'-l 29.5-96 (2d eel. l994); ROGER SHER\ 1,\N. TH E
REG ULATI ON OF MON OPOLY 80-81 (1989); D AN IEL F. SPULBEK. RE GU U TIOI\ AND
MA RKETS 3 (1989); JE AN TIROL E, THE TH EO RY OF INDUSTRIAL 0RGA 'i !ZATI O:--i 19-20
(1988); KC:~NE TH E. TRA IN, 0PTI~ I A L REGUL ATION : TH E ECONO'vii C TH EOPY OF
NATL:Ri\ L iV!O:--iOPOL Y 6-8 (1991).
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analysis. <ll1titru st law aims 8t defining th e a nticompetiti ve conditi o ns
th at should tri gger a change of legal pro tect ion from on e type ol property ru le prot ec tion to a diffe rent typ e o f p roperty or liability rul e . In
contras t to th e esse ntial fac iliti es doctrin e. not all ant itrust remed ies
crea te class ic p li ab ilit y rul es . For exa mpl e . rem edi es req ui ring the
brea k up u f th e a ntico mpe ti tive corpor a ti o n ca n be see n as enforc in g a
titl e shifting p li ab ility rul e in which, up on the occurrence of <1 give n
tri gge ring conditi o n, prop e rty rule protec ti o n passes from the h <mds of
o ne e ntitlement ho ld e r (th e a nticom pc titi ve corporation) to one o r
mo re ot her e nti tle ment ho ld e rs.
3.

Pos£-B oomcr Nuisw zce

Fina ll y. we turn to th e nuisa nce ru le crea te d b y Boolller v. Arlruzric
Cem ent Cu .;:: as yet a noth e r exa mple o f a class ic pliabi lit y ru le. In
Boomer. a g roup of homeowners brought a laws uit seek ing to enjoin
th e nuisance cause d by pollution from th e Atlantic Ce ment pla nt. D evi a tin g from th e es ta blish e d rule of aw a rdin g injunctions in such cases .
th e New York Co urt of A ppeals pe rmitt e d the plant to continue o pe ra tion s. provided that A tl a ntic Ceme nt pa y perman e nt dam ages to
th e homeowners. The court reas oned th at the Atlantic Ce ment plant
was too valuabl e re lative to th e homeo wn e rs ' polluti on losses to follow th e traditi o na l rule. F or Ca labresi and M elame d , the Boomer decision re prese nts an instan ce of liability rul e prote ctio n. Effec ti ve ly,
the court preve nte d th e h omeowners from exercising their prope rty
rul e r ight to exc lud e Atlanti c Cement's poll ution. Instead, th e co urt
forc e d them to suffe r th e po llution in exchange for the liability rule
co mpe nsa tion decreed by th e cour t.
Whil e Calabresi and M e la med 's sta tic perspective is valid in de scribin g the imm ediate effect of th e Boom er decisio n , its impa ct fro m
th e dynamic pe rspe ctive we offer is eve n more far reaching. In jurisdictio ns adopting Boomer's reasoning as a rule of law, Boomer created
a pliabili ty rule. Under th e Boomer plia bility rule , hom e owne rs e nj oy
property rule protection against all nuisa nces in stage one. Howeve r,
once a nuisance-crea ting act ivity becomes sufficie ntly valuabl e, th e
Boomer rule d owngrades th e homeown ers' entitleme nt into li a bility
rul e protec tion . The Boom er pliability rule thus aims to preserve
pro pe rt y rul es in most cases, while adopting liability r ule protec tion
where enj o inin g a nuisance diminish es eco nomic e ffici e ncy. Imp ortantly, the re te ntion of th e property rule baseline in this case wo uld
crea te a hold-out problem, as it would forc e Atlantic Cemen t to buy
out the injunctio n from each of plaintiffs -homeown ers . Con versely ,

127. 257N.E.2d870(N. Y 1970) .
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e limin a ting property rul e protec tion altoge th e r would exccssivel v reduce incentives for inves tm e nt in the property.

C.

Ze ro Order Pliability Rules

Lik e classic pliability rul es. ze ro order pliability rules begin with
property rul e pro tec tion for th e e ntitlem e nt ho ld er. However , by co ntrast with classic pliability rul es. in the second , liab ility, stage ol th e
p li ab ilit y rule , th e expec ted li ab ility damages fo r us e of the asse t a rc
zero. Thus. in ze ro order pli a bility r ul es, property rule protection is
succee ded by 8 no- li abi lit y rul e . U pon th e triggeri ng eve nt, the initi cll
e ntitl e ment hold er loses the a bility to exercise property rule pro tc1>
tion. such as th e ri ght to exc lud e, over her prope rty. Instead, all com ers may use the prope rty fr ee of charge - th at is, with zero o rder
liability. No twithstanding the ze ro order liability, no third pmty may
gain a supe rior right to th a t of th e original en title me nt holde r. The
ze ro order pliability rul es may therefore b e seen as creating a ntiexclusion , open access, or common property regimes.
As the examples we bring from copyright and pa tent make clea r ,
zero order pliability rule protection is ubiquitous in the context of intell ectual property. There, ze ro order pliability rul es serve both economic efficiency and th e interests of fairness. Zero order pliability
preserves property rul e protection necessary to encourage investm e nt
in useful invention s, while also using zero order liability to curb th e
dea dweight loss created by m o nopoly powe r over the creation. Like wise , ze ro order pliability ba lances the claims of justice by the crea tor
who wants exclusive control over her creation , o n th e one hand , and
th e public that cla ims a need to use the creation , o n th e o ther.
l.

Copy right and Patent Protection

Nowhere is the rol e of property protection in inducing investm e nt
in reso urces more evid ent th8n in the context of copyright and pat ent
law. Co pyright law creates a nd protects exclusive rights in expressive
works of authorship. P a tent law provides protection for inno vative
products, processes, a nd d esigns. Both bodies of law are rooted in
utilitarian philosophy, and th e principal justificatio n for their existence
in th e United States is wid ely known as the "ince ntive theory. " 12 x In-

128. See. e.g .. Kenn e th Arrow, Ecuno nzic We/(are and 1/ze A l/ocmion of Resources .fiH
!nv enlion. in TH E RATE AND DIR ECT ION OF. INVENTI VE A CTIV ITY 609 (1962): Stank y M.
Besen & Leo J. Ra skind. An fnlr oduclion /o !he Law and Economics of Jm ellcclllal Propcnr.
5 J. ECON. PERS. 3, 5 (1991); Stephen Breyer. '!he Uneasy Case for Copy rig/11: A Slll{h' of
Copvrigl11s in Books, Plzo10copies and Complller Programs. 84 H ARV . L. RE V. 28 !. 29 1-CJ3
( 1970): We nd y J. Gord o n , Fair Use as 1\llarkel Failure, 82 COLUM. L. RE V. l600. 1602- 12
(1982): Robe rt M . Hun & R o be rt M. Schuc hm a n. The Economic Rmiona/e of Copv rig/11. 56
AM. ECON. RE V. 42 1. 425 ( 1966) (pape rs and proceed in gs) : Willi a m !VI. Lande s & Ri c hard
A. Posne r. An Econ omic Analysis of Copyrig/11 Lmv. 18 J. LE GA L STUD. 325 . 326 ( 1989)
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deed , the utili taria n grounding of Ame ri ca n copyright and patent la w
is even manife ste d in th e Constitutional intellec tual property clause ,
which empowers Congress to create excl usive rights in intellec tual
works in order '·to promo te the Progress of Science and useful
A rts. " 1" 9
The need for an econ omi c incentive in th e field of inte!I ect ual
property sterns tro m the ··public good·· characteristics of intellectual
go ocls. 1 ~ 0 Un li ke tangible goods. publi c goods share two distinctive
charact eristics: nonr iv ztlry of cons umpti o n and nonexcludability of
bcnefits. 1-' 1 A good is nonrival in co nsumption wh ..;n a unit of that good
ca n be co nsum ed by cme person witho ut dimini shing in the sli gh test
the con sumption opportuniti es ava ila ble to others trom th at same
unit. 1' 2 A good displays nonexcludable benefits when individuals who
have not paid for the production o f that good cannot be prevented a t a
reasonable cost from ava iling themselves of its bc ncfits. 133 The nonexclud ab ility property of public goods gives ri se to two re lated proble ms. First, public goods arc likely to be und er-produced if left to the
private market. Second , markets for public goods will not form.
Since inventions and ex pressive work s arc esse ntially information
goods, the y too arc s uscept ibl e to th e twin problems of underproduction and lack of market excha ng e. 1 3 ~ In the absence of legal pro[h c re inartcr Landes & Posner. Copyrig/71 Lr111']: Stewart E. Sterk. Rheroric and Reulirv in
Coprrig/71 Lu11·. ')4 i'vl ICH. L R EV . 1197. 11 'J7 ( 1'J'J6): Barrv W. Tyerman. The Economic Rorionulcfor Cop_ITighr Prorcllion )rH !'uhlislll:'d Bonks: A Reply ru fJrofcssor Breyer. 18 UCLA
L REV. 1100.1100-01 ( 1'J7 1).
129. U.S . CONST. a rt. l. ~ 8. EdwarJ Wa1te rschcid points o ut that the intellec tu a l prope rty clause ·' is uniqu e in bein g th e only instance wh e rein the de legates prescr ibed a spe cific
mode of accompli shing the particular autlwrity granted:· c'\'cc Ecl l\'iird C. \Valtersch e id. To
Prom ole rhe Progress of Scit>n cc 0/1(1 Usejid 1\rrs: The Background ond Origin of rh e lnlcllecr ual Prup erlv Clouse of rhc Unire d Sl{l{es Consriuaion. 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L 1. 33 ( 1994 ).
131J. See. e.g.. Gordo n. supm note 128. nt 1610: La ndes & Posner. Copyrighr Law. supm
no te 128. a t 326: see als o Richard P. Adels tein & Steven I. Pe ra . The Co111peririon of Technologies in 1\1/arkers j rJr Ideas: Copv rig/11 und Fair Use in Evolurionarv Persp ecrive. 5 [NT' L
REV. L. & ECON. 209. 218 (19:-\:i). For a view that inte ll ectual wo rk s do no t share th e di stinguishing attrib ute s o f public goods. sec Tom G. Pa lmer. lnrellecrua/ Properly: A NonPosneriun L111v und Eco nomics ;\pproucfl. 12 1-IAl\ILli\ E L R EV. 2111. 273 -87 (1989).
131. See . e.g . ROBERT COOTER & TH OMAS lJLE N. LAW AN D ECONOMICS 411-48 (lst
e d. 1988): RICHARD CO RNES & T ODD SACIDLER. THE THE ORY OF EXTER NA LITIES.
PUBLIC GOODS. AND CLUB GOO DS 6-7 (1986): E DWIN MANSFIELD. PRINCIPLES OF
MA RCRO ECONOMI CS 400-04 (6t h eel 1989).
132. See COR NES & SANDLER . supm no te 131.

al

160.

133. Set' id. It shou iJ be not ed that the impossibility of exclu sion is hardly ever abso lute.
As a matter o f fact. when exclu sion bv contr~1c t is con siclerccl. very few goods. if any. di splay
nonexcludab le benefits in the stri ct se nse o f th e term. T hus. it is more accura te to desc ribe
goods as di spla yi ng non excluclnbk benefits when it is prohibiti ve ly costl y to bar nonp aye rs
from enjoying th e good. See P<:J trick C roskcry. Jnsriuuional Uriliru riunism and Jnrel!ecrual
Pmpertv. 68 C HL- KENT L R EV. 63 1. 632 ( llJ93) .
134. See. e.g .. fRITZ MACIILUP. J-\ ,'.1 ECONO\II C RE VIEW OF TH E PATENT SYSTE ivJ.
St udy No. 1:i. 85 th Cong .. 2cl Sess . (1 'J58): Kenneth W. Dam. Th e Economic Underpinnings
of Pmem Law . 23 J. LECAL STUD. 247 (10lJ4): .John S. McG ee. /'orenr Explo irmion: Some
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tection, competitors ot the original inventors and authors would be
able to copy their inventions or expressive works without incurring the
initial costs of authorship and research and development. The unauthorized reproduction of successful expressive works and inventions
would drive the market price down to the point where original authors
and inventors would not be able to recover their initial expenditures.
Thus, without intellectual property protection, the private returns to
authors and inventor:; would fall short or the social value of their
\vorks and inventions, and too fe\v inventions and expressive works
would be created.
Worse yet , m~1ny of the invention:.; that would not materialize
absent intellectu'll propert:v· protecti\ln arc likely to be of great socia!
value. Socially important inventions arc often dependent not o nly
upon large expenditures but also upon a high level of risk. Inventors
often do not know. ex ante, whether their research and development
will yield the anticipated result. They do not know how the invention
will fare commercially. Subsequent copiers, however, face no such uncertainty. Copiers may reproduce- risk-free- only inventions with
proven commercial success. 1" The same holds true of expressive
works. For expressive works to make it to market, authors must generally find a publisher who believes the work is commercially viable.
But publishing is a risky enterprise. Publishing involves a hit-and-miss
process in which a small number of successful works subsidize the cost
of publishing all other works. For publishers, commercially successful
works are used as a risk spreading mechanism, enabling the publisher
to bring to market various works that may not cover the publication
and distribution costs. However, copiers may zero in on the successful
works. By reproducing only successful works, and selling them at a
lower price, copiers would deprive publishers of the ability to spread
risk, and thereby force them out of business.
Patent and copyright protection solve these problems. By creating
and enforcing exclusive rights in expressive works and inventions,
copyright and patent law prevent unauthorized copying and thereby
guarantee adequate rewards to authors and inventors. The right to exclude permits authors and inventors to engage in voluntary transactions with users and set the price of these transactions. Yet, copyright
and patent are unique property regimes since they restrict the duration of the property rights they confer. Copyright protection endures
for the life of the author plus seventy years; 136 patent protection lasts
Economic and Legu! Problmzs. 9 .1. L. & ECON. 135 (1966): Richard R. Nelson. The Econornics of Invention: A Survev of rlu: Lirer(i/ure. 32 .1. Bus. 101 ( 1959): Dan Usher. The Wel./{m" Economics of!nvention. 31 ECONO~IIC:A 279 (1964).
135. See Arrow. SIIJml note l:ZS. at 609. 614-15 (suggesting that the uncertainty as to the
outcome of the inventive enterprise and the lack or market mechanism for risk shifting. will
result in underinvcstment in inventive: activity).
136. 17 U.S.C.

~

30:Z(a) (1998). In the case of an anonvmous work. a pseudonymous
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tw e nty years from the date of filing an application. 1' ' O nce the prot ection lapses, th e formerl y p rotected expressive works and inventi ons
fall into the publi c doma in , a nd anyone can usc. reprod uc e, and market them freely. Both paten t and copyright are . therefore . examples of
m a ndatory zero ord e r pliability rules. In both cases. the initial property rule protection cha nges into a zero ord e r liahility rule protection
at the e nd or th e sta tut o ril y prescr ibed term .
T he use of zero order p li<lhility rul es in thi s contex t se rv es severa l
importan t purposes. Patent a nd copyright law e mbody a fundam e nta l
tr<!deoff between ex ante and ex post effici ency . or. put differen tly, a
tradeoff between production ancl access. E;; ant e . p<:Hr.: nt and copyright
la w see k to spur adequate produc ti o n of inform at ion goo ds: ex post,
aft e r the inform ation goods h<:tve bee n produ ced. they seek to ensure
the wides t possibl e access to th ese goods . As the int e llectual property
cla use clea rly indicates, the purpose of establishing exc lu sive rights in
inte ll ectual goods is not to rewa rd autho rs and in ve n tors per se, but
rather, to promote th e prod ucti on ancl disse mination of n ew information to th e public. 138 The exclusivity con fe rr ed u pon a uth ors and inventors promotes the creation of new works and innovation, but it do es so
a t the cost of curtailing the dissemination of the n ew information
prod ucts to the public. Copyright and pate nt protection essentia lly
grant monopoly power to auth o rs and inventors, a ncl thus, like all monopolies, generates a socia l ''dead-weight" loss. The sa m e exclusivity
that induces creativity and inves tm en t also b ri ngs abo ut supracompetiti ve prices, and lea d s to the exclusion of certain consumers
who wo uld ha ve bee n willing to pay th e competit ive price Y 9 Robert
Coote r and Thomas Ule n have stated th e bas ic d ile mm a presented by
int e ll ectual pro pe rt y is th a t "witho ut a lega l monopo ly not enough information will b e produced, b ut with legal mo nopoly too little of the
information will b e u sed." 1 ~u
The zero ord er pliability rule mitiga tes the tensio n between the
two social goals th at in te llectu al prope rt y law seeks to promote . The
initi al property rul e protection - represented by th e limite d monopoly - unde rwrit es th e pr od uct ion of informa tion goods. The subseq ue nt ze ro order pliability rule - represe nt e d by the eventua l fall of
exp ressive works and inve ntions into th e public domain- gu a rantees

work. or <1 work mad e for hir e . the copy right endures for the shorter of 95 years from the
year of its first pu b li cation. or 120 yea rs from the year or it s c rea ti on. /d.~ 302(c) .
137. 35 U.SC.

~

154(a)(2) ( 1999) .

!3:0:. See CRAIG J OYCE ET .·\L.. COPYR IGHT LAW 1-70 (5th ecl2000) .
!39. See. e.g. , Christian Koboldt. fnrelleclllal f'roperry illlll Oprimal Copyrig/11 ProreCiion,
19 J. CULT. ECON. 13 1 ( 1995) (arguing that even op ti ma l copy right protec tion c<J nn ot lea d to
a first -best allocat ive effic ie ncy soluti o n).
140. COOTER & ULEN. supra note 13 1. at 135 (in latest edit io n. 3d e el . 2000. s im il ar
propos ition. but not sa me se nt e nce. appea rs on page 128).
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the public unrestricted access to information goods once the limited
monopoly expires. The limited duration is supposed to guarantee that
the goal of copyright and patent protection is positive because in the
final analysis the goal of copyright and patent is to make more and
better intellectual products available to every one. 141
The employment of a zero order pli<:bility rule serves another policy goa 1: it reduces the cost of su bseq ue n t authorship and innovation.
1t is important to reali ze that the public domain is not merely the
sphere of works whose protection has e:-:pired: it is also a source of the
raw materials for future authorship dlld invention. 1 ~ 2 \Yorks whose
protection has expired ensure the continuitv of 2uthorship and innovation as they perpetually replenish the supply of expression and
knowledge for future authors and inventors to draw on. Furthermore,
public domain works reduce the cost ur creation and research for future authors and inventors. and consequently, the total cost of producing intellectual works.
The zero order pliability rule protection is also attractive on distributional grounds. Those most likely to be harmed by the monopolies wrought by copyright and especially patent protection are the least
well-off. Low-income consumers can ill-afford to pay the supracompetitive prices charged for patented products and copyrighted
works during the property rule protection period. The shift to a zero
order liability rule opens up the market to competition and enables
low-income consumers to enjoy previously over-priced goods. Consider, for example, pharmaceutical drugs. The need to recoup their initial investment in R&D prompts brand name pharmaceutical companies to charge supra-competitive prices for patented drugs. The
principal victims of the monopoly pricing are the indigent 143 and the

141. It bears emphasis that we do nor suggest that the current protection term is optimal. Nor do we endorse it. Our analysis has nothing to say about the issue. We merely seek
to explain the use of zero order pliability rules in intellectual property law.
!42. See. e.g., Jessica Litman. The Public Domain. 39 EI\lORY LJ. 965,968 (1990).
143. For analysis of the effect of monopoly pricing on poor countries see, for example.
Bernard Pccoul, Figlzring for Surviml. HARV. INr'L REV. Fall 2001 , at 60 (noting that international trade agreements and patenting of medicines in other parts of the world intluence
the global marketing and pricing policies of research-based pharmaceutical companies,
which in turn impacts the availability and afforcbbility of medicines, including AIDS medicines, in the least-developed countries): Jonathan Mann et al.. South Africa's AIDS Agreemen!. CNN INT'L: INSIGHT (Apr. 19. 2001). available ar 2001 WL 14386528 (reporting that
·'[t]he commercial price of the triple therapy treatment to control HIV costs up to $10,000
[per) year per patient. That dwarfs the per capita income of every African country "; also reporting that in response to a "well-organized. high-profile campaign by pressure groups. the
major drug companies have slashed their prices to the poorest countries. In Zambia, about
20 percent of the population is infected with HIV. [Recently). Glaxo Smith. Bristol Myers
Squibb and Merck offered the Zambian government a deal so that anti-retroviral treatment
would cost two dollars a clay''): Anthony Birrittcri. !urellectuul Properly Protecrion a lvfusr
.fiH Dmg Firm Success. N.J. Bus., June 2001. at 56 (reporting the April 2001 settlement between South Africa and thirty-nine drug manufacturers. allowing the country to broaden
acce ss to medicines for the estimated 4.7 million South Africans with AIDS in exchange for
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who m os t criticall y need the new dr ugs, but lack suffic ie n t
fund s to afford the m. F urth erm ore, eve n th ose who can p urchase th e
drugs ove rpay for th e m since th e drug comp a nies. owin g to their m o nopoly powe r appropri a te m os t if not a ll , of the con sume r surplus.
Th e pri ce o f new d rugs fa lls dr a m a tica ll y. hO\veve r, o nce th e pat e nt
protecti o n ex pires and gene ri c d ru gs e nter the ma rket . Ind eed, according to some repo rts, two years after the ir introduct io n to th e markcL th e price of ge n e ric substitutes is on average 35 -3S'X, o f the pr ice
of th e re leva nt bra n d n a m e clru b'
a and th e mark e t s h a r :.~ of t he Q.enerics
a ve rages 45 - 59%. 1 ~" It bea rs emp has is, tho ugh. that without the ini t ia l
induce m e nt p rovided by t he pate nt protect ion . neith e r the origina l
dru gs no r the ge ne ric substitutes wo u ld be p ro duc e d. Tiw:; . the use of
pliability rule protect io n in thi s con text in d uces scient ific p l·ogress, e ncourages co mpe ti t io n amo ng va ri o us dru g m a nu[ac tu rer::; in th e long
te rm, a nd o ffe rs signi fic an t distr ibuti ve ad va n tages relat ive to sta ndar d
prope r ty rul e p ro tectio n.
~~

2.

G enericism in Trod en zork Lmv

. Th e ge nericism d o ctrine in tradema rk la w is ye t a no th e r exam ple
of a ze ro order pliability rule . Trademark law protects symbolic informatiOn signifying the source o f goods and se rvices. 1 ~(\ Unlike pate nt
and co pyright pro tection that see k to spur creation of in ve ntions a nd
~lclh ere n ce to \VTO p a tent laws) .

GA;:~·

:ohrn M .R Bull , Subsidiz ed Dm gs /(Jt· Seniors Facitrg De/i cir .. PI TTS BURGH _POST. TE. No v. 28 . 20lll, a t B8 (drsc uss rng the tm anc ral d rUrc ult rcs o t Pennsv lvam a s p ro g ram to s_u bsicl ize presc ri p ti o n dru gs fo r se nior c itize ns. ca lle d Ph a rm ace ut i~a l Ass is ta nce
~o~tra ct to r th e Elde rl y . o r ·' PA CE'' ); H owa rd D ea n. Deli Scalpel . Nx r ·L J .. Nov. 17. 200 1.
~~ .) 61 : ( rev rcwing G EORGE D. L UNDBERG . SEVER ED TRUST: WHY A\ IERICAN MED ICINE
ASN 1 BEEN F! x. ED (2000)) (describin g th e Congress io na l de ba te ove r p rescripti o n drug
b enefrts to r tl
·
·
..
.
1e e 1ci e rl y. a nd notmg
th a t ... Democra ts a rg ue tor
a st r::n· ght governm en t· n drug b e ne trt
·· ca rrym
· g a p rr·ce tag o t· a 1Jout .$~~
..lmancecl . M ed
· ic are presc· rr· p tro
.) ll0 tJ J.,,.ron, ·· w 111·1e
-~e ,:u ~lrcan s p r ess fo r a p rog ra m in wh ic h th e gove rn men t provi des vo uc he rs so th a t pa~ent s Cd n b u y pri va te ins ura nce .") : In side !Ire fndusrrv: P/i:er Announces NeiV f'harnwcv
tSCOtll r! Ca rd (o r Senio rs. AiVI. HE ALT H LI NE. J a n. 16 . 2002. available ur Wcs t la w . l/ 16/2002
f;P~ -~E6 ( n oting th e st reng th of " po lit ica l pr~ss urc on th e a l"forda b ili ty of med icine for the
elder,~; ), M o rton Mint z, S1ifl Hard 10 Swa fl o1v. WASI-l. POST. Feb. 11.200 1. a t Bl (re po rting
~at [w] h a t 's new abo ut presc ripti o n d rug pricing is th e at te ntion that it" s be en ge ttin g in
on g ress. than k s p a rtl y to b us loa d s o f e lde rl y A m e ri cans goi n g to Canada a nci Mex ico to
lJ uy th e ir m e di c in es a t sha rply lowe r cos ts'' ) .
145
.
· . See H e nry G rabows ki & J o h n Ve rno n. Longer Parenrs for Increased Generic Colll pe!tlw n tn !h e US.: The Waxmon-I-fulch Acl Ajier On e Decade. 10 PH AR~'IACO ECO NOM I CS
110
(Su pp . 2 . 1996); Willi a m Haddad. Tes1ing Tim es fo r rlr e U.S. Generic lndusrry . SCR IP
~lAG ~, _M ay 19 92. a t 26. 27 : U .S. [NT"L TRADE COiVIM'N NO. 332-302 . GLOBA l_
'--',Oil ll E fl fiVEN ESS OF U.S. A DVANCED TEC HNO LOGY MFG . I NDUS.: P HARiiiACEUTI CALS
L)-l 6 (S e p t. 199 1 )
1 6
· 15 U.S. c. § 11 2 7 ( 1988 & Su pp . IV 1992) : see also Ra lphS. Brown J r.. Adn~rrising
0
1
:.~~~~~/ e Puh fi~· lll!cre.l l . Legal Pml f'Ci i o n of Trade Smr hofs. 57 YAL E L.J . 1165. 11S5 (194S)
(
ml o t ln d ltve JOb o f tra d e symbo ls rs co nv e ntr o na ll y co nsrd e re cl to be rd e nttfl e<1t ton o f
so urc e : a n cl rt is thi s capacity whi ch co urt s trad itio na ll v have protec ted .. . ).
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exp ress ive wor ks. trade m a r k protection purports to e nh ance compe ti tion a mong provid e rs of goods and services .w Tradem arks promo te
competition in two rel;rtcd wavs. T radem arks - by themselves and in
combin ation with ot her forms of adve rti sing - convey informati on
about th e qu alit y of prod ucts and services, re ducing co nsumers ' sea rch
co s t s . 1 ~.~ T his info rm a lio na l fu ncti on of trade marks is espe cially va luable in the context of ex peri e nce goods, wh ere consum e rs cannot discern th e attribut e:; o f prod ucts before purchasing thcm. ~·~ and mu st
rely on prior experi e nce in c}::ciding am ong competin g bra nds. T rade marks all m.v consunie rs to associa te product and ser vice at trib utes
with certain finm. anc! hasc their consump tio n decisions on th is assorl···tt· o ··l
( · 1· '
l. 't1e· ''\ lj-J nl\i
Sl·l..·l e tr"clcnl'lt·l· 1-)
nrnl
l , ;<o l="n·· t\1i -: n' ""' .J ''
t-' -'
_ C' ' Ct l. \')1'
spurs firm s to m a intain an d imp rove the qua lity of th eir produ cts a nd
se rvices.''' Th e availability of trademark protection protects firm s
from fr ee -riding by co mpe ti tors . e nabling them to re ap the fruit s of
their in vestmen t in superi or p roducts and services . F urthermo re.
trad emark protecti on provid es firms with an incent ive to establi sh
brand recognitio n ancl lo ya lty. by "educating" consume rs about the
virt ues of the ir products. T hus, trademarks constitute an importa nt
channel of communi ca tion be twee n firm s and consumers, with the attendant twin effec ts of motivating the form er to improve the quality of
th eir products and e nabling the latter to differentiate among various
products on the marke t.
1
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147. See S. RE P. 0:0. 79-!33l. at 3 (1946) : H.R. RE I'. No . 79-219 . a t 2 ( 1945 ) ("Trad..: ·
mar ks defeat mc no po lv bv st imu latin g co mpe titi o n ... ).
142. Ser . e.g .. Nicholas Eco no mides . Tradenwrks. in T t-tE NEW P,\LGRAVE DI CTIONARY
OF E CO!'\O 'vtt CS A:\D TH E LAW 60l. 602 -03 (Peter Ne wma n eel.. 1998 ) (noting that tra demarks ··facilitate and e nhan ce consume r decisions"): William P. Kratzke. Normuti\' e Ecu·
nomic A nalysis of Tradema rk Lim. 2 i MEtviPHIS ST. U . L. REV. 199. 214 -1 7 (1991 ).
149 . The te rm .. c \pe ri ence goods .. was coined bv Philip Ne lson. !nfo n narion an d ConBehavio r. 78 .I . POLiT ICA L ECO!'\ . 3 11 (1 970): Philip Ne lson. Adt·errising us !nfi> n narion. 82 J. POLITI CAL t::CON . 72Y ( l Y74 ). A search good is one whose impo rtant a ttri but es
may be ascc rtaint:cl be fo re purchase or use . Beside s sea rch and e\pe ri e nce goods. a third
category. usua ll y appli ed to serv ices. is " crede nce." A crede nce quality cannot be evaluated
by direct obse rvation or ust: . For exa mpl e . a consum e r may purcha se a utomobil e repa ir
services and never d iscove r. bdore or after th e purc hase . whe ther th e re pa ir was necessa ry.
See Micha el Darby & Eci i Ka rr1i. Free Com petirion on d rit e O ptima/ 1\mounr of Fruut!. t6 J .L.
& ECON . o7 . 68-69 ( l l)7:;)

.\tll li er

!50. See Mark A . Lcmkv . Tlze M od em Lanham A cr and the D eath of Common S ens1' ,
108 YALE L.J. lo87. 1690 ( ll)l)9) (no tin g that advertising communi cates th e "expe ri e nce "
cha rac teristics of goocJ,; direct ly to co nsume rs. whil e "trade marks e nsure that co nsum e rs as sociate th e cha ra cteri stics wi th the ri gh t prod uct'' whe n ma kin g purch as ing dec isions).

15 1. Willi am M. Landes & Ri chard Pos ne r. Trarlen wrk Lm v: ; \n Eco n omic Perspnriv1'.
30 J. L. & ECON. 265 . :26lJ ( !987) [here in aft e r Land es & Pos ner. Tmd enw rk Lmt']. La nd es
and Posne r note that tracl e m<lrks have a se lt·-cnforcing qu a lity since th e y de note ··con siste nt
qu ality. a nd a firm has a n ince ntive to deve lo p a trad emark only if it is ab le to maintain co nsistent qua lity ... iJ :1 t 270 .
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As a ge neral rule, any expressive term or symbol may be used as a
trademark as long as it is distinctive a nd nondcce ptive .152 However,
generic terms may not be used as tr adema rk s.15 ' The doctrine of genericism has two temporal dimensions: a prospect ive dimension and a
retrospective dimension. Prospective ly, th e gen e ricism doctrine bars
th e appropriation of gene ric term s such as "WINE" or
"COMPUTER' as trad e marks. Courts ha ve app lied the doctrine prospectively to dc nv trademark protection to terms such as,
"INJ U RY ," 1" 4 "386,'' 15 5 "HONEY BROWN." 15'i '·YOU HAVE
MAIL ," and '·BUDDY LIST" 1' 7 Th e genericism ductrinc m ay also be
15 2. 15 U.S. C.~ lU52 (e) (l) (1 988): sec also T"u l'esos. fn c. '.Taco Ca bana. fn c., 505
U .S. 763 . 769 ( 1992) ('·The ge ne ral rul e rega rdin g cli s tinc ti, e ne >:" is c k;~r: a n id e ntifying mark
is d isti nc ti ve and c:1pab\e of being protected if it ei11i er (l ) is inh e rent\\ distinctive or (2) ha s
acquired di stinctiv e ness th ro ug h secondary m e aning.·· ): R obe rt C. De ni cola. Freedo111 10
Copv . lOS YAL E L.J. J66l. 1673 (1999) ("For wo rd m arks. th e u,;e ul bruad ca te go ri es de termina tive of inh e rent dis tinctiven ess avoids the adm inio;t nll i'.·c cn,;t,; l'l il case -by-case balancing of the informati onal advantages and competitive di sadvantages o f prote c ti on. It a lso
affo rd s a deg ree of pred ictab ilit v. va lu ed bo th in de cisio ns to ad op t a nd decisions to imitate a
putative trademark.").
Traditionally. trad e mark protec tion sprang into ex iste nce upo n th e use of a mark in
trad e . In 1988. the Lanham A c t was am e nde d to c rea te a feder a l registry of trademark s. see
Trademark Law R evision Act o f 1988. Pub. L N o. 100-667. 102 Sta t. 3935, and now businesses ca n regi s te r marks eve n before using the m in trade upon a showing o f a bon a fid e in te nt to use th e m in th e futur e. See Lanh a m Act ~ l (b) . (cocliliecl at !5 U.S. C.
1051(b)
( 1994) ): J. THOMAS M CC ARTHY. M CCARTHY ON TRr\DUvlM/.K Ac.!D U NFAIR COMPETITIO N
5 (4th eel. 2001) (noti ng that "[b]y fa r the mos t sweepin g c hange [effec te d by the 1988
ame ndme nt s] was the inclusion of a n ·intent-to- use · ba sis for a pplicati o ns." which granted
--United Stat e s firm[s] ... the op ti on to apply fo r fe d.:r al regi s tr~lli o n of a mark ba se d on a
bona fide intent to use the mark in comme rce"). D escriptive m a rk s. s uc h as "Burger." see In
re N at'\ Pres to Indus .. Jnc.. 197 U.S.P.Q. ISS (TTA B. 1977) (ho lding "Burger"' for cooking
utensil s descriptive of purpose of goods) . --PM.-- see B1·is to\- ivlye rs Squibb C o . v.
McNcii -P.P.C, In c.. 973 F. 2cl \033 (2d. Ci r. 1992) ( holding te rm "PM" desc ript ive o f an an a lgesic/s lee p aiel des ign e e\ fo r night-time use). and "KING SIZE." see King-S ize . In c. v.
Frank' s King Size C loth e s. Inc .. 547 F. Supp. 113:- 1 (S.D. Tex. 1982 ) (ho ld ing the te rm " K!NG
SIZE" de sc ripti ve of m e n's clot hes). ma y o nl y be reg is tered if th ey have a cquired a secondary meaning. See Two Pesos. 505 U.S. at 769 (explaining that ··descriptive mark s may acquire the di stin c tivene ss which will a llow th e m to be prote c te d under th e [La nh a m] Act ..
Thi s acquire d di sti nc tive ness is ge ne rall y calle d ·secon dary me aning ' ").

s

s

l53 . Originall y. gcneric ism was a cou rt-made doctrine. Sr>e. e.g .. Canal Co. v. C lark. 80
U.S. (13 W aiL) 3 11,323 (1S71): R ESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 735 (l93S ). Today. the doctrine
is codifi ed in th e La nh a m Act. See 15 U.S.C § 1064(3) (1994). A ge ne ri c term is o ne that
de notes ·'th e nam e o f a kind of goods ... [u]nlik e a trad e mark, which identifies the source of
a product. a ge neric term mere ly identifie s th e ge nus of which th e particular product is a
spec ies. " Liquid Controls Co rp. v. Liquid Cont ro l Co rp .. 802 F. 2cl 934. 936 (7 th C ir. 19S6).
154. Dran otl-Pe rl stein Assocs. v. Sk lar. 967 F2d S52 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that th e
''injury" po rtion of the mark '·INJURY-I." a telephone numbe r mnemonic. is gene ric and
th e refore unprotected as a trad e mark).
155 . Inte l C orp. v . Adva nced Mic ro D ev ices. In c. , 756 F. S upp. 1292 (N .D. Ca l. 1991)
( rulin g th a t Int el's mark '·386"' is ge neri c and thu s no t pro te c te d ) .
156. G e nesee Brewing Co. Inc. v. Stroh Bre wing Co .. 124 F. 3c\137 (2cl Cir. 1997) (concluding that th e term "H ONEY BROWN " is ge neri c wh e n a ppli ed to ale be e r).
157. America Online. Inc. v. AT&T C o q>., 64 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E .D. Va. 1999) (holdin g
that se rvice m ar ks ··you H AVE MAIL" c: nd "BU DDY LIST' are gene ric rath e r than sugge stiv e ).
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appli e d retrosp e ctively to invalidate trad e mar ks that we re initially distinctive. but through overuse became ge ne ric. E xa mples o f m a rks th a t
initially receive d protection but we re later nullifi e d on genericism
grounds includ e, among oth ers , ·'aspirin .'. 15 ~ .. co la.'' 15'1 " thermos, " 160
''corn-fl a kes,'' 16 1 yo- yo ,''' 6 " "trampoline ,' ' '('' "e s c a lat o r , " 1 6~ and " linoleum . ·· rr.s Th e re trospective applicatio n of the generici sm doctrine effe ctive ly trans forms th e initi a l pro pe rt y ru le p ro tecti o n a cco rded to
th e tra d e mark own e r into a ze ro o rd er li a l•ility ru le p ro tection . Y et ,
th e lapse of pro pe rty rul e prote ction is no t a ut o ma ti c afte r th e passage
of tim e . as in th e case of prope rt y a nd p<tle n t. R at he r , th e prop e rty
rul e stage o f th e ze ro orde r plia b ilit y ru k is broug ht to a clo se by an
e ve nt whose timing - and eve n ex iste nce - is unce rtain : th e tra nsform a tion o f the me aning ot a ter m to a ge ne ri c one.
The application of a zero ord e r p li a bilit y ru le in this co ntex t has
several desirable efficiency effe cts. ;-\!th o ugh tra d e mark protection
ge ne ra ll y pro motes efficiency by fo ste rin g com petition , trad e m a rk s
als o ha ve a potential dark side. E xce ssivt2l y stron g trademarks may
harm co mp e tition since th e y con stitute barrie rs to e ntry. 166 In such
cases. th e social cost of prote cting tradem a rk s ma y outweigh the social
ben efit. Conside r , for instance, the term ''cola ... If the te rm were a
protecte d trademark of the Coca-C ola company, competito rs who
produce d similarly tasting beverages co uld not use th e te rm " cola " to
describe their products. Under this regim e. compe titors' mark e ting efforts wo uld be stitlecl, a nd cons um e rs woul d have t o pay supracompe titive prices for the trad e marke d p ro d uct. 167 T h e genericism

15.';. Bay e r Co . v. United Drug Co .. 272 F. 505 (S.D .N .Y . 1LJ2 1).
15 9. Coca -Co la Co . v. Sta nd a rd B o ttlin g Co .. 138 F.2d 7S8 (l Oth C ir. ILJ43) : Dixi-Cola
Labs., Inc. v. C oca- C ola Co., 117 F. 2d 352 (4 th Cir. 1941 ).
160. Kin g-Se eley Thermos Co . v. Aladdin In d us .. 32 1 F.2d 577 (2 d Cir. l 963) .
161. See PAU L G OLDSTEI N, C OPYRI GHT. PAT ENT. T RADE\! ,\RK AND R EL ATED STAT E
D OCTRI NES 243 (4th e el. 1997 ) (reproducing a n ad by Xe ro x e ntitle d. " Once a Tra demark
no t always a trade m a rk ," that lists e xam ple s o f tradem a rks that have becom e ge ne ri c.) .
162. !d .
163. !d.
164. !d .
165. !d .
166. In the 1930s eco nomi sts be lieve d that a ll fo rm s o f tra de mark pro tec ti o n were
a nti co mpe titi ve . Th e m os t nota ble champi o n o f thi s v ie w wa s Ed wa rd Cha m berlin. wh o a rgued th a t the combinati o n o f trad e mark pro te c ti o n a nd pe rs uas ive adv e rti sing form barriers
to e ntry. See E DWA RD H. CHAMB ERLIN , TH E T HEO RY OF MONO POLISTI C C OMP ETITIO N
(1s t eel . 1933). F o r an e xce llent re vi e w o f th e de ba te as to the effec t of trad e m a rk pro tec ti on
o n co mpetiti o n. see Daniel M. McClure, The La nhrun i \ u / \.fier Fi fiy Y ears: Tra denwrks an d
Co mperirion: Th e !?ecenl Hisco ry, L Aw & CO NTE\-IP. P ROBS.. Spring 1996. a t 13.
167. S ee J o hn F. C ove rda le , C o mme nt , Trademarks and G eneric W o rds: A n Ef fecr on
Co mpetirion Tesr , 51 U. CHJ. L. REV. 868 , 870-71 (1 984) (no tin g that whe n th e re is o nl y one
word to describe a product, trademark protectio n wo uld equate to m o n o poly p o we r) .
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d o ctrine avoids this unde::iirable result. It empowers co un::; to terminate . in ex treme cases, the property rule protection
rna
wh o se
value to third parti es - i.e., competitors an d consu lT:,-:r:; - t:xce e d s
their valu e to their original appropriators. Essentially. the genericism
doctrine is an ex post mechanism for reallocating generic tcnns to a
1["
'Lll" p;tblJ'C_ r'0-t1SU!11'~ '-S ' 11111 (' () 'fl'l.(lr' 1 ;i ·-;r · ~ '1 ];'t.-P J(l.)
Cl
._,
1'1 _:0)1 P f \i'']LJP
Hence. the generici:.;m doctrine provides a n cmma rk ct rnc:ch<ulism for
impro ving allocativc efficiency.
The e x ante effects of the genericism doctrine a re '>en morr.; interesting. Ex ante. the genericism doctrine gi v·:: s ri~-;,.; to h·/U :o rocornpe titive effects: seil-regulation and informat ive
· i·;ing. The
kcv to both ettect:; lie s in the usc of a conclitio nal;cru ; ,;ci c:T ia. bility
rule to protect tradema rks. T radernarks do ne t bccon1c generic by
mishap: the decisions of trademark owners determin e th<~ marks' fates.
T rademark owners determine the exposure o f t he ir rnark:-; as well as
which information and image to convey to consumers. Ma rk s become
generic either because there is insufficient competition in the relevant
product o r service market , or because trc1demark ovvner:; promote
their brand names too aggressively. T he genericism doctrine curbs the
incentive of firms to engage in these types of anticompetitivc behavior.
To avoid the risk of losing protection, firms must ensure that the public d oes not associate the mark with a particular product , rather than a
particular producer. The safest way to accomplish thi s is to ensure
some degree of competition in the product. or service mar k ets. in
which dominant mark owners operate. T he risk of ge ne ricism causes
firms to self-regulate by introducing a winner 's curse [() trademar ked
markets. Over-aggressiveness toward existing comp e ti'Lors may result
in the firm 's mark - an asset it has labored hard to promote becoming available to all competitors, both exist ing and future. Exercising restraint toward smaller competitors, on the other hand , goes a
long way towards securing the longevity of the mark. T hus, the use of
conditional pliability rule protection in this contexl encourages competition in product and service markets.
The doctrine of gencricism also produces desirable information effects. In a classic article, Ralph Brown not e d the symbiotic relationship between trademarks and advertising. 169 Brown argued that the
scope of protection afforded to trademarks must be calibrated to the
degree to which advertising promotes the public interest. Brmvn mainl~t ~ '-
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168. As for the prospective dimension of genericism. Landes and Posner have suggested
that by barring existing generic terms from becoming trademarks. trademark law provides
an incentive to " enrich the language, by creating words or phrases that people value for their
intrinsic pleasingness as well as their information value." They explicitly recognize, howe ver.
that this benefit is very "small." See Landes & Posner. Tmdenwrk Law , supra note 151, at

271.
169. See Brown. supra note 146: see also Symposium. R.olplz Sharp Brol\'11, lnre//ectu u/
Pmperry and rhe Public lmeresr. 101'> YALE L.J. 1611 (1999).
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taincd that tr ade marks · chief virtue lie s in their ability to p rom ote
com pet ition th ro ugh adve rtising. By prom pting merchants to a dvertise. tr ade mar k protection enh ances the informati on availa bl e to pote ntial cons umers. thus improving con sumpti o n decisio ns. 17n Influe nced by the eco nomists of his time, Brown di stingui s he d be twe e n
"informative C\dve rtising" and ·'persuas ive ad ve rtisin g ... postul a ting
tha t th e former was bene fici a l and th e latter hann fuli 71 Subseque nt
eco nomic wo rk ca l!eel into qu est ion Bro wn ·s ch<Hac te rizatio n of pe rs uasi ve ad vertisin g, noting that eve n "pe rsuasiv e .. ;tch·cni sing m ay cdso
produ ce vari ous effici e ncy enhancing e ffects. P hilip Ne lson. fo r insta nc e. po int c:d o ut th a t much of w ha t Brown conside red pe rs uasive
a d ve rtising serves <in irnportant signaling funct iun. w hi ch impro ves the
informatio n ~1v a il a ble to consumers. Since busin •.: ·;scs ;·cc<.: ive gre ater
ret urn s o n advert isin g that produces re pe at sale s. the level or a dvertising_ for a produc t provides a usef ul in d icati on of con s umer sat isfact io n.1 72 frresp ec tive of th e ultimate desirab ility o !" persua sive advertisin g. Brown 's basic insig ht about th e direct effec t o f trad e m ark
protection on th e marke t for commercial inform at ion rema ins va lid.
D.

Sim ultaneo us Pliability Rule.">

Intellectual property also provides a n example of a different kind
of pliability rule: the simultaneo us pliability rul e. A s usua l, simultaneous pliability rul es in vo lve at leas t two different s ta ges of prope rty or
lia bility rule protection, and th e fulfillme nt of a pre determ ined co nc.iition tri gge rs a s hift from o ne type of prote ction to the other. H owever ,
u n like th e other pliability rules we have discussed so far , the tri gge ring
condition doe s not tak e place a t a discre te m o ment in time and the
types of protection arc not sequential chronologically. Rat her, a single
asse t is simultaneo usly protected by diffe rent kinds o f rules , depending on the kind of use. V is-a-vis some uses , th e ent itleme nt hold e r enjoys the baseline property rule protection. However, certa in kinds of
uses trigger another kind of prote ction , s uch as liability rule protection.
Simultaneous pliability rules were clearly recognized by Calabresi
and Mela med , albeit without being labeled as s uch. In fact, Calabresi

170. Brown. supra note 146, a t 1186.
171. !d. at 11 83 ("' With qua li fications th at need no t be repea ted. persuas ive advertising
is. for th e co mmunity as a wh ole. just a luxurious exercise in talking ourselves into spending
o ur incomes ."). Brown's view of persuasive adverti sin g was heav il y influenced by th e work
of the eco no mist Edwa rd Chamberlin, who argued th at th e co mbin a ti o n of tradem a rk protec tion and pe rsu asive advertising form barrie rs to entry. See C HAiviBERLI N. supra note 166.

172. See Philip J. Nelson , The Econ om ic Valu e of Adverrising . in ADVE RTISIN G AND
SOCIETY 43 (Yale Broze n ed. , 1974). Othe r econo mi sts went even furth e r do ubt in g the abi lity of adve rtising to ge ne rate demand. Ser>. e.g .. J ULIA ;-,; L. Sl\100! . ISS UES IN THE
ECO I\0 /vii CS O F AD VERTISJI\ G 205 -06 (1 970) .
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and Me la med n oted that ··m ost e ntitl e me nts to mos t go o ds arc
mi xed ,·· th e re by adm itting th a t p ro te cti o n of e ntitlem e nts can ha rd[y
ever b e d escribed as fa lling un de r o ne of the pure rul e typ es. 17 ' O ur
mod es t contributi o n he re is to integ rate Cala bresi and M e lamecfs in sight into o ur bro a de r fram e work o f plia bility rules. Fo r this reaso n.
we lim it o ur disc ussion o f sim ul taneo us pli a bility rul es to tvvo examples.
W e e mphasize t hat simultan eo us plia bility rules diffe r from oth e r
pli a bility r ul es we d isc uss in th at t hey lack a dynamic ele me nt O'.'C: r
tim e . As our exa mpl es illu strate. in simult a neo us plia bility rul e:;. Lh~_·
ry pe ul protec ti on depends o n t he type uf usc o r th e type o f use r, ~tnd
doc s no r cha nge ove r t ime .
l.

Fo ir Use

We illu strate simult a neous pli a bility rul es with th e exam ple o f t he
fair use doctrine. O rdinarily , as we noted previously , copyrigh te d
works e njoy property rule pro tection for th e life or the a uthor p lu s
seventy yea rs, fo llowed b y a ze ro o rder liability regime. 17 ~ However,
even durin g th e pe ri od o f prope rty rul e protection , copyri ght law recognizes a fair use privil e ge. 175 An affirmativ e d efense against copyrig ht
liability, th e fair use privilege empowers courts to excuse un a uthori ze d
appropri a tion of a co pyrighted wo rk when do ing so adva nces the pub-

173 . Cala brc:s i & iV!t: la m cd. supru no te 5. a t I osn.
174. Sec supru Sec ti u n li. C. l. The d tlc trin c: o f expe rim e ntal use is yet a nother ex:un plc
o f a sim ult aneo us pli ab ili ty rule:. Co u rts hav<.: io ng exe mpted. in pri nciple. purely
·' ·e xpe rim e nta l use[sj' of a pate nt e d in ve nti o n. with no comm e rcia l purpose ... fr o m in frin ge me nt li a bil ity. See R ebecca S. Ei se n be rg. l 'arenrs and rhe Progress of Science : Ex clusir·e
R.ighrs and E.1peri111enro/ Use. 56 U . CHI. L. REV . l0l7. 10 19 ( 1989) . Thi s im p li es that pa ten t
hold e rs do no t a lways operate under proper ty rule protec ti o n : as again st expe rimental use rs.
patent o wn e rs entitlcmc: nt is protected by a ze ro order p li a bility rule. Base d o n the ex pc:ri·
m e ntal use doc trine. ~ 27l (e) o f th e P at e n t Ac t. whi c h was adde d in 1984 as part of the
W a x m a n-H a tch Ac t, now pe rmi ts ge ne ri c dr ug m a nufa c ture rs to mak e, use, o r se ll ··a pa ten ted inve nti o n . .. sole!v for uses re a so n ::~ bl y rela te d to the deve lopm e n t a nd s ub mi ssio n o f
inform a ti o n un de r a f ed era l law wh ic h reg ul ates the m an ufac ture, use. or sa le o f dru gs .·· 35
U.S.C. ~ 271 (3) (2001 ) . T he impact of th e sectio n was to d ra m a tically e xpedite the introduction of ge ne ri c drugs to th e ma rket upon th e e xpiration o f the patent. and th e r e by cabin th e
discre ti ona ry effects of pate nt grant s. CI G ide on Pa rcho m ovs ky & Pe ter Siegelman. To·
lmrds w1 ln regrurcd Theon· of !wellecruu l Properr.L 88 VA . L. R EV. (fo rth comin g 2002) (di sc uss in g a l! e rn a tive m eas ures fo r red ucin g th e di s to ni o na ry effects of pa te nts).

s

175. 17 U.S.C. 107 (1994). Se cti o n 107 begins with a no nex hau sti ve li s t o f illust rati ve
uses - such as commen t. c riti cism, sch o la rship. research. ne ws reportin g, a nd teachin g that m a y q ualify as fair. a nd th e n enum e ra tes four fact o rs a co urt should we ig h in de cidi ng
wheth e r a pa rti cular use is fa ir. The fa c to rs li s te d a rc : ( I ) th e p urpos e of th e usc . including its
co mm e rcial o r no nco mm e rcial na ture: (2) th e na ture o f the prot ected wo rk o f th e pl a int ifl':
(3) th e a mo unt a nd im por tance o f th e pa rts th a t we re reproduced : (4) the impac t of the u;;e
on the pote ntial marke t for th e cop yri gh ted wo rk. !d.
Current ly, patent law does not recog ni ze a fa ir use defense . For a proposa l to change th is
existing sta te of affairs by introducing a fa ir usc defen se into patent Jaw, see Maure e n A .
O'Rourke, Towa rd a Docrrine of Fair Use in Parenr La w, 100 COLUM. L. R EV . 1177 (2 CJOO) .
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li e benclit without s ubstantially impairing th e economi c valu e o f th e
ori g inal work . 17" Thu s. with re sp e ct to cert a in uses. th e copy ri g ht e d
\VOrk is placed und e r a zero ord e r liability r egim e . ra th e r t han the ordinary pro p e rt y rule regime.
Th e '·fair usc .. pri vil ege se r ves seve ral goa ls. Firs t. it p rov id es a
sa fe ty va lve th at m <ty be use d to den y copyri g ht p rot ec ti o n wh e n th e
p e ri ls of mon opo ly powe r lo om la rge a nd the nee d fo r c: dd it iona ! in ce ntive to create i:s s light. tn In this ca pacity, the ' ·f~lir usc .. d oc trin e
co nst itutes a n effect ive \'C hi c le fo r miti gatin g a ny a nti co m pct it ivc effec ts cop yright pro tec tion may ca use . Se cond. th e d oct r ine furni sh es
<l n e ffec ti ve m e an s to r ove rcomin g m a rke t fa ilu res ~ t ssn ci~1L e d with
h ig h tr ans acti o n costs o r s trat egic b e havi or o t· cre~t t ors. 17 ' ln many
tr ans a ct io nal settin gs that inv ol ve inte ll ec tu a l good s. the cos t of vo lu nta ry e xc ha nge is hi gh a nd th e b e nefits to both p a rti es in conscqu·.: nti a l.
In thes e situati o ns. a finding of fa ir us e is like ly to ge nera te a net bcn c l"it to on e of th e parti es without s ig nifica ntl y harmin g th e ot hcr. 17') F urth e rmore . the fa ir usc privil e ge re duce s the cost of c re atin g s ub sequent
wo rk s. In man y cases, th e part y standing to ben efit fr om a fa ir use
finding is herse lf an a uthor who borrows pree xistin g ma te ri a l to crea te
h e r own work .
Th e incorporati o n of a fair use defe nse turns co p yri g ht law into a
unique example of pliability rul e prote ction. Essentially , the fa ir use
pri vilege e ntitles third parties to ta ke the inte llectua l pro pe rl y o f others with o ut pa ying a ny compen sa tion to th e prope rty o wner s . 1 ~ Due
0

17 0 . .').:t: Ciord o n. sup m nutc 128 . at 160 l.
177. Sec. e.g. . S terk. supm note 128. a t 121 1. Th e so-ca ll e d ··zap rud cr Fi lm · of the: assas s ina ti o n u f J oh n F. Ke nn edy is a case in point.
178. See. e.g .. Cio rd o n. sup m no te 128 , a t 161 3; La nd es & P os ner. Cu p.1· rig lu Lrnv. supm
no te 128 . a t 357-58: Sterk. supra no te 128. a t 1211.
179. Fo r inst a nce . a st ud e nt wh o wi shes to qu o te a phras e fr o m a co p y right ed book is
lik e ly to in c ur a signi fi cant cos t s ho uld she ch o o se to secure pe rmissio n from the co p yright
owne r. A t th e sam e time. quo ting with o ut pe rmi ss io n wo ul d infli c t ~l ne g li g ible ha rm o n the
copy right o wner.

180. T he inco mp le te p riv ilege o f pri va te necess ity ava il ab le in cases of inten tio nil l to rt
offe rs an ana logy to fa ir usc . Pri v<l te necessi ty pe rmits a d efe nda nt to com m it an inte nti o na l
tort to an ot he r's rig hts in p roperty to protec t a high e r-valu e interes t. e ither in prope rt y. bo d ily sec urit y. o r life. See RESTATEMENT (SECON D) OF T ORTS s§ 262. 263 & c m t. cl (1965).
Where the hi gher-val ue in teres t be lo ngs to a large cl <1ss - for example . whe re the cit v mu s t
be sa ved from a fire - th e privil ege is on e o f publi c nece ss ity and th e defe n d ant is re lieve d
o f anv d ut y to co m pe nsat e the pla intiff. See id. at § 262 & cmt. d . W he re the h igher va lue
in te res t be longs tu a sm <l ll g ro up o r a n in d ividu a l. however, the pr iv il ege is one o f pri v;1 te
necess ity a nd th e defe nd a nt mus t compe nsa te th e plaintiff. See irl . at § 263(2) & c mt. c.
Beca use co m pe nsilt ion is owin g in th e la tte r case. th e p ri vilege is sa id to be .. in co m p lete ...
In th e we ll-kn ow n case o f Vincent v. L ake Erie Transportation Co .. l 24 N .W. 22 1 (M inn.
10 10) , a shi po wn e r's ship d a mage d a clock when the o wn e r a ttem p ted to m oen th e ship durin g <1 sto rm . Th e co urt in vo ke d the inco m ple te pr ivile ge o f pri va te necess ity to h ol d th e
sh ipow ner li able. In p li a bility te rm s, the d oc trine of p ri va te necess it y trilnsfu rm e cl the doc kow ne r 's tra dition a l prop e rty rul e p ro tecti o n into a simulta ne ous p liabili ty rule. Fo r m os t
uses. t he cloc kowner ret ain e d p roperty ru le p ro tection; b u t und e r e xtrao rd in ary circu mstan ces. the shi powne r was pe rmi tte e! to ta ke th e d ockowner's prope rt y fo r a sum eq ua l to
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to thi s umque doctrine . co pyright protection is a t once a zero order
pliability r uie - since the property r ight it bestows is limited in time
- and a sim ulta neous pli ability rule - sin ce the protection copyrig ht
accord s ad mits of nonco nse nsu a l tak ings .
2.

Pri1ilegcd Take rs

i'ld10t he r in sta nce of simul tan eous pl iabilit y protec tion ca n lx
fou nd in t he ca se of privileged take rs. in w hich property rule protec tio n is susp end ed with respect to some nonconsensual users. T hese
privile ged use rs need o nly pay fo r thcir use unde r li ability rule s whik
property rule protec tion re main s in i"cnce against th e rest of the \Vorld.
Such a regim e is illu st rated by the case of Head v. Amoskcng
J\,1mwfauuring Co. 1" 1 T he re . th e S upre me Co urt upheld a statut e that
pe rmit te d mill owners to clam waters . dep riving ripari a n own e rs of
the ir prope rty, if two co nditions were sa tisfied: first, th e takin g must
be for a public be nefit ; a nd , seco nd, the mill owne rs h a d to pay co mpe nsation at 150'Yo of mar ke t value.
In p li a bility te rms , the Supre me Court ruling es tablished a sim ulta neous pliability rule regime. Wh ile the riparian own ers e njoyed full
property r ule pro tection vis-a-vis all oth er trespassers , the ir right to
exclude mill operators was protected by a liability rule. It is
no teworth y, th ough. that mill owne rs had to show that the use effecting th e tak ing benefi ted th e public. The e mplo ym ent of a simultaneo us
pliability rule enab led th e court to bal ance th e right to private property against the inte rest of th e m ill owners , and the broader public in
p utting th e land to its highest va lue use.
The simult aneous pli a bility rule described in Head differs fro m
tha t se e n in fair use in an import ant respect. Whereas fair use emp lo ys
a ze ro order liability rul e , the simultaneo us plia bility rul e described in
Heod requirecll50% compensati on for r ip arian owners not cover ed by
property rule protection. The reason for this gap in compensa tion
schem es ca n be discerned in the difference between the two types of
uses permitted by the pliability rules. Use rs of copyrighted m ateria ls
under the fair use provisions d o not take exclusive possession of the
entitlement. Although fair users utilize the copyrighted materials, the
entitlement holder may continue to engage in commercial transactions
regarding the copyrighted materials with other users. Fair use is not
exclusive of the entitlem ent holder. Furthermore, fair users are o nl y

th e judi ciall y- cl ete rmi ned da m age s. Im portan tly. pri vate necessity is dis tin gu ish a ble from fair
use in th at necessi ty re q ui res compensati on whil e a fair user need not compe nsate th e copyri ght hold e r. Therefore, building o n the typo logy we have dev eloped, fair use may be te rmed
a "ze ro simulta neou s pl ia bility rule " whil e p rivate necessity m ay be called a " positive simulta neo us pliability rul e.' ·
18 1. 113

u.s. 9 ( 11\85) .
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allowed to take a small part of the entitlement. On the other hand. in
t he Heod case , the usc pe rmitted by the pliability rule is exclusive.
Once a m ill own er d ams -..v a teL the flo ode d or water-dep rive d riparian
land is a ltered indefinitely - for as long as the cl a m is in operation.
The riparian ow ner cannot continue to transact with othe r poten ti a l
users of th e la nd as she did prior to th e damming. The condition o f th e
la nd hc.s bee n alte red . <mel the pli ability r ule takes this int o account in
its co mp e nsati on sch eme .
E.

Lope rtv R ules

A not her type of pliability mk is th e lopcrty rul e . By contr::t::;i \Vit h
the pliability rules we have dis c ussed so far. loperty rul es begin with
li a bility rule pro tect ion. whic h. upon the occurre nce of a trigge r ing
event, is tran:Jorm cc.l into pro perty rul e protec tion. The goal of luperty protect ion is gene ra ll y to in centivize the entitleme nt ho lder to
take som e acti o n in order to earn property rule protection. Co nsider
th e famous "fe ncing o ut" rule tha t governed ra nging property in th e
American West in the nin e tee nth century. T he fen cing o ut reg im e reversed th e common law rul e th a t preve nted cattle from grazing on a
neighbor's land . Instead. the fencing o ut rul e a llowed cattle to roam
fr ee ly on others' property until the property was fenced. Thus, landowners who wished to enjoy traditiona l property rul e protection over
their ranches bore th e burd en of fencing out neighbors ' cattle. 1 ~ 2
Analyzed in pliability terms, the fencing out regime se ts a zero orde r liabilit y rul e as the base line fo r using the land of oth ers. Abse nt <1
fence , land wa s presumably part of an open access regime. and cattle
grazers co uld use the land \V ith o ut paying compensation. However ,
any landhold er could alter the b ase line protection by erecti ng a fenc e.
By erecting th e fenc e , the land holder would tri gge r a change in protection from zero order liability to property. Under the new prop erty regime, the landowner could exclude cattle grazers by me ans of injunction, and could collect dam ages in the eve nt of a trespass.
By imposin g the burde n of exclusion on the landhold er, th e fencing out rule ac hie ved two important goals. First, given th e presumed
mutual interest of all cattle ranchers in allowing cattle to ro am freely,
the fencing out rul e eliminated the burden of costly nego tiations
among ranchers. Second, the rule created a mechanism for separating
those owners for whom property rul e protection was efficien t from
those whose land was better served by an open access regime. Spe cifi-

182. R OB ERT C. ELLI CKSON. ORDER WITH OUT LAW: H OW NEI G HBORS SETTL E
DI SPUTES 76 (1 991 ). Fencing out is still the law in Colo rad o . COLO. REV. STAT. A NN.§ 3.5 46-1 02(1) (Bra d ford 21)(Jl) . See generally T e rence J. Centne r, R eforming O urdarl! r! Fm cl'
Law Pro visions: Good Fences Mak e Good Neigh bors Only if Thev are Fair. 12 J. ENV l"L. L.
& L!TIG. 267 (1997).
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call y. it induced cattle ranch e rs to assess and communica te to oth e rs
the value of exclusive usc ol th ei r land.
Additionally , a loperty ruk may also be used to inccntivize potc nti<d takers of th e e ntitlement. Co nsider aga in the case of Boom e r 1 ~'
Th e Co urt of Appea ls of New Yo rk cl ecick cl to protect homeown e rs
affected by a nuisa nce by mea ns o r a li ability rule. At la ntic Ceme nt
was perm itted to cont inue in fri nging upon homeowners· ~:njoyment of
the ir property and , in exchange . pay the d<Hnage am ou nt assessed by
the co urt. The court was moti vn ted in pan by the concern that r eq uirin g A tl a ntic Cemen t to dev e lop s up er ior ~~ b ~tt c m e nt tec hnologies on
suc h short noti ce would be in e quitable:. Thus . the court determined
tha t the homeown e rs sho uld perma nent ly lo ~e their Cull p roperty rul e
prot ect io n. A judicia lly craftedloj!erty ruk co uld have better balanced
the eq uities. Under s uch a lopc rt y rul e . f\tl a ntic Cem e nt would h ave
e nj oyed the ri ght to pollute fo r payment o nl y lo r a limite d tim e, say
five yea rs. Thereafter, prope rt y rule protecti o n over th e homes would
be re insta ted. This result achi eves a better distribution of the burd en
of indu strial uses. On the on e hand, hom eo wners wo uld not nee d to
for[eit pe rmanently their prope rty rights. O n th e other hand, large industria l e mploye rs, s uch as At lantic Ceme nt would be g iven several
years to develop th e pollution control m eas ures necessa ry for th e ir
busin esses to continue without unduly harming neighboring homeowners.
F.

Title Shifring Pliabiliry Rules

Having discusse d pliability rules that involve trans1t10ns from
prope rty rules to liab ility rul es and vice ve rsa, we n ow turn to titl e
shifting pliability rul es, und e r which a p rese t conditi o n trigge rs th e
transfer of property rule protec tion from on e e ntitleme nt hold er to
anoth er. 184 The initial holder rece ives no compensation. The recipi e nt
of th e entitlement in the second stage, howeve r, enjoys full proper ty
rule protection. Thus, as we disc uss in our e xamples below, the importance of title shifting pliability rul es lies in their being a nonconsensual
mech anism of transferring property int erests. 185

18:'\. 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
l S4. As we note in o ur example s in thi s Section . in stage 2. th ere m ay be more th a n o ne
e ntitl e me nt holder.
185. As we explain later in th is Sec ti o n. in some cases . title shifting pliability rule s di splay se\'era l advan tages ove r the oth e r m a jo r noncon se nsual transfer m ec hanism- li a bility
rule protection. These adva ntages stem from the fact that th e subsequent e ntitlement holder
enjoys prope rty rule protec tion unde r title shift ing pliabil ity rules.
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Adverse Possession

Adve rse possess ion provid es a stark example of title shifting
pliability protection. As Dwye r and Mcn eil noted. adverse possession
ts '· [p.J erhaps th e most startling mea ns o f acq uirin g property
[ri ghts]." 1s6 Under this doctrin e. a st ran ge r ca n gain titl e to another's
land by occupying it - " but on ly if th e occupation is indeed wrongful." !SI To succeed on an adve rse possession claim. th e occupier mu st
show tha t her occupation is host ile to th e ow ner's interest, actual.
open a nd notorio us, exclusive. ancl continuuus fo r th e sta tutoril y man da tt:d pe riod of tim e _ ~,,,, Th e successfu l adverse possessor is not only
immun e against a sui t for e jection : she acq uires th e ful l panopl y of
ri~,: ht s ass ociated with o\vnershi pi"! Effec ti ve ly. therefore, adve rse pos sess io n is a lega l mechanism that sa nctions pr ivate tak in gs o f property.
Unde r our proposed typology, ad\'erse possess ion is an exa mple of a
title shifting pliability rule. Adverse possess ion el imin ates the legal
prot ec ti on accorded to the original owner fro m a property rule, and
instead invests someone else with full property rul e protection over
th e en titlement. As in the case of esse nti a l facilities, th e reduction in

l Rfi . JOHN P. DWY ER & PETER S. :VIE'JELL. PR OI'F.RTY LAW r\N D POLI CY : A
CO:VIPARr\ TIYE INSTITUTIONA L PERSPECTIVE 76 ( llJ91i). In a simi la r vei n. Stoebuck and
Whitm <J n ca ll adve rse possessio n '·a stran ge <1 nd wo nde rfu l sys te m ... WILLi r\M B. STO EI3UCK
& DALE A. WHITM AN . TH E LAW OF PROPERTY R53 (3d ed . 2000) : see also H enry W.
Balla ntin e. Tir/e by Adverse Possession. 32 Hc\RV . L. REV. 135 . 135 (J91R) (" [T]he doctrine
[of ad ve rse possession] appare ntly affords a n anomalous instance of mat urin g a wrong into a
ri ght co ntrary to one of the most fund amental a\iom s o f th e bw. ·For tru e it is. that neithe r
fraud nor migh t/Can make a title where th e re IVaiHe th ri ght' ·· (qu oti ng A ltham's case . 8
Coke Rep . !53. 77 Engl. re pri nt. 707)).
lf\7. STOEI3UCK & WH IT!vtAN , supm note LS6. at 853.
188. See, e.g .. DWY ER & MEI\ELL. sup mnotc 186 . at 77-R2; .1 ee also VanVa lkenburgh v.
Lutz. 10fi N.E .2d 28, 29 (N.Y. 1952) (n otin g that ·'[tj o ~.leq uire title to rea l p roperty by adverse possession not found ed upon a written instrumen t. it must be shown by clear and co nvi ncing proof that fo r a t least fifte en yea rs (formerly twe nt y years) th e re was an ·actu al' occupa ti o n unde r a claim of title . ."); H owa rd v. Kunt o. ~77 P.2d 210, 2 13 (Was h. Ct. Ap p.
1970) (restating "the oft-quo ted rul e th at: ·[T]o constitu te adve rse possession, there must be
actu al possession which is uninterrup ted. ope n and not orious, hostile and exc lu sive , and un der a claim of right made in good faith for the statuto ry period' ") . Bur see O 'Kee fe v.
Snyder, 41 6 A.2d 862 ,870 (N .J. 1980) (noting that '·[t] o es tablish title by adv erse possess ion
to cha tte ls. the rule of law has bee n that the possession must be hostile, actual. visibl e, exc lu sive , and continuous"); Chap lin v. Sa nde rs. 676 P 2d 431. 436 (Wash. 1984) (o ve rrulin g
1-!mvard v. Kunlo to th e extent th a t th e case sugges te d a good -faith req ui reme nt for adverse
possession. and specitical\y noting th at an adve rse possesso r's ''subjective bel ief rega rdin g
his tru e interest in th e land and his intent to dispossess or not dispossess another is irre levant''). However, the O'Keefe court also noted that in th e ca se of wo rk s of art. th e '·introdu ct ion of eq uitable considerations through the discovery rule,'' id. at 1::72. which ·'prov id es
that. in a n app ropria te case, a cause of ac ti on will not accr ue unti l the injured party discove rs, o r by exe rcise of reasonable dili gence sho uld have discove red. fac ts whi ch fo rm th e basis
of a cause of action ," i d. at 869 . " provides a more satisfactorv response than th e doctri ne of
adverse possession'' !d. at 872 .
189. See . e.g .. STOEI3UC K & WHI Hif\N . suf'ro note !Sri . at 853 ("Title ga ined [through
adverse possession] is usua ll y in fee sim ple abso lute.").
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protec ti on dep e nds on th e behavior or th e pro perty owner. The shift
of property rul e protection is not mandato ry . but rather, it is triggered
by th e hil urc of the owner to assert possess ion ovcr the property. 1911
In the context of adverse possession. pliability rul e pro tection is intended to deter cert ain types of inacti on on the part o f property own ers . U nde r the analys is of advoca tes of adverse possess ion , the use of a
title shifting pli ab ility rule in the case of <lc!v e r:;;,~· possess ion promotes
bot h efficiency <mel fairne ss .191 T radition ally. propon e nL:; o[ adverse
possess ion ha ve asse rted that the risk of los ing the propert y rul e protec tion en lnn cc? S efficient use of re s our ccs i'~c A dvcrs•..: possession , on
thi s th eory . gene ra tes two co mple mentar y ince nti ve d tcc ts: a nega tive
and a p osit i v,~. ']'he negative effect targets prop·.::rty ()\Vncrs: th e posi tive <1pp li e~ to po tential occupi e rs. By pcrwii7:ing nr.: gligc nt and dormant ow n:.:r ~s who "sleep on th eir rights, .. 19·' adverse possessio n in duces
property ow ne rs to handle their propert y in ~~ soc iall y respon sible
manne r. By reward ing productive occup::ltion of land . the doct rine is
thought to encourage search and use of negl ected property. The combination of penalty and reward effectiv ely ens ures th at property is put

190. See . e.g .. J effery Evans Stake. Th e Unmsy Case fur A d ve rse Possessio n. 89 GEO .
L.J. 2419. 2443 (2001) (suggesting th at "adverse poss ess io n helps d ea l with the probl e m of
mi ss in g o wners''): see also Monica Kive l K a lo & Jose ph J. Kalo. I h e Bo11ie 10 Pres erve Nonh
Carolina 's Esnwrinc /V!orshes: Th e ! 985 Legis/(l{ion, Pri\'1/le Cloi111s lu Esllwrine M arsh es,
D enio/ of Per111irs ru Fill, and 1he Public Tms1. 64 N.C. L. RE V. 565. li06 ( 19R6) ( no ting thZ~t
"landow ne rs nee d not rece ive actual not ice that th e ir ri g h ts are in jeo pard y to tri gge r th e
running of the statu te o f lim itations . . . [where] possess ion ... (isJ actua l. e xcl usive. open and
notori ous . a nd continu ous and uninterru p ted ").

191. See Thomas J. M iceli & C. F. S irmans. /\11 Eco nomic Th eo n · of i \ dve rs e Possession.
15 I :~r' l~ REV . L. & ECON . 161. 161 (1995) (e nume ra ti ng jus tificati o ns fm the "curi o us doctri ne ... in cludin g ( l ) p rese rvin g ev ide nce , which d eca vs O\ e r tim e t he rdw in c rea s in g th e diffic ult y of trying ca ses: (2) penalizing ow ne rs for siuing o n thei r rig h ts o r using th e ir la nd
ineffi cient ly: (3) reducing transaction costs a nd thereby facilit:1ting m a rk e t exc han ge thr o ugh
th e e limination of old cla ims to property : (4) suppo rtin g the relian ce int e re st that d e velops
am o ng occ upiers).
192. See Ri c ha rd A . Posner, Sovignv. H olmes. wul thl' Lall' and Econo mics of P ossession . t\6 VA. L. RE V. 535 . 559 (2000) (" The eco no m ic rat io na le of adve rse posse ss io n . co nce ived as a method of shifting own e rshi p with o ut bencfi1 o f negotiati On o r a paper transfe r.
can be made perspicuous by asking wh e n property sh o uld be d eem e d aba ndunecl. that is.
rdurn e d to the common pool of un ow ne d resource s a nd so made available for appropriati o n
th ro ugh se izure b y so meone else. Th e eco nomist' s a nswe 1· is that thi s should happe n when
it' s li kely to p rom o te the e fficient use of va luabl e reso urces ." ) . Spra nklin g . ho wever, co ntends th a t the doc trin e may spur overex pl o ita tion of wildl a nd s. a nd th us p roposes th a t wild
land sho uld be exem pt fro m th e doc trin e . See John G. S p rank lin g. A n Environmenra/ Cririqu e of 1\dver:;e Possession. 79 CORN EL L L. RE V. 8l6. o-+0 ( 1994) (n o tin g that .. [ujn d e r the
de ve lopme nt model. a dv e rse possess ion functions to faci litate the eco nom ic exploita ti o n of
lan d " ).

c·

193. See Sta ke . SlljJ/'11 not e 190. at 2434-35
Accord ing to Jth c l ·s lee p ing' theo ry. adverse po ssess ion a cts a s a civ il pe na lt y fo r wron gdoe rs. Th e wrongdoers a re th ose wh o s lee p
on th e ir rig hts. an d th e ir pe na lty is to lose those right s." ) : so' alsu Ba ll :mtine. supm no te 1 ~ 6 .
a t 135 ( .. ·Eng lish lawve rs reg::1rd not th e merit ol" th e: possessor. hut th e d e merit of th e o ne
out uf possession.· .. (quoting JAiVI ES BARR AM ES . L ECTUT<ES ()~; LEGA L HISTORY 197
( 191 3)))
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to sociallv desirable uses either by the title-holder or by the a dve rse
possessor. 1'14 Adverse possession thus constitutes an inform a L nonmarket mechanism for improving allocation of resources.
Second, the use of a title shifting pliability rule in this context has
desirable information forcing effects. Carol FZose likened property to
··a kind ()[' :c;pcech, with the audience composed of all others who might
be:: int e rested in claiming the object in qucstion ... 1"' The group of potentia! claimants is not limited to adverse pusscssors. It a lso includes
buyers. lc:;se es. ancl creditors, who all ne ed to know the identity or the
rightf:Jl owner in order to transact. Thu:;. ck~ctr titles have two de si rabk ,_:tlc cts: thcv facilitate trade and redu ce crmrlicts. Frum an inCormCltiun~ll ;x~rspcctive , therefore , aclver:;,~
serve:-; the dual
functions or .. quieting titles" and tacilit dt ing transactions. '~"
t hi~:
view , <ldverse possession is not intended to l"C\\ard industriousness a ncl
det e r slacking, but rather, to prompt property owners to cornmunicate
clearly with th e rest of the worlcl. 197 The use c1f a title shifting pliability
rule is responsible for this result. By rewarding clear communication,
and penalizing vagueness, the title shifting pliability rule pre~;erves the
informational integrity of the property system. thus leading to more
transacting and less conflict. Obviously, the importance of this function varies depending on the effectiveness of the jurisdiction's recording system.
10--t. See. e.g. ROGERT COOTER & THOMAS UI.E'.!. L'\W AI\D ECONO\IICS 156 (1st cd.

19SSJ (noting that :1dverse possession .. tends to prevent valuable resources from being left
idle Co r long periods of time by specifying procedure:; for a JHOcluctiv<:: user to take title from
an unproductive user" ' : the rule thereby '·tends to move property to higher-value uses. as
required lor effici e ncy. by redistributing it to aggressive 0\\ners .. ). Following Holmes's suggestion that a p e rson becomes gradually more attached to land he occupies. sec Oliver
Wendell Holmes. The Path of !he Low. I 0 HARV. L. RFV. -+57. --+77 (I S07). Richard A.
Posn e r has argued that adverse possession is in large part about diminishing margin a l utility
of incomt: ... The adverse possessor would experience the deprivation of propertv as a diminution in his we:1lth: the original owner 1vould experience the restoration of the property as
an increase in his wealth. If they have the same wealth. then probably their combined utili tv
will be gre~1tcr if the adverse possessor is allowed to ke e p the property ... RICHARD A.
POSNER. ECONO MI C ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 (4th eel. 1092). Burse!' Omri Ben Shahen. Till:'
Erosion ofRigilrs by Pasl13reuch. 1 AM. L. & ECON. Rr:v. 100 . .2.25 (1000). Ben Shahar conl<cncls. contrary to the common wisdom. that the risk of loss of title. which he calls "erosion ...
is likely to prompt owners who neglect their property to .. seck to evict possessors. wherea s
abs<::nt an erosion risk [such property owners] would potcntiallv hav e allowe d the efficient
possessor to quietly maintain use." According to Ben Sh:1har the main effect of adverse possession is to ··facilitate the movement of assets away from absente e owners because it makes
e nfo rcem e nt uf absentee ownership more costly." !d. at .225.
105. Ca rol M. Rose, Possessio n as the Origin of Prop ertv. 52 U. CHI. L. R EV . 73. 79
( i 985) [hereinafter Rose. Origin of Propertv]. For an information-based theory of property.
sec Thomas \V. Merrill & Henry E. Smith. Optimal Srundnnlizorion in the Llllt" u( Pmparv.·
Til e Numerus Clausus Principle. 110 YAL"E L.J. I (20UIJ ) .

1%. S ee Merrill. supm note 102. at 1129 (noting that a .. concern which has frequently
been advanced in the literature on adverse possession is the interest in ·quieting titles· to
prope rty" ' ): ill. at 1130 (noting that the use of a mechanical cntitkm e nt determination rul e in
the context o f adv e rse possession facilitates the development of a market in propertv rights) .

107. Rose:. Origin of Propenv. supra note 195. at 70-00.

58

Michigan Law Revie 11'

[Vo L !(J l:l

Fin ;J ll y, the risk of losing th e property rule protection deters titleho ld ers fr o m a tt e mptin g to exto rt qu as i-rents from adve rse possesso rs. ~ ~~ Un der standar d property rule protection , and abse nt an cfl'e ctive system for co nve yin g clear inform at ion , property ow n ers co uld
e licit t hird parti es to im p rove th eir prope rt y by inte ntion a ll y misrep re se ntin g thzn the p rop erty has been abandoned. Such stra te g ic b e havior
is a tr ap to innoce nt occupa nts. Believing that they will be entitled to
the full v;_du e of their in ves tm en t, innoce nt adv e rse posses::;ors will expend cons ide rable effort a ncl reso urc es o n others · property and ultimately will lose their investment alto get her when th ~ true ow ner
reas:>erls her rights .:···· Th e st rategic mi sreprese ntatio n tl! th e true
O\v ncr d istorts the deci sio n making process of th e adverse possc~;so r by
crc:tting a n dp pca rance of an eco nomi c opportunity tlwt in re a lit y
does not c:\ ist. A d verse pusscss ion miti ga tes, to some C\ tc n t, th e ex
an te in ce ntive or property owners to e ngage in such str ategic mis rcprescnt <ltion . and thus. permits "me mbers of th e public [toj rr..:l y upon
their own reasonable perce ptions.'' 200 H ere, too , th e importance o f this
funct ion depends o n th e qualit y of the reco rding sys tem <mel ot he r information about the sta tus of th e property.
The use of a title shifting pliability rul e to tra nsfer th e titl e oi th e
property fro m th e original owne r to the adverse possessor is also j ustifi e cl. at times. o n fairn ess grounds. The fairn ess ration a le maintains
that aft er a long period of possession, th e reli ance inte res t of the a dverse possessor s hould o utweigh th e formal title of the original owne r.
In doing fa irn ess to th e parties, the law must con sider th e fact th at the
a dverse possessor has deve lop e d a n exp ec tation to re ta in possession of
th e prope rty, a nd that th e o rigin a l owner, inte nti o nall y or n eg li ge ntl y,
fos ter ed this expec tation. Thus, so me d egree of moral fau lt attach es to
the tru e owner for e nco uragin g a relatio nship of dep ende nc e, wh ich
she la te r inte nd e d to c ut off? 11 As Jus tice Holmes fa m o usly stated ,
property ''tak es root in your b e ing and cannot be torn a way without

IYS. Scr: Me rrilL supm note 102 . at 11 3 1-1132: Mi ce li & Sirm a ns. su pra no te IYI , at 161!i2.

I '!Y. This probk m is partic ul ar ly acute in cases o f boundary disputes. ln s uch cases. a
prope rt y ow ner pe rmits an adjace nt ne ig hbo r. who mistake nl y believes s he is ac tu a ll y
bu ildin g on he r ow n la ne!. to e ncroac h on the property owner 's land. Aft e r the encroac hment
occ urred. th e encroached upon owner can ex ploit he r neigh bor's investmen t to extrac t a
m uc h hig he r payme n t fr o m her to set tl e th e dispute than she o th erwise wo ul d. A s M e rrill
no te d. in ex tre me cases. the strategica ll y e nc roache d upon own e r ·' may be able to extract not
on ly the v:du c: of th e la nd but the lull va lu e of th e addit ion as we ll. '' See M e rrilL supro note
Ill!. at 11:'\1: i\·liccli & Sirman s. supm note 19 1. at l !i l-62 (notin g that ·' wh e n a bo uncLt rv error occurs .. allowing titl e to pass to th e possessor aft e r a ce r tain pe ri od prev e nt s th e true
owner !'rom ta king ad va ntage o f th e possessor's initi a l e rro r to exto rt qu as i re nt s c rea te d by
his rel ia nce e xpend itur es ") .
21JU. Ro se . Origin of Properry. supm note 195 , a t 80.
2Ul. Se.: J osep h W. Sin ge r. Th e R eliance In terest in Property . 40 STAN. L. RE V. 6 11. !i67
( i Yt\::·i).
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your resenting th e act a nd trying to dctencl yo urse lf, howe ve r yo u
came by it.'·cn:> Subseq ue nt empirical studi es hav e affirmed Holm es ·s
conjccture .c 11 ' These stud ies indicate that peopl e deve lop an especially
s trong attachment to assets in their posse ss io n. This cognitive phe nomenon . \videly known as an "endowment dfec t. '' 2111 further tips the
sca le in favor of th e a d ve rse possessor. Th e in creas in g attachment of
th e adverse possessor to the property rai ses th e subj ec tive va lu e she
assigns \0 th e prope rty, a nd as time goes by he r cla im to th e prope rly
g rows stro nge r relat ive to th e claim of th e o ri gina l o wne r. The title
s hi fting p liability ru le und e rgirding ad verse pos:;ess ion pro vides the
lega l S)hkt11 with a m ec hanism to move the p ru pcrty to the adve rse
posY,cSS(l!. \\hen fairne ss so requi res. It mu s t he note d. however. th <lt
the requirement that th e adverse possessor possess the property "hostilcl v .. significantly und e rmines the adverse pu:-;se::;so r·s claim to fairne ss .

G. !'v/ultipfe Stage Pliabiliry Rules
As we noted earlier, p li ability rul es need not be r es tricted to one
s tage. In theory, pliability rules are unlimite d in the number of prope rty and liability rules they can aggregate into a sin gle pliability rule.
Multiple stage pliability rules serve the same functions as their twostage cousins, and are necessary to accommodate anticipa ted multipl e
changes in circumst ances or a particularly complicated balance of inte rests.

1.

Eminent Domain

Arguably the most fa mous instance of pli ab ility rule protection is
pro vided by the law of emine nt domain. The power of eminent domain authorizes governme nts to seize privat e property upon making a
decision by a process specified in law. By exercising its power of emi202 . H ol me s. supm note 194. a t 476-77 .
203. See Ro be rt C. E llickso n, Bringing Culture and t-lul/11111 Fmilly to Rmional / \ctors: A
CritiliiiC of Classical Law and Econ omics, 65 CHI. K ENT L. RE V. 23 . 39 (1986) (op in in g th a t
Ho lmes ··is more faithfully inte rpre te d as a nticipating ( in a primi tive way)'' late r deve lo pm e nts in cog niti ve psychology) .
204. On the endowment effec t. see generally Dani e l K<dlll e man e t al.. Erp erim enral
Tes1s of ril e End01 vm enr Effect and th e Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990): Dani e l
Ka hn eman et al.. The Endowm el/l Effect, Loss Aversion, and Sw ill s Quo Bias. 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 193 ( 1991 ): Richard Tha le r, To ward a Positiv e The ory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.
E CON . BEHA v. & ORG. 39 (1980): see also Owen D. J ones. Tim e S luJi ed Rarionnlily and th e
LaiV of LaiV's Levem ge: B ehavioml Economics Me els B ehavioral B iology, 95 Nw. U. L.
RE V. 1141. 1154 (2001) (report ing that "people tend to va lue an object more hi ghl y as soo n
as th ey possess it - often twice as high ly - compared to how th ey va lu e the sam e obj ect if
they had to purchase it ,"' or, m o re forma ll y. " th eir indiffe rence cur ves shift in a syste mat ic
m ann e r as soon as the y acq uire a good. in creasing th e ascr ibed va lu e o f th e e ndo wed good
re la ti ve to al l other goods") .
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ncnt domain , th e gove rn ment ma y transform the property rule prutection into liability rule pro tection, so long as it pays "jus t co mpe nsa tion," as mandated by the C ons titution 205 - und e r current doctrine,
the mark e t value of th e prope rty taken. 206 So long as exercised for a
public purpose a nd accompanied by "just compensation, " this p ower is
a lmost limitless. This m akes eminent dom a in one of th e m ost im portant pliability rul es. Indeed. it ca n justly be said that, in li g ht of the
ubiquity of ta kin gs. a ll propr.:rty e ntitlements should be viewed <tS protec ted by pliable pro tecti on . :.t t least vis- 3-vis the gove rnm ent.
Here, we charac terize takin gs as res ulting from a thre e-stage
pliability rule p ro tec tin g (;s:<.ets: prope rt y rule pro tec tion , follow ed Lw
li ab ility rul e protect ion . <tlld then p rop erty rule protecti on aga in . ~"' In
this characte rizati o n, a gover nm e nt decision to exe rcise th e power o f
e minent doma in - to '·take" - elkcts a tran sition from property rule
pro tection in th e han ds of the original holder to li a bility rul e protecti o n. Before the governm en t's d ec ision to take the asset , the pri va te
property hold er e njoys property rule protection, e ve n v i s - ~1- vis t he
gove rnm e nt. For exa mpl e, the private property owner has th e ri g ht to
exclude governme nt age nts seeking to pe rform warrantless search es,
as well as to sue the government to a bate nuisances to the ex tent s uch
suits are no t barred b y sove reign immunity. However, once th e gove rnment de cides to exercise its po wer of e minent domain , the entitlem e nt hold e r enjoys only ordinary liability protection - the rig ht to
"just compe nsation " in exc hange for th e asset. After th e gove rnm e nt
ta kes th e property, howeve r , the asset is once again protecte d by
property rul e pro tec tion , albeit thi s tim e the entitlement h o lder is the
government.

205 . U.S. CONST. ame nd. V ( .. (NJo r sh all pr iva te prope rty be take n for public use. wi tho ut just com pe nsation .'').
206. See Lcwinsohn -Za rni r. supra note \1, a t 242 (noting th at "whe n lan d is taken by the
s tate for public use, compe nsation is based o n the (objec ti ve) m a rk e t va lue of th e prope rty.
regardless of the un ique public usc intended by th e governme nt" ') . In the context of regu lato ry takings. co ur ts hav e t: mploy<cd a .. modifi ed mark e t value test,"' which measures th e e xten t to whi ch the regu la ti on at iss ue d imini she d th e property 's market va lu e . See, e.g .. A. f\.
Profiles, In c. v. C ity of Fort Lauderda le . 253 F.3d 576.583 n .7 . 584 (11th C ir. 2001) ( ho ldi ng
th at the m od ifi e d m arket va lu e tes t was th e app ropriate meas ure of damages for a permane nt regul a to ry takin g. rega rdl ess o f wheth e r the takin g had a valid p ublic purpose). Ca librating compe nsation ha s proven con tenti ous. See. e.g., William A. Fischel , Tile Ojfei!Ask
Dispari1y and J us! Conzpens{[[ion fin Tak ings: A Con slillllional Choice Perspeclive. 15 INT "L
REV. L. & ECON . 187 . !93 (19\15) (a rg uin g that " latter-day criti cs who ca ll for cnhancc cl
compensation under e minent doma in would upset a so lution to the offer/ask problem th a t
h ad a lre ady bee n stru ck in sco res of co nstit utiona l conventions" ); Aa ron N. Grue n. Tokiugs,
Jus! Conzpensllliun. and file Etficienl Use of /_and, Ur/)(l n, and Em,ironmclllal R esources . 33
URB . L AW. 517.536 (2001) (s ugges ting th at .. if th e gover nm e nt pays more than mark e t va lu e
for a property, it ma y result in un de r-investme nt in beneficial publi c goods th a t the private
market cannot effici ently provide' ').
207 . Aclmittc cl ly, thi s is no t th e o nly way o f c haracte ri zin g ta kings in a pliabilit y analysis .
See infi·a note 214 and accompanving tex t.

•

Octo ber 2U02 ]

Pliobiliry Rules

61

T he ev id ent enormitv of th e powe r of e minen t do m a in has led to
discomfort about its use, re fl ected in the cons titut ional re quirements
of "just co mpe nsation ·· and '' pub lic us e,'' 208 as well as a voluminous literature abo ut the proper scope of the constitutional Takings Clau se. 209
Yet , th e power of e m ine n t do main has also b ee n see n as indispe nsa b le
in ord e r to allo w· gove rnm e nt to fulfill its impo rtant fun ction of providin g p ubli c goods..: 1u Thus, emin e nt domain serves a different set of
go a ls than . for exam ple . adv e rse possession . \V her c adverse possession
aims to curb nc gkc t of prope rty by th e o riginal e ntitlement ho ld e r.
emi ne nt cl c rnain is not co nce rn e d wit h any "w rongdoin g· · o f th e o n g1----- - - ~-·· ------------------

l !i:-\. i\t k<: st ' ' ' :1 l lliiil·~ i u l gramn1ar. the phr asin g of the FiCth Amend men t' s T:1kings
CI:Jusc iiC tu a Jh· su gc:c's ts t!ut .. J'llbli c usc .. is a conditi on prece de nt l< l th e· pav m cn t ,['··just
co m pensatio n .. iitt he r thil ll t•J the ex e rcise of the tak ing power CJ: i\:lOR TO"i J. II OI.ZI\' ITZ.
Til [ TR A"iSFO R\1.-\TiU:\ t l! ,-\ \1 ER IC>.N L\ W 1780- 18!i0. a t 65 ( 1977) (c iti ng a rgum e n ts of
nin e tee n th C•: nturv lawye rs thai sim ilar p rov isio ns in s tate consti t ut ions di d no t lim it puwc r
to tak e for priv:!lc us c). Neve rthele ss. th e C l:tus e h as not been read tc' e liminate the need ((,r
JUSt compensation wh ere prope rt y is tak e n fo r nonpublic usc. Rath e r. it ha s been see n as
embodying the Anglu -,-~mcr ic a n tr ad iti o n o f limitin g the powe r of emin e nt do m ain to cases
where the taking is lo r a pL!b lic u se. See BRUCE A. A CKERrviAN . PRI VXIE PRCJPEIH Y ;-\~;[)
TH E CONSTITUT ION 19U n. 5 ( 1977) c·[Tj h e m o d ern und e rs ta ndin g of ·pu b li c u sc:· ho ld s tha t
an y s ta te purpose o th e rw ise co nst itu tiona l s ho uld qua li fy a s s uffi c ient ly ·publi c ' to j us tify a
ta k in g.'') (c ita ti o n om itt e d ). ln rece nt yea rs. th e '·pub li c u se" require m e nt ha s fa llen into
disuse. see. e.g .. Ri ch ard A . Epste in. Nu1ice and Freedom of Cunlm CI in rlze L1m· uf Servill ules. 55 S. CA L. L. RF.V. U5..i . 1367 n.29 (1982) (ob se rv in g that "'th e pub li c usc li m it a ti o n
has little . if a ny. cons tituti o nal bite tod ay . exce pt in case s inv o lvin g th e con dem n ation o f ex cess Janel"). prom pt in g protes t from so me sc hola rs. See, e.g. E PSTEI N. supra no te I 0 I . at I n 18 1: G id eo n Kan n e r. Conrlemnario n !Jiighr: Jus/ 1-/mv Jus£ Is J usr Cmnp ensmion ' . 4~ NOTRE
DA1\·IE L-\ WY ER 765 ( 197 3 ): Thomas W. Merri ll. Th e Eco nomics of Pu blic Use . 72 COR NE LL
L R EV 6 1 ( lY:\6).

lOY. Set'. e.g .. E I'STE I;\. sup m note I il l: WILLI Aivl A. FISC HEL. R ECiU LATO KY TAK INGS
(1995): Frank f. Mich e lm a n. Prop erry, Urili!y. and F(/im ess: Co mmenrs o n rh e Erhiwl Foundarions of "Jus! Con1pcnwriun .. Lmv. 80 HARV. L. R EV . 1 165 ( 1967): J ose p h L. Sax. Tak ings
and ;he Police Po ~< ·er . 7J, Y,\ LE L.J. 311 (1964). For a hi s tori ca l ove rview of ta kings. see Wi lliam Mic hael Treanor, The Origin al Ullllers{(lnding of rh e Takings Clause and rhe P o liEica l
Process . 95 C OLU'-''- L REV . 782 ( 1995). M os t of th e m ode rn literature foc uses on th e que stion of wh a t acts o f gove rnment sh o ul d be co nsid e re d co n stitutional '·tak in gs" such th a t just
com p e nsa tion mu st be paid. Thus. th e bulk o f takin gs sc holarship does not directly conce rn
itse lf with the scope o f the powe r of e minen t dom a in: ra th e r, it addresses th e sub s id iary
qu est ion o f w he n cons ti tu tio na l lim it at ions ap pl y.
2 LO. See E PSTEII". supra note lOL at 4 -5 (a rguing that the sta te ca n o nl y va lidl y exe rc ise
co ercive power to preve nt priv ate agg 1·ess ion or to provide public goods) : see als o T h omas
W. M e rrill. Rcnr Seeking unci !hi:' Co111pensa rion Principle. 80 Nw. U. L REV. 156!. 1569
(1986) (re viewing RI CHARD A. EPSTE IN. TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TH E POWE R
OF EMI NENT OO iviA IN ( 1985 )). Me rrill' s rev iew notes Eps te in 's a rgumen t th a t "whe n th e
powe r of e mi ne nt dom a in is use d to s upp ly pub lic good s, th e surplus will te nd to be d ivicl e cl.
at leas t ap proximate ly. in propor tion to pre exis tin g sh a res of wealth. Th ose w ith large pr e exi st in g sha re s will ob ta in large b e nefits fr o m publi c goods : tho se with small preex is ting
shares wi ll o btain smal l be nc: rit s." ! d.: cf Ugo M att e i. Efficiency as Eq uirv: !nsighrs fi-olll
Co nz pumrive Law and Econo111 ics. 14 l NT'L R EV . L & ECON . 3. 7 (199-f) (''As far as the
p ubl ic usc req ui remen t is co nce rn e d . the e con o mi c th eo ry of p ubl ic good s provide s both a
justifi ca ti o n and a limit. T he j ust ificat io n is th a t th e gove rnm e nt needs to b e able to acqu ire
the inpu ts th a t arc necessa ry to provid e pub lic goods whic h the marke t ca n no t ea sily pro vide. The iim it is set by the co nsid e rat ion that any priva te use of th e powe r o f emin e nt d om a in will be ineffi cie nt sin ce it produces a result th a t priva te parties wou ld not be ah le to
;-each by barga inin g.") ( interna l citati ons om itted).
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nal h o ld e r. Rather, e min e nt d omain is used as a too l tor transfe rrin g
titl e in property to a presume d hi g her-va lu e us e r. Emine nt domain
tak es a n ass et from private hands and pl aces it in th e ha nds of a government that ne e ds the asset to provid e for a public goo d. The coe rcive m ec hanism is necessar y in o rd e r to overcome s tr a tegic diffic ulti es
that impede barga ining and preve n t voluntary reass ignm e nt of th e as set to th e governmen t in m arket transactions.
T h e ce ntral b arr ie rs to success ful negot ia tions overco me by em inent doma in com e un de r the hea ding of strategic behavior and include
the closely re la te d problems o f bi lakral m o nopo ly a nd asy mmetri c in l"o rm a ti o n .:11
In a situation of b ilateral mono pol y, the re is but one pote nti al
buyer and one p otentia l seller. [ ac h knows that the tnm saction cann o t
tak e pl ace without he r cooper:J.t io n. and each , therefor e. attempts to
ex tract a ll the profit fro m th e tra nsaction. The probl e m of bil a tera l
monopoly can b e illustrated with the exampl e of a govern ment d ec ision to build a railw ay throu g h an isolated valley. The re is only o ne
railw ay, and ther efore only on e potential buye r of valley la nd. On th e
other hand , th e railr oad mus t purchase all th e valley parcels along the
lay of th e track ; eve n one hold-o ut can ruin th e proj ec t. Each parcel
owner is thus a monopolist who may att empt to hold out for a high er
price that will dive rt the railro a d protits to he r own pockets. In such a

21 1. F o r a comprehens ive review of th e li terature o n strategic ba rri ers to bilateral negotiati o n. see Robe rt Coote r. Th e Cosr uf Couse . ll J. L EGA L. STU D. l. 23 (1YS2) (pointin g o ut
that di sag re e ments a s to ho w to divid e the contra ct ual s urplus may pre vent successful
Coa sean barga ining): J o hn Ke nnan & Robe rt Wilson. Barga ining ll'itlz Privwe Information.
31 J. ECON . LITE RAT URE 45 . 46 ( I YLJ3) ( hypoth esiz in g th a t differe nces in priva te info rma tion are a p rim a ry ca use o f ba rgainin g d e lays): Robe rt P. M e rges. Of ProperLy Rules. Coase.
and !n rellect ual ProperLy. 94 CO L U~·I. L. RE V. 2655. 2659 (1994) (obse rving that in th e fi e ld
of int e ll ec tual propert y th e va luation proble m heighten s th e possibility of stragetic barga in ing): E ri c L. Talley. Not e , Co nrrocr Ren e;:.o rimion, ;'v/eclwnisiii Design, and the Liiluidared
Dam ages Rule, 46 STAI'!. L. R EV . II 95. 1198. 1219 (1994) (discuss ing th e prob le m of bil a tera l
mon opo ly in co ntract re negot iati on).
On asymmetric info rm at io n spec ifi ca ll y. sec Lo ui s Kap low & Steve n Shave ll. D o Liability Rules Facilirare Bargaining? A R eplr ro ; l yres a/Il l Tallev, 105 Y ALE L.J. 221. 223 -29
( I 995) (" Wh e n each party·s own valuation is not known by the o th e r. each party will have
incentives to misrepresent its valuation in bargainin g. h o ping to extract more of th e bargaining surplus from th e ot he r part y. Parties may the refo re demand too much or offer too
littl e. with the result th a t effici e nt barga ins ma y not be reac he d. In thi s case, o n e canno t say
un a mbi guously whe th e r prope rty rul es o r li a bility rul es wi ll be supe ri or. " ); see also Kare n
Eggles to n e t a !. , Th e Design and !nrerprerariun of Contracts: Wh y Co111p lexiry lV/a rrers, 95
Nw. U. L. REV . 91 , 109 (2000) (definin g ·'a sy mm e tri c in fo rmation '" as a situation in whi c h
"'[o]n e party to a contract ... has m o re info rmation about future state s of the world th a n
doe s th e o ther party'" ); c(: William Samue lson. A Co mmenl on th e Coa se Theor em. in
G AME -T HEORETIC MODELS OF BARC J\ INING 32l. 33 1-35 (A lvin E. Roth e el., 1985) (a rg uing th a t if a n e ntitl em e nt is auc ti one d in a particular way be tween the pa rti es rath e r than
a ll oca te d thro ugh ba rga inin g, the pro bl e ms assoc ia te d with asy mme tri c information a nd
bargaining ca n be overcome, but ackn owledg ing that hi s propose d aucti ons may be im p rac ticable because they would req uire th e initial e ntitlem e nt ho ld e r to share th e proceeds) . See
generullv RICHARD A. POS NER. EC ONOM IC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56 (4th eel. 1992) ("A goo d
econ om ic a rgument for em in en t domain ... is that it is necessa ry to prevent monop o ly."').
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situ ation, th e ex ante pr ice is unknow a ble. transaction costs m ay become prohibitive , and the attempt to out-stratc gize the opponent may
foil th e project aitoget hcr. E min e nt domain provid es the solution by
permitting the government to ta ke th e parcel s of la nd in the vall e y a nd
then open them for us e by th e railroad.
T he problem of asymmetric information is particularly impo rtant
in this regard. Private e ntities may o ft e n ove rcome th e bilateral mo nopoly difficulty by using straw age nt s or the lik e to hid e their plan s. It
is far more difficult. iHl\Vevc r. for th e governmen t to hide its pl a ns.
Parcel own e rs possess kn ow k clge o f th e gove rnm e nt p lan s. whil e th e
government can o nly g u·-.:ss <ll th e owne rs· ·'tr ue' · se lling price . T hi s
lea ds th e pa rce l own e rs tu cng<1ge in strat egic be havi or and re ntse eking, a nd burden s th e o p po rtunil)-' to succe~;; s fully negot ia te a transactio n .
The power of e min e nt do m <tin prov id es a solution to th ese strat e gic barriers to effici e n t tra nsac ti o ns. On th e o ne ha nd , emine nt domain does not disturb th e prope rt y rul e protection granted in ordinary
circumstances. Howeve r. wh e re th ere is a public nee d that is likel y to
be foiled by stra tegic problems, th e government may exercise its
power of emin ent domain , trigge ring a change to liability rule protection , and a llowing the orderly transfer o f th e asset. The constitutional
Takings Clause prevents overutil izat ion of this power by limiting the
power of eminent domain to thos e cases where re ason a ble marke t
transaction s are unlik e ly. Ind ee d , th e requirement of just compensation makes th e exercise of eminent domain sufficie ntly costly that, in
many cases , th e government prefe rs to ne gotiate a transfer of th e asset
under ordinary property ru le prote ction, rather th an force a change to
the liability stage of the pliability rule. 212
While we classify takings as part of a thr ee -stage pliability rule , the
rul e co uld also be classified as a title shifting pliability rule with a
compensation requirement , or as a classic pliability rul e as welL 213 For
instance, due to the just compensa tio n requirement, to th e original asse t holder, the pliabi lity rule protection affo rd ed vis-a-vis takings appears to consist of prope rty rule protection followed by liability rule
protection.m In th e initial stage, th e asset holder enjoys ordinary
212. See Willi a m A. Fi sc he l. Th e !'u!iiica/ Econo111y of .lust Co111p ensilliun: Lessons .fi-0111
the Military Draji fo r the Takings Issue . 20 HAR V. J.L. & PUG. P OL.'Y 23. 40 (1996) (obse r ving that " [w]hen it becomes known tha t compen sation will be m ade ... th e go ve rnm e nt e ndures·· th e tran sact ion cos ts of mak in g se ttle ment (o r se ttl e m ent cos ts) . including th e cost of
ne gotiating with conde mn ecs . participating in an eminent domain tri a l (if negotiations fail).
·'the de a dw eight loss o f addition a l ta xe s to fin a nce the compe ns at ion and the negotiation s.
an d th e losses from moral ha zard on th e part o f pro pe rty owners who a nti cipate that com pe nsa tion wi ll be made '") (i nt e rn a l citati o n o mitt ed ).

2 13. Calabresi a nd M e lam ed co nside r e minent d o main a n e xample of '·mixe d pro tecti o n.' ' or. under our termin o logy. a sim ult a neou s pliability rul e. Ca labresi & Mel a m e d. supra
note 5, at 1093. For th e ren sons di scussed in the text. we prefer a diffe rent c ha ra c teri zation.
214. Se e Me rrill. supra no te 208. at 64 ("'[r] n the e min e nt domain a rea . which so o ft e n
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property rule protecti on . W he n the governm ent rnak es a d ecision to
exerc ise its power of emin ent domain. the asset- ho lder's pro tection e~ 
scnt ially becomes one of liability rult: prot ection in which the asset ho lckr cannot prevent others from impingin g upon he r exclusive en jo yme nt of the asse t, but she does h<we the r ig ht to rea sonable compen ::;atio n for such impa irm e nts of her rights in the asse t. In thi s sense,
t he tak ings re gi m e can b e see n as a ch;sic pliab ilit y rule. t h ough t he
act that trigge rs th e shift be twee n th e t\vo st<lges o f th e p li abil ity rule
nrotec tion- an exerc ise of e min e n t ck:m ai n -- e nd ows t he ne w C1SSet
lwl cler \\itb prope rty rul e protecti o r1 nithe r than m e rely liability rule
p rot ec tio n. Alternatively, in lig ht ot th e t~;ct th'1t the subse quent ·~ntitlt:: ment holder enjoys prope rty ruk
:lcct ion lik e the origine1l entitlement holder, the law of takin gs c1n
s:1i ci to crcat,.:: a title shiftin g
pli ab ility rule.
We prefe r the ch aracterization of " Ihrcc -sta ge rule in order to
hi ghlight how the pliability rul e em bodied in eminent doma in overcomes th e " reciprocal tak ings·' difficult y enge ndere d b y lia bility rule
protectio n of objects subject to possesso ry disp utes . As we note d earlier ,215 Sh::lVe ll and Kaplow fa vored property rul es to resolve possessory disputes, lest each ta king of an object protected by a liability rul e
e nge nder a reciprocal taking, leading to an e ndl ess cycle of takings
a nd retakings of the object. The pliability rule e mployed in eminent
clomC1in resolves this difficulty by limiting use of the li ability rule protection to a single taking. O nce the obj e ct is tak e n (in the second stage
of th e pliability rule) , property protection is restored. albeit in the
ha nds of a presumed highe r-value use r. 21 r'
l

para ll e ls private law doctrine, co urt s have effectively dec lared that li a bility rules alone shall
prot ec t all private proper ty rights. " ) (int e rnal citation omitted) .
2 15. See supm notes 56-58 and acco mpanying text.
216. A pliability analys is thu s has a n important imp li ca ti o n fo r th e debate betwee n
Kap lo w/Shavell and Ayre s/Balkin , de scribed supra in note 58 . Ayres a nd Balkin reso lved th e
reciproca l ta king difficulty by noting the possibili ty of an a uc ti o n regim e . This can be desc ribed in o ne of two ways in a pliability ana lys is. On e de sc ripti o n wou ld see the Ayres and
Balkin solution as prese rvin g a sin gle type of rule protectio n - liab ility rule protection but requiring that the price paid for the taking be altered in ea ch round in order to retle ct a
ne w value. On this view. Ayre s and Balkin did not sugges t a p li ab ili ty rul e and did not recog ni ze that reciprocal takings could be a rrested by iimiting app li catio n of a liability rule.
A second description - and probably the one that would be favored by Ayre s and
Balkin - would view th e sugge sted auction as a kind o f protection di st inct from o rdin a ry
prope rty an d liability rules. U nde r t hi s descrip tion. Ayre s and Balk in we re s ugges tin g a pli·
a bility rule in which th e takin g of an obj ect in a posse sso ry di spute wou ld trigge r a change in
rul e pro te c ti o n from li a bility to a uc tion. Viewed in thi s lig ht. A yres and Balkin 's s uggest io n
is m e re ly o ne of seve ral way s to reso lve th e reciproca l ta ki ngs pro bl e m by me ans of a
pliab ilit v rul e. Inde ed, any rul e th a t limi ted the iia b il itv rul e s tage of th e pliability rul e wo ul d
fo il infinite reciproca l ta kings.
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E!emems of Plioh i!iry R ules

So far, we have de m onstrat ed the perva siveness of plia bility rul e s
in o ur lega l sys te m. Before turnin g to th e normative case fo r pliability
rules, we summarize so m e sa li ent features of pliability rules pre se nt e d
thu s far.
P li ability rule s invo lve ~ll least three e le m•.:nts: a firs t s tage rule (e ith er prope rty o r liabiiity). a tri gge rin g e vent causing a s hift between
st ages, a nd a seco nd s tage ru le . Fo r simpl icity' s sa ke, we have fo c used
on two- s tag e pliability ru ks . a ltho ugh, <lS \Ve d emonstrate d wi th the
ca se of em inen t dom a in. th e re is no th eo retical limitation to the num b e r of stages in a pliubi!ity rule. l\dditi cmally. a s we have noted, th e
st ag es of the p liabili ty rule need not necessarily b e chrono logica lly se q uen ti al. Sometimes, as in the cnse of fa ir use, for exa m p le , the stages
may coincide chronologically. N e verth e less, in all cases, a triggerin g
eve nt or fac t is necessa ry to s hift protection from o ne stage to ano ther.
For exa mple, in the case of fair use, cop yright is b es t seen a s prote cte d
in the firs t stage b y a property rule , and in th e next stage by a ze ro order liability rule, wh e re th e trigge r is a typ e of use that qualifies as a
'' fa ir use."
One of th e important inno va tions of a pliability analysis th e refore
lies in a study of triggerin g mech a nisms. On either side of the trigger,
th e protec tion is either by m eans o f a li ability rul e or a prope rty rul e,
b oth of which have been the subject of a rich and illuminating scholar ly colloquy. However, as plia bi lity r ul es have no t bee n previousl y
ide ntified, th ere has been no pre vious discu ssion of triggering e vents.
As we have see n , triggering m e ch an isms can be based in the passage
of time , changed circumstances , m agnit ude or nature of use , or a combination of any of th e three .
Time-centered triggers specify a preset period of protection in
stage one at the end of which a differe nt type of pro tect ion begins.
The zero order pliability protection use d in patent and copyright law
employs a time -cente red trigger.
Triggers b ase d o n chan ged circumstances are , naturally, less easily
e ncapsulated. Thus far, among the changed circumstances that we
have see n used as triggers are market powe r , care lessn e ss , a nd the
emergence of a highe r value use . Excessive marke t powe r serves as a
trigger both in the genericism d oc trin e in trad emark law and in the esse ntial facilities doctrine in th e law of a ntitr ust. Careless behavior on
the part of th e prop er ty owner is the tr iggering m ec hanism in th e case
of a dverse possessio n. Emergence of a high er value use is th e trigger
in t he case of emine nt d omain. C hanged circ umsta nce s may a lso be
combined with the time e le ment as de monstrated by th e case of adverse p ossessiOn.
Trigge rs based in the magnitude of th e use specify tha t the ordina ry protect io n offered by the base lin e rule are set asid e wit h regard s
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to ce rt a in low magnitude uses . Thus far, we have see n s uch a tr igger
employe d in copyright with re ga rd to fai r use .
lt is noteworthy that in some instances of pliability pro tection th e
initi a l entit lem e nt ho lde r contro ls the tri gge ring mechanism. whil e in
o th e rs she does not. Pure time -ce nte red triggers , ror e xample , are n ot
s ubje ct to th e control of th e e n titl eme n t hold e r. Pate nt holders , fo r instance . lack th e ab ili ty to alte r the twen ty yea r period th a t sign a ls the
shift fro m prop e rty to zero order liabilit y pro tec tion. Ot he r tri gge rs,
however , correlate the shift to th e beha vio r o f the initial e ntit lem e nt
ho lde r. In s uch cases, the use o f pliabilit y rules gives th e e ntitl e m e nt
ho ld e r <!11 ince nti ve to se lf-regu late or ~t c t in :lccorclance w ith socia ll y
cle sirctbl e sta ndard s. Fo r example, the ciuctrincs of esse ntial ra ei li ti es
and ge ne ricism ince ntivize e n tit leme nt hu!Jers not to acc umulate ex cess ive ma r ke t power lest the in itial pro pe rty rule pro tect ion be replaced with a liability rule . T he doctrine o l adve rse possessio n, on the
other ha nd, det e rs careless behavior on th e part of p rope rty owners by
subj ecti ng carel ess mvners to the risk of titl e loss .

IlL THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR P UABIU TY
Having explained and illustrate d th e e le ments of p li a bility rul es,
we now turn to th e normative case for using pliability rules. First, we
show that pliability rules achi eve different ai ms than property and
liability rule s, and we show when p liability rules sh o uld be use d. We
then turn to som e practical lessons to be dr awn fro m a p li ab ilit y a n a lysis. Here, we sh ow both how explicit recog nition of the ca tegory of
pliability rules sugges ts possibl e modifi catio ns of exist ing pliability
rul es an d how pliability rules ca n be use d in ne w a reas of the la w.
A.

When Pliabiliry Rules Sh ould Be Us ed

In this Section, we take up the task of id e ntifying those situations
m w hi ch pliable rules possess a relative adva ntage over their stat ic
cousms.
From a norm ative perspective, the importance of pliability rules
lies in that they significantly broaden th e range of lega l rul es avail ab le
to policy makers . We posit th at pliability rul es a re most advantageo us
und er the following conditions: (1) when po licymakers anticipate s ubstantially changed circumstances; (2) when com peting inte res ts must
be acco mmodated in a single rule; and (3) when n ecessa ry to transcend the inherent limitations of prop e rty and liability rules. In a ll
th ese cases, the use of a pliability rule facilitates plannin g by the en titleme nt ho ld er , as well as bargaining b e twee n the hold er an d pote nti al
acqUJrers.
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Chunged Circwns·tances

Th e utility of pliability rul es is most obvious in the case of changed
circumsta nces. Naturally, changed circumstances m ay necessitate a
change in th e initial mode of protection in order to adjus t th e legal
rule to the ch a nged reality. Pliability rules. du e to their !"lcxibility. arc
the id cJ I policy tool for this ta sk . Pliability rul es a llow po licym c1kers to
anticipate changed circumstances and incorporate th e m into a lega l
rule by identifying th e change as the trigger that s hifts prot ec tion
mod es . Many of the exa mple s or pliability rul es that we haw' c ited so
fC~r have bee n motiva ted primarily by changed circums tan ces. Fo r
c'\a mpl c, the esse ntial fac iliti es doctrine. as it s name s uggests. <tims to
identify those circumstances in which a property has become ·· cs::;e ntial'' to competitors , and to usc that change as th e trigger of a plia bi lit y
rule. Neither a uniform property rule protec tion nor li <tbi!ity ruk protc:ction is capabl e of accommodating th e challenge of c ha nge d circums tances. Uniform property rul e protection prese rves in perpetuity the
facility owner's right to exclude. As suc h, uniform prope rty rule protection is incapable of dealing with th e emergence of circumstances
that render such exclusion anticompetitive. Uniform li ab ility rule prote ction , on th e other ha nd. allows for no nconse ns ual uses, but docs so
at the cost of undermining the owner's incentive to deve lop h er prope rty. Whe n circumstances change. the re fore , e ither uniform rule implies so me efficiency loss. Pliability rules, by contrast, preserve the efficiency advantages of both rules. despite the change in the
circumstances.
Wh ere the changed circumstances are affected by th e behavior of
the original entitlement hold e r, pliability rules have an added advantage over the pure protection m odes . In such cases, plia bility rules ma y
be used to ince ntivize entitlement own e rs to avoid certain und esira bl e
circumstances. For example, in the case of antitrust law, pliability rule
protection encourages owners to avoid the anticompetitive behavior
that may lead to the dilution of their property rights. Similarly, th e
pliability rule of gen ericism in trademark law incentivizes own e rs of
strong marks to preserve compe tition in their fi el d of tr ade, and to distinguish their products from competing ones, les t they lose their prope rty rule protection altogether. The promotion of self-reg ulati on also
produces the added benefit of economi zi ng on regulatory and judicial
costs.

2.

Conf licting Interests

It is le ss easily seen how pliab ility rul es are beneficial in accommodatin g competing interes ts in a single rule since pliability rul es often
involve sequ e ntial , rath e r th a n simulta neo us, modes of protect ion .
Yet, on more careful examination, pliab ility rul es can prove a useful
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m~~chanism for balancing incompatible interests. For instance. pliability ruics may he us ed to incorporate competing concerns of efficiency
and justice. Consider patent protection. The time limitation on the
prop erty rule protection stage in patent l::nv finds grounding. at least in
part, in concerns of distributive justice. The legal monopoly granted by
patent protection. while incentivizing inventors ex ank. also subjects
th e public to supra-competitive pricing of new products. such as medicines. Distributively. then, the first stage of property rule protection
has the undesirable effect of denying the least well-off access to valuable. or even life sewing. commoclities. 217 Yet , the same legal monopoly
that leads to c:..:clus ion of the poor is also responsible fur the prcKiuction of the im<:ntion in lhc first place. Additionally. man y view an inventor's ciaim over her invention as a moral one. The usc of a timecentered zero order pliability rule balances these competing interests.

3.

Inherent Limitmions

Pliability protection in patent law also provides an example of the
use of pliability rules to overcome the inherent limitations in uniform
property rule or liability rule protection. In addition to being subject
to the tensions between concerns of efficiency, justice and fairness,
patent law also must cope with the inherent tensions of efficiency
within uniform property rule protection. By granting the absolute
power of exclusion, property rules allow owners to invest optimally in
their property. Property protection also provides the background
against which voluntary exchange takes place. However, property
rules may also create inefficiencies. Property rule protection of monopolies encourages underproduction, supra-competitive pricing and a
deadweight loss. Patent protection illustrates both these virtues and
vices. The ex ante anticipation of enjoying a property right is necessary to spur investment in research and development of new products.
H owever, it comes at the ex post cost of supra-competitive prices. Patent Jaw 's pliability rule protection mitigates the inefficient elements of
property rule protection without entirely sacrificing its beneficial as217. Distributive justice concerns are paramount in the work of philosopher John
Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14-15 (1971) (arguing that "social and
economic inequalities ... are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone.
and in particular for the least advantaged members of society"): Steve P. Calandrillo, Re-

sponsible Regulnrion: A Sensible Cost-Benejil, Risk Versus Risk Approach 10 Federol Heal!h
and Safetv Regulurion. 81 B.U. L REV. 957. 983 (2001) (describing the Rawlsian ·'veil of ignorance·· by asking '·[f one did not know what her position in society would be- i.e .. one
might be among the best otl or the absolutely worst off member- what kine! of a society
would she choose to construct and live in·)"). Calanclrillo also suggests that "[t]he implicit
presumption [in Rawlsianism] is that because people justifiably care about fairness and equity. and arc also risk averse. they would choose a society that maximizes the position of the
worst-otf member.·· and therefore "in the regulatory arena , Rawlsianisrn would ask how a
proposed policy affected the most disadvantaged person or group, and rwt whether overall
social we lfare increased in the aggregate ... /d.
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pects. The initi al property rule protection preserves the incentive to
inves t in rese arch: and th e subseq uent zero ord e r liabili ty rule stage
cab ins the distorting effects of monopolist ic pricin g.
Hav ing id e ntifi ed the three primary cases in w hich normat ive consid e rati ons point toward the adoption of pliability rules. we can now
suggest two sets of practical results of a pliability analysis. F irst, we
exa min e the ex ten t to which existing pli abi lit y rule s can be modifi ed to
be tter achieve the ir goa ls. Second , wc uncover s itu<~tions in which
p li ab ilit y ruks uught to be empl oyed , but have not bee n.

B.

Rn ·ising Erisring Pliohilitr Rules

In thi:-; Se ction. \VC ret urn to some of our earli er exam ples of ex ist ing plia bility ru les to de termine how their goa ls can be more e tli cie nt ly
a nd Llirly ctclva ncecl . Spec ifica lly, we dis cuss adverse possess ion. pa ten t
protection and gene ricism .
1.

Adverse Possession

To rev iew briefly , th e pliability rule of adverse possessio n institutes
property rule protection in both of the tw o stages of the r ule, with th e
shift trigge red by time and evidence of owner carelessn ess (such as exclusive , ope n. notorious a nd hostile possession by a trespasser). T he
p li a bilit y rule is designed to disco urage underutiliza ti o n of the propert y as we ll as reward ad verse possessors for bringing the prop erty
back into ac ti ve use.
Recogn izing that adverse possession embodies a p li ability rul e en a bles one to design alternative pliability rules that might better
achie ve th e doctrine 's aims. As currently structured , th e doctrin e of
adve rse possession is stark. If the adverse possessor satisfies all the
sta tutory elements, she may take title, free of charge, and with full
pro perty rule protection. However, if even one of the statutory elements is missing, even in part , the adverse possessor receives nothing.
F or example, where the statutory period is twenty years, an exclusive,
open , no torious and ho stile possession for ninet ee n yea rs and eleven
months e ntitles the adverse possessor to nothing.m A t its extreme ,
then, the doctrine of adve rse possession merely incentivizes the owner
to visit the property , and possibly take corrective action, every nineteen years or so. This res ult may strike some of us as neith er fair nor
efficient.
The rigidity of current adverse possession doctrine stems from the
fact th at it e mpl oys a two -stage , time-limited , title shifting pl iability

2 1il. It is poss ible that th e ad ve rse possessor mi ght have a c la im for damages in unju s t
e nric h ment. o r that the owne r mig ht ha ve a ciaim in tre spass. For th e sake o f the di sc uss io n.
we disre gard thc:sc poss ib ilities.
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rule. To introduce more flexibility into the doctrine, we note the possibility of adding several new stages to the pliability rule. This can be
done is various ways. Assume that, optimally, where state law does not
provide for an adequate recording system, property owners should inspect their property at least once every five years. Under this assumption, the legislature can revise the doctrine of adverse possession to
give no rights to adverse possessors in the first five years of their stay,
and thereafter to reduce the owner's rights vis-8-vis the adverse possessor's a certain percentage of the title. For example , the revised adverse possession rul e mC\y st z1te that the successful adverse possessor
gains twenty-rive percent ul the titl e every five years. The rule might
further provide that if the advc.:rse possession is interrupted alt e r a certain percentage Clf the title was acquired by the adverse possessor, she
will be entitled to purchase the remainder from the original owner. In
other words , after the first five years of possession, the adverse possessor would receive a call option on the land she possessed, with the exercise price depending on how much longer the adverse possession
continues. At the extreme, if the adverse possession continues successfully for twenty years, the exercise price would be zero.
Naturally, the legislature may also create a put option in the successful adverse possessor in the liability stage of the proposed pliability rule. This would mean that after five years, the adverse possessor
would not only acquire twenty-five percent of the title to the land but
also the right to sell this share back to the original owner. Under this
regime, at the conclusion of twenty years of adverse possession, the
adverse possessor would have the right to sell back the land to the
original owner at market price.
States unsympathetic to adverse possession, such as New Y ork,m
may also employ a classic pliability rule in this context, but design it in
a way that would make adverse possession less attractive. For example, New York can stipulate that the successful adverse possession
gains at the end of twenty years, not the title to the land possessed, but
rather a call option to buy the land at market valueY 0
Finally, it is also possible to adopt a still different classic pliability
rule that introduces an auction mechanism at the liability stage. Under
this variant, the adverse possessor receives no property interest whatsoever in the land possessed, but merely a right to receive a monetary
award for identifying the continuous underutilization by the original
owner. At the end of the statutory period, the title to the underutilized
land would be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with the proceeds

219. See. e.g., Joseph v. Whitcombe. 279 A.2d 122. 126 (2001) ("New York law has long
disfavored the acquisition of title by adverse possession.") (citations omitted).
220. Alternatively. the states more sympathetic to adverse possession could give the adverse possessor a put option, thereby requiring the owner to buy the land back at market
value.

I

October 20021

Pliabitiry Rules

71

divided between the original owner and the adverse possessor. The
advantage of this system is that it transfers the land to the highest
value user as determined by the auction.
2.

Pntents

As we explained, patent protection represents an example of a
zero order pliability rule. Critics of the patent system have long argued
that a superior way to encourage innovation would be to substitute a
system of compulsory licensing for the limited property rule protection
accorded to patentees. Under a system of compulsorv licensing , a
regulator would set the price for use ot new inventions, and the patentee would have no pmver to deviate from that price. Tel compensate
the patentee Cor the loss in revenues, the protection term could be
longer than that currently provided for by L:m.ccl If set correctly, the
compulsory license would adequately reward patentees for investing
in research and development without creating a social deadweight
loss. This proposed system of compulsory licenses represents a patent
system that is based on liability rule protection. Thus, to date , this central debate in patent law has proceeded in terms of pure property rule
versus pure liability rule arguments.
Our discussion of pliability rules introduces a third option that may
be superior to the competing ones. Specifically, we propose a classic
pliability rule that combines initial property rule protection and positive liability protection. Under the new rule , patentees would be accorded property rule protection for a certain period of time, and then
the invention would become subject to a compulsory license for another period. For example, Congress can enact a rule under which
patentees will enjoy property rule protection for ten years, and then
liability rule protection for another twenty years. During the latter period, the invention would be available for a price determined by the
PTO, or some arbitration tribunal.
Relative to the current patent system, the proposed pliability rule
would reduce the deadweight loss associated with patent protection by
cutting the exclusivity period in half; at the same time, the prolonged
liability rule period would preserve the incentive to engage in innovation. Relative to a pure system of compulsory licensing, the proposed
pliability rule diminishes the risk to which inventors are exposed. A
fundamental problem with compulsory licenses is that it is extremely
difficult to set the license rates accurately. The license rate, in order
not to undermine the incentive to innovate, must reflect not only the

221. See Pankaj Tandon. Oprimal Parenrs wirh Compulsory Licensing. 90 J. POL. ECON.
470 (1982) (contending that the optimal patent would have an indefinite life. for both process and product innovations , but even if the patent term is left at seventeen years, compulsory licensing may lead to substantial welfare improvements).
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expec ted profits o f th e pate ntee on the c urre nt innova ti o n. but ulsu
the expe nditure s incurred by th e patent ees in research projects that
fail ed to yie ld a patentable res ult. Given that there is n o mark et pri ce
for n ew invention s, it is very difficult to se t co mpulsory lice ns e ra tes
accura tel y. Grante d , the pli ab ility rule \Ve propose incor porates compu lso ry li ce nsin g in th e lia b ilit y rule stage. Howe ver. it ex poses p2tc nk es to a small e r ri sk of und e rcomp e nsa tio n by granting th em te n
vears of pro perty ru le protection.
The pro posed class ic pli ab ilit y rule has a n add itio nal advan tc:gc
cner i1.s p ure liab ili ty cousin . Ass um e th at th e liability rule cq ui v~:l ent
of o ur pro pose d pliabil ity ru le is fo rt y yea rs o r liabilit y rule protectio n.
In th·.:nry . the lon ge r protection per iod can m ake up lo r rh,; fa c t th a t
l''!knt ces recei ve no property rule protect io n. In pract ice. how ev;: r.
th e t~ddit i o nal te n ye ars ma y prove wor thl ess . This is so bcccws e n ewe r
a nd supe rior inve ntio ns ma y re nder exi stin g o nes va lue less . In add ition. d isco untin g or futur e va lues imposes an inhe re nt limitati o n on
ho w much patent protection m ay be ext e nd e d. In othe r wo rds. th e incentive effect o f th e ea rly yea rs of protectio n is much stro nge r than
that o f late years.
3.

Genericism

As we discusse d , the gc ne ricism doctrine in trade mark law is
predicated on a ze ro order pliability rul e . If cons um e rs identi fy a
dominan t mark not wit h a partic ular company, but rath e r wit h th e u nch::rlying product. the prope rty rule protection of the mark holder
lapses and the mark falls int o the public domain. That is, o nce a rnark
is pronounced ge ne ric, competito rs of th e mark hold er can use it free
o f charge .
We suggest th a t a classic pliability rul e can improve upon existing
gen ericism doctrin e. Specifica lly, Congress could repl ace the curre nt
rule wi th o ne th at grants compe titors th e ri ght to us e dominant m ark s
in exchan ge for payment. 222 The PTO could then dev ise a m e nu of
prices for the use of dominant marks, with the amount to b e paid d e pending on the dominance of the mark: the more dominant th e m a rk ,
the smaller the payment. Alternatively, once a mark becomes dominant , C ongress could require the mark's owne r to pay its compe tito rs
to reta in the ri ght to den y th e m access to the mark. E ithe r way, the
use of a classic p li abilit y rule with a menu of prices would result in a
more refine d regime than that currently in place. S uch a refined sys tem wo uld better e nhance competition, and is potentia ll y fairer to a ll
th e part ies in volve d.
222 . T he dominan ce of th e mark ma y be measured hv th e mark own er's m <1rket sha re in
th,_: re lcl'ant p roduc t o1· se rvice mark et. A lterna tivel y. th e: do minance o f the mark ma v be a
fun ction o f the streng th of cons um e rs· assoc iation of the mark with its associated produ ct (as
opposed to tht: ir associati o n o f the mark with th e product's manufacture r).
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C.

fnrro ducin g N nv Pliability Rules

Pliability rul es need n o t be limited to th e circumst ances in which
they ar e alread y curre ntly e mployed. In this Section, we discuss tvvo
instances of field s of lmv th a t co uld bene fit from the intro duction of
pliability rules. O ur fi rs t exa mp le grappl es wi th the probl em of t he
anti-co mmons - t he pro ble m of the di visio n of prope rt y int o too small units. Our ot her examp k g•:: ne ralizes th e anti-co mmons anal ys is
and exa mines the possibilit y uf ex porti ng so me of th e princi p ie:; of
emin e nt do m ain into th e pr ivate ~ec t o r- in o ther wo rds, th e creation
o f a private takin gs pmve r.
1.

;Lui-Comm ons

Th e fa mili ar co mm o ns pro ble m dea ls with too m any owners m
commo n of a sin gle resource. !n his "Tragedy of the C ommo ns,'" 22 ;
Garrett H ardin pos ite d tha t uve rexploit a ti o n of the resource wo ul d
result. H ardin illustra ted th e phe no menon with the example of a rural
pasture commonl y ow ned by a co mmunit y o f shepherds. H e p os ited
that th e she pherds would all ow th e ir he rds to overgraze the pas ture
since each shepherd only be a rs a small fr action of the marginal cos t o f
each use while e njoying the fuli marginal benefit. The result is th e
tragedy of the co mmons: prop erty held in common will be over ex ploited. m Hardin's o ft-cite d co nclusion was that freedom in a co mmons " bring[s] o n universal ruin.· ·~ 1 " Th e traditional solution to com mons problems is privatization. leading on e owner to internali ze th e
full m arginal cost of each use .
l'viichael Hell er note d that a converse pro blem- which he labele d
the anti-commons pro ble m - co uld result if the resource were divid ed
into too-small pieces of property, each owned by different own e r s. c :~>
In an anti-commons , property interests in a certain asse t are dispersed
among multiple h o ld ers , each of whom has an effective ve to over an y
given use of the property. Because each property owner has veto
powe r over all compe ting uses, individual o wn ers can be have stra tegi-

223. Ga rret Hardi n. The Tragedy of rlre Com m ons . 162 SCIEN CE 1243 (1Y68).
224. Bw see Caro l M. Rose . The Com edv of rhe Com muns: Cus1om , Colllm erce. and lnlr erently Public Propenv. 53 U. C HI. L. R EV. 7 11.723 (l<J8G) [he reinaft e r Rose . Comr:d_1 of
rlr e Co mmons] ("" [C]ustonw ry doc trines sugges t that co mme rce might be thought a 'comedy
of th e comm ons· not onl y because it may infinitely expand our weal th. but al so. at k as t in
part. beca use it has bee n th ought to enhance the soci ab ilit y of the me mbe rs of an oth erwise
atomi zed society"') .
225. Hardin. supra note 223 . ;n 12-li). H;1 vi ng sai d th a t ·· [f]reedom to breed will bri ng
ruin to all"" Hardin goes on to propose that ··[t] hc o nl y way we e m preserve and nur tu re
oth er and mo re pre cious freedo ms is by n' li nq uishing the ft·ee dom to bret:cl ." !d.

22() . Mi chael A. He ile r. Tire Trugr: dv of rlz e An1icomm ons: Prop erly in rile Trun sirirm
.fi"om i\1/urx 10 Mw!ws. 111 l·l."'. RV. L. REV. 62 ! ( 1998) .
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cally with respect to their prope rty or may fa il to cooperate with o ther
us e rs clue to hi gh transaction cos ts. H ell e r ha s o bse rved that, clu e to
thi s c haracteristic of prope rty rule pro tec tion. asse ts in an anticomm o ns common s regim e wi ll fall prey to uncle rutili za tion."27 The
so lu tior; to an anti-commons diffic ulty is th us aggrega ti o n of pro pe rty
ri gh ts into fewe r ha nd s.
One of the most promine nt ex amples of an anti-commons is provided by the lan d regi me in Native Am e ri c~ 111 res e rvations. In a wellinte ntioned but misg uid ed a ttempt to rrotcct co mmunal Native
America n la nds in th e late nin e teenth cen tu ry . Co ngress provid ed for
th e a ll ocation o f rese rva ti o n lands among N<t ti vc A m e rican ho use ho lds. vvit h provisos se verel y limi ting ali e na! in~ of th e parcels. "2" Ove r
th e years. as the lands became ever mo re d ivided a m o ng he irs, the
parcels became increas in gly frac tionated . to th e point w here some
la nd inte rests produced a lease incom e u[ as littl e as one cent per
month. and much of the land lay fallow. In L983. Congress passed the
Ind ia n La nd Conso lidation Act, which esc heated small portion s of
highly fractionated pa rcels to th e tribe upon d ea th of the owner. Howeve r, in Hodel v. lrving,229 th e Supreme Co urt rule d that the escheat
worke d an unconstitutional uncompen sa ted takin g. A s a result many
Native American lands rem a in in an anti-co mmons.
A similar problem arises with resp ect to many other properties
typical ly passed o n to heirs as owners in common. After several cycles
of intes tate succession , the prope rty is lik e ly to have numerous owners
who have little comm unicat ion with one a nother and divergent inte rests. Indeed, citing Rob ert Brown ·s a na lysis, H eller an d H a noch
Daga n recently suggested th a t such an anti-co mmons regime was responsib le for th e underutiliza tion of African American-owned rural
land , a nd , ultim ate ly, th e diss ipation of Afr ican -Am e rican participation in the agricultural economy Y 0
A pliability analysis introd uces additional tool s to resolve anticommons difficulties. A properly tailored pliab ility rule could avoid
anti-commons problems by altering protection from property rules to
liability rules whe n the value of the prope rt y interest b ecomes suffi-

227. !d. a t 624. 626 (noting th at " [wjhen th e re a rc too many ow ne rs holdin g ri ghts of
exclusion. th e reso urce is prone to und e ru se - a rragedy ofrhc amico mm ons .. and proposin g
tha t '·[p ]ri va tizing a co mmon s and bundling a n antico mm o ns ca n solve th e tra ge di es of mi suse by better ali gning indi vidual incen ti ves with socia l we lfa re ''). H e lle r does note th a t an
anti -com mons regim e is idea l where no nu se is th e mo st hi ghl y valu ed " use" o[ the proper ty.

22::::. See Gener a l A ll o tment A ct of 1887. ch. 11 9. 24 Sta t. 388: see also Act of M a r. 2,
1889. ch. 405. 25 Stat. 888 (a uthori zing the division o f th e Great Reservat ion of th e Sioux
Nat io n into separa te rese rvations a nd th e a ll otme nt of speci fi c tracts of rese r va tion la nd to
indi vidu a l Jndians. conditio ne d on the co nse nt of three -fo urth s of th e adult mal e Sioux).
229. 4B1 U.S. 704 (1987) : see also You pee v. Babb itt. 519 U .S. 234 (1997) .
230. See Han och Dagan & Mich ae l A. Heller , Th e Uherol Commons. 110 Y ALE L.J .
549.551 & n.3 (2001).
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ciently small. For exa m p le . in th e Indian L an d Consolidation Act, instead of providin g for a n uncompensated eschea t, Congress could
have changed th e nature of the interests in Nat ive A merican Lands
into a pliability rule in w hi ch own ers enjoye d property rule protection
o nly as long as th e va lu e of the interest was suffici e ntly large , or th e
numbe r of owners in an undiv ided whole s uff icie n tly small. E the
va lue or number of ovv ne rs crossed a specified thres ho ld , howe ve r. th e
own er would e nj oy on ly liabil ity rule p rotection in he r land vis-a-v is
othe r tr iba l membe rs o r vis-): -vis the tri be . If, in th e hands of the ne\v
ow n e r, the aggregate of land int e res ts we re to heco me suffi c iently
va lu a ble or were aga in conc,.:nt rate cl in a su fiic ie ntly small numb e r o f
hands , the interest could o nce more '.:njoy property rul e protection.
More generally. th e usc o f <t pliability rule co uld help res o lve th,:;
diffic ulties proclucccl by success ive intestate successions and th e res ulting multiplicit y of un coord inated he irs. In s uch cases , policym akcrs
co uld adop t a m echa ni sm of inte r- gro up p li ability prot ection , a llowing.
for example, h eirs of intes tate succession holding a too -sma ll perce ntage to be subject to lia bility protection for the ir small holdings. Such
liability protection , howeve r, wo uld only app ly vis-a-vis other he irs.
W ith regards to non-h e irs, th e owners would e nj oy full property rule
protection. To th e extent th at anti-commons problems were responsible for the decline of Africa n-American farm in g communities, a
pliability regime could ha ve been a valu able tool in helping to preserve minority rural la nd ow ne rship.
Inter-group pliability regimes wo uld e njo y two significant advantages over the Congressional schemes of th e last two decades. First,
since the transition to pliability rules would still e nta il full compe nsa tion for takings , it wo ul d no t fa ll a foul of the Takings Clause. Second ,
because different potenti a l owners could compete for the land until it
arrived in hands with suffi cie nt other land holdings, without the necessity for potentially costly negotiation, the pliability regime would provide a more efficie nt m a rk e t mechanism for aggregating the property
holdings. 231
2.

Emin ent Domain and Pri va(e Takin gs

Pliability rule protection as a solution for anti -commons uncleru tilization can be seen as pa rt of a broad er catego ry of pliability rul e
applications in th e realm of private takings. A taking, in a pliabili ty
a n alysis, transforms property rule into liability rule protection, and
23 1. Given th e immovabi lit y o f th e Ja nel holdin gs, th e leg isla ti o n wo uld have to provid e:
a mec ha nism by which perso ns could se ize the la nd subj e ct to th e li ab ility protecti o n pha se
o f the pli a bility rule. O ne possib ilit y wo uld be by se rving no tice upon a court and the pe rso n
fro m who m the land is be ing se ized . In cases of m ult ip le m in o r ho lde rs tryi ng to se ize the
sa me prope rty. or cyclica l tak in gs a nd re ta kin gs of th e sam e prope rt y. th e co urt co uld ini tia te
a closed a uc ti on.
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th e n back into prope rty rule protection in new hands - thos e of th e
government. Howe ve r , a public taking is no t in ev itabl e . Condemnati o n could pave the way for the interes t ending up in priva te h a nds in
th e third . prope rty rule phase of th e p liabili ty ru le. This would be a
private, rather than public taking.
No twithst a nding the constitutional requir~.::ment th at the go vernment e\ e rcis c its power of e min e nt d oma in for a ··pu bli c use:-:~' 2 ofte n.
the takin g resu lts in the transfer an object lrom unc se t of private
hands to a noth e r. For e xampl e, in th e fa n11ws case of Po!erm vn
Neiglih orlzood Coun cil v. Ciry ofDerroir. 2'; the city o f Detroit se ized a
number o f rrivate lo ts in order to trans fe r th e m Lu Genera l Motors for
building <1 ne w fac tory . Vi s-a-vis the government. ever)' origin a l owner
of a private lot in Poletown e njoyed thc pliab ility rule protect io n
sh aped by th e law of eminent domain. Thi s p liabilit y rule protec ti o n
was not a ltered by the fact that the ultimat e destination of th e property was<:. different se t of private hands. Ind e ed. im ag in e that Ge ne ra l
Motors co uld itself trigger the process for a taking by eminent domain
by petitioning for city council approva l for a private taking. In s uch a
case, th e original owner would e njoy the same pliability rul e protecti o n as in th e case of a public takin g, so lo ng as the pliability rul e's
trigger for altering rule protection remained the same.
Whil e priva te takings might produce th e same incentive effe cts on
th e original owners as public takings, private takin gs offe r two potenti a lly significant advantages . First, by e limin a tin g an unnecessary acto r, private takings reduce surplus burea ucracy and decr ease the cost
of coordination. If the Poletown case h ad invol ve d a private taking,
General Motors could proceed on its own o nce it had received approval to exercise a private taking . In stead of coo rd inatin g with a government agency to undertake the project, General Motors could ncgotiate and inte ract directly with th e land owne rs in Pole town.
Importantly, as in the case of the public taking, owners dissatisfie d
with th e ir compensation could see k judici <1l re view. Thus, the lack of
direct involvement of a government agency would no t alter the rights
available to the lane! owners.
Second, private ta kings lead the parties to a more accurate accounting of th e costs of their actions , leading to fewe r inefficie nt takings. Were Pole town a private takings case , Gen e ral Motors would
pay th e require d just compensation directly to th e land owne rs, requirin g it to internalize the full cost of the tak ing. By contrast , in th e
context of a public taking, the P o letown case permits General Mo tors
to und erestim a te th e cost of th e takin gs while possibly requiring th e

23 2. Bur see supm not e 208 .
233. 304N .W.2d 455(Mich. l98 1)
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government to overestimate the cost.''! Indeed. the takings compensation costs for the Poletown project greatly exceeded original estimates,
leading to a depletion of public funds of in excess of $200 million.= 35
Private takings could be widely permitted. given the ubiquity of
the strategic problems justifying public takings.=''' The strategic problems afflicting government acquisitions can be seen in such private
contexts as railroad ancl utilit: l<md purchases. lncl e ccl. it is for precisely this reason that private t:tkings were cl wid e ly used tool in the
nineteenth century for railroa(L. =;'
An important caveat must be ~tdcled here. So long as the trigger
c:mployecJ by the pliability rul>.:: ie ll1<lii1S the ~ame. the nature of the
p liability r u le protection depend-; I1{)l at all on the actor who ends up
with the final entitlement. Thus. a pliability analysis demonstr<lles
that, in one sense, private takings are no less defensible than public
takings. However, when the pliability rule ·s trigger depends on the
discretion of a particular party. the identity of the party exercising that
discretion naturally affects the incentive effects of the pliability rule.
In our example of a private taking in the Poletovvn case, we vested discretion in the same actor as the real Poletown case did - the city
council. Thus, we did not have to take account of the altered incentive
effectsY 8
CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have developed the concept of pliability rules
and demonstrated its centrality to a full understanding of the entitlement theory sparked by Calebresi and Melamed's classic article. We
have also shown the pervasiveness of pliability rules in existing legal
structures, and demonstrated how pliability analysis can transform
property and intellectual property law.
Any study of a subject requires an understanding of its animating
principles. The law is no exception. In light of the widespread use of

234. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky. Gi ving.,·. 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001);
Merrill. supru note 20i-:.
235. Editorial, Proleclllze Tuxpavers. DETROIT NEWS. Oct. 19. 1999 at AlO; Tina Lam,
Dispule Could Cause Price u( Land f!;r Swdium' 1o Rise. DE.f ROIT FREE PRESS. May 17.
1999. at lB.
236. See. e.g .. EPSTEIN, supm note 101. at 169-l:-\l (arguing in favor of private takings
for public usc): Lawrence Berger. The Puhlic Usc Rcquircmenl in Eminenl Dolllain. 57 OR.
L REV. 203.236-37.243 (1978) (proposing that th e public us e requirement in private takings
-for e:-:ample. where landowners need to acquire access to their real property - should be
allowed only if fifty percent excess compensation is pa id).
237. Sec FischeL supra note 209. at 80-S9 (1995) (discussing historical evidence of private takings by railroads in the nineteenth century) .
23S. A fuller analysis of the ince:ntive effects created by discretionary triggering events
in pliability rules lies beyond the scope of this Article.
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pl iabilit y rules in our legal syste m. it behooves the academy to upd ate
its theories to fit a comp lex legal reality. Given the ability of pli abi lit y
rules to accornmodate diverge nt social concerns . it is not surprising
that they are already widely used, forcing the acZtclemy to plZly catch up. A ttention to pliab ility rules is thus necessary to a lign theory and
realit y. ?viorc ove r. such academic ana lysis of pliabili ty ru les can ge ne ra te sup e rior possibilities for decis ionmakers, as we illu strated in the
fin al Part o f this Article.
Our expositi o n has provided a taste of the possibiliti es created by
pli abil ity a na lysis . rat her than e xha usted th e m. The pr ism of pliability
highlights t rend s and fea tures of the law that a n .: no t eas ily seen oth erwise . Listing a ll the examples lies beyond the ken of this Artic le .
But. to illustrat e some possib le directions for futur e d isc ussion s. we
close by brieLl y touching upon a field of law that we ha ve not yet mention ed - bank rup tcy.
To be sure. the place of bankruptcy rights in C alcbres i a nd
Melamed's traditiona l fram ework is not easily determin ed , rend erin g
it somewha t difficult to define precisely the various stages of the
pliability rules crea ted by bankruptcy. 239 But there is littl e doubt that
the ba n krup tcy framewo rk follows the broad outlines o f pliability
rul es: o ne type of protection is altered by a trigger (the filing of th e petition) and replaced by anothe r type of protection. Bankruptcy law establishes that a certain event- the proper filing of a bankruptcy petition - alters the rights of all persons with regard to the p ropert y of
the debtor. A new set of rules applies to all the debtor 's and creditors '
entitlements while the petition is in bankruptcy court, and after the
proceed in g is complete d, the debtor is considered a new person, e ntitled to a "fresh start..,
However. the importance of bankruptcy for pliability a nalysis lies
not in its p roviding ye t another instance of the usc of pli abi lity rules in
legal practice; rath er, the example of bankruptcy points to the imp act
of pliability rul es on commercial practice, and the importance of understanding pliability rules as a category distinct from property o r
li abi lit y rules. Aware that a potential b a nkrupt cy will trigger a change
in protections, parties to comme rcial tr ansactions shape their ex an tc
expectations. The possibility that a bankruptcy petition will alter the
rights of owners and creditors has led to business practices such as
credit ratings, risk-based interest premiums and guara ntees. It has also
spawned such lega l fields as secured transactions, which seek to shape
the rights of parties in the post-petition state of th e debtor. All these
239. See S hu bha Gh os h. Th e i'vl orphing of Properly Rules and Liab ilitv Rules: 1\ n !m el·
lectua/ Prop er!v Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy . 8 fORDH AiVI I NTELL. PR O P.
MEDIA & E NT. L J. 99 (1997); see also David Frisch , Th e Implicit '" Takin gs " Jurispruden ce
of Arricle 9 of the Uni_l(mn Co twn ercial Co de, 64 F ORDHAM L R LV. ll (1 995) (examining
prope rt y rights in the conte xt of secured transactions); cf Merrill & Smit h. supra not e 94
(arg uin g against prope rty a nalys is of in personam rights).
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in stitutions ar e based upon th e parties· a ware ness that th e legal rights
th ey e njoy will not necessarily extend infinit e ly into th e futur e . Yet.
th e part ies also know th at if a b ankr uptcy petition trigge rs a
rearrangeme nt o f their ri ghts, they wi ll not fin d th e mselves in
unkn own territory. The pos t-pe tition rules of bankruptcy are re lative ly
clear a nd ca n be pl anned for.
Thus. bankruptcy provid es an importa nt guide on how th e legal
academy should use pliability a nalysis. In exa minin g any given kga i
enti tkme nt. we must reject th e te mptati on t() engage in a s tatic <m a lysis that freezes th e e ntitleme nt a t th e present time. In s tea d. we mus t
adopt <t dynamic pe rspective tha t incorp<m:tes th e chan ge that the en titlem e nt is clu e to undergo. Like th e commt:rci a l actors aw are of
bankruptcy. we too can proj ect change and create st ru c tures - like
secur ities and pl edges in the context of bankruptcy - that ta ke into
account the abi lity to c hange built into th e ri g hts created by l aw. 2 ~' 1
The thre e decades th a t have elapsed since C abbresi a nd
M e lamed 's landmark article have demonstrated its durability and use fuln ess. To retain its vitality, howeve r. Ca labrcsi and Melam ed 's
model must be adap ted to the d ynamism of legal rul es. Static prope rt y
a nd li ab ility rul es have become basic stap les of lega l research. It is
time for their dyn am ic cousins - pliability rules- to jo in them.

2-10. Before conclu ding. we no te that ou r Artick - lik e man y base d o n The Cmhedra/
- has focused o n prope rty a nd liab ility as the two ba sic building blocks identi fied by
Ca labres i a nd Me lamed. Ot he r combinations are. o f co urse, possible. Co nside r c hild labo r.
Until a ce rtain age. a child· s labor is ina li e na ble : afte r th at age . a pe rson may se ll her labor at
any ag ree d upon price, wi thin the bounds se t by lab or la ws. Thus. child labo r laws create a
typ e of '·pli a bility rul e" th a t involv es a transition from in a li e nability to pro perty ru le pro tecti o n .

